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It's hard to argue logic in a feeding frenzy ....
INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002,2 in which Congress
introduced a series of corporate governance initiatives into the federal
securities laws, is not just a considerable change in law, but also a departure
in the mode of regulation. The federal regime had until then consisted
primarily of disclosure requirements rather than substantive corporate
governance mandates, which were traditionally left to state corporate law.
Federal courts had, moreover, enforced such a view of the regime's
strictures, by characterizing efforts of the SEC to extend its domain into
substantive corporate governance as beyond its jurisdiction. SOX alters
this division of authority by providing explicit legislative directives for SEC
regulation of what was previously perceived as the states' exclusive
jurisdiction.
SOX was enacted in a flurry of congressional activity in the runup to
the midterm 2002 congressional elections after the spectacular failures of
the once highly regarded firms Enron and WorldCom. Those firms entered
bankruptcy proceedings in the wake of revelations of fraudulent accounting
practices and executives' self-dealing transactions. But many of the
substantive corporate governance provisions in SOX are not in fact
regulatory innovations devised by Congress to cope with deficiencies in the
business environment in which Enron and WorldCom failed. Rather, they
may more accurately be characterized as recycled ideas advocated for quite
some time by corporate governance entrepreneurs. In particular, the
independent-director requirement and the prohibition of accounting firms'
provision of consulting services to auditing clients had been advanced as
needed corporate law reforms long before Enron appeared on any
1. Jim Drinkard, Scandal Publicity Drives Accounting Bill Forward, USA TODAY, July 25,
2002, at 1OA (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Senator Phil Gramm).
2. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745 (to be codified in scattered
sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). Politicians heralded the Act as the most important financial market
legislation since the initiation of federal securities regulation in the 1930s. E.g., 148 CONG. REC.
S7356 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Corzine) (claiming that the legislation "may be
the most important step" taken since the enactment of the securities laws); Remarks on Signing
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1283, 1284 (July 30, 2002)
(calling the legislation the "most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the
time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt").
3. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (striking down an SEC action
to require one share, one vote through its stock exchange rulemaking authority).
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politician's agenda.4 That is not, of course, unique or surprising, because
congressional initiatives rarely are constructed from whole cloth; rather,
successful law reform in the national arena typically involves the
recombination of old elements that have been advanced in policy circles for
a number of years prior to adoption. 5
There is no rigorous theory of how policy proposals come to the
forefront of the legislative agenda, but the political science literature
identifies shifts in national mood and turnover of elected officials, coupled
with focusing events, as key determinants that open "policy windows" for
policy entrepreneurs to link their proposed solutions to a problem.6 At least
two of those three elements were without question present to create the
window of opportunity for advocates of the corporate governance
provisions included in SOX: As indicated in Table 1, in 2002 there was a
shift in public mood regarding big business, 7 coinciding with the high-
profile corporate scandals causing significant displacement and financial
distress, as well as a sharp decline in the stock market.
4. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's Director Independence Listing
Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370, 377-81 (2002) (comparing the post-SOX exchange rules that
expanded on the SOX audit committee mandate to the abortive ALl corporate governance project
of the 1980s). Efforts to separate auditing from consulting services were not new: Congress
considered the issue in the 1970s. See SUBCOMM. ON REPORTS, ACCOUNTING, & MGMT. OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., IMPROVING THE ACCOUNTABILITY
OF PUBLICLY OWNED CORPORATIONS AND THEIR AUDITORS (Comm. Print 1977). More recently,
under Arthur Levitt's term as chairman, the SEC vigorously pursued the issue in two rulemaking
processes in 1999 and 2000. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence
Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008 (Dec. 5, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-02, 240.14a-
101 (2004)); Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42,266, 64 Fed. Reg.
73,389 (Dec. 30, 1999) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228-29, 240 (2004)).
Exchange rules requiring independent audit committees were adopted in tandem with the 1999
rulemaking proceeding.
5. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 151, 192, 209-11
(1984).
6. Id. at 20-21, 170-72, 206-08.
7. As indicated in Table 1, the proportion of the public having either a great deal or quite a lot
of confidence in big business in 2002-200/--was the lowest percentage in more than a decade
and represented a substantial drop from the relatively high level of confidence-an average of
29%---over the prior five years, 1997 to 2001, as reported by the Gallup Organization. It is also
more than 10% lower than the average, 24%, over the period 1990 to 1996, and 20% below the
average of 26% for the decade 1990 to 2001. It is quite probable that the two variables, public
opinion toward business and stock prices, are integrally related-that is, when the stock market is
doing well the public's perception of business is positive, and when the market drops it is
negative, whether or not the change in price is related to corporate scandals. There is some
credence to this conjecture: The correlation between the S&P 500 Composite Index and the
percentage of the public expressing a great deal of confidence in business is significantly positive
(at less than 5%), ranging between 0.55 and 0.59, depending on whether the S&P is measured at
the end of the month preceding the poll, the end of the month in which the poll was taken, or the
average of the two months. S&P 500 data are available at S&P, http://www.standardandpoors.com
(last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1524 [Vol. 114: 1521
Quack Corporate Governance
TABLE 1. GALLUP PUBLIC OPINION
POLLS OF CONFIDENCE IN BIG BUSINESS, 1990-20038
Percent expressing
Poll Date Sample "great deal (quite a
size lot) of confidence" -
total of both categories
Gallup Aug. 1990 1241 9 (16) =25
Gallup Feb. 1991 1012 11 (15)=26
Gallup Oct. 1991 1009 7 (15) =22
Gallup Mar. 1993 1003 7 (16) = 23
Gallup/CNN/USA Today Mar. 1994 1036 9 (17) = 26
Gallup/CNN/USA Today Mar. 1995 1008 8 (13) = 21
Gallup/CNN/USA Today May 1996 1019 7 (17) 24
Gallup/CNN/USA Today July 1997 1004 11 (17) = 28
Gallup/CNN/USA Today June 1998 1003 11 (19) = 30
Gallup/CNN/USA Today July 1998 1035 13 (18) = 31
Gallup/CNN/USA Today June 1999 1016 11 (19) - 30
Gallup June 2000 1021 9 (20) -29
Gallup/CNN/USA Today June 2001 1011 10 (18) 28
Gallup/CNN/USA Today June 2002 1020 7 (13) = 20
Gallup/CNN/USA Today June 2003 1029 8 (14) = 22
There was no turnover of elected officials prior to the enactment of
SOX, the third element thought to be important in propelling proposals onto
the legislative agenda. However, it was widely perceived in the media that
members of Congress were motivated by reelection concerns when a statute
was hurriedly enacted in the summer prior to the midterm elections, after
months of languishing in committee, following heightened attention on
corporate malfeasance as the WoridCom scandal erupted post-Enron. 9 The
8. Poll data were obtained from the iPoll databank of The Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research at the University of Connecticut.
9. The House Committee on Financial Services held its first hearing on Enron in December
2001 and reported a bill, which was passed shortly after its introduction, in April 2002. The
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suggestion from the media was that the priority of members of Congress
was to enact something, with the specific content of less concern and
importance.'°
The failure of Enron, then, provided the occasion for implementation of
corporate governance initiatives that were already in the policy soup. What
is perhaps most striking is how successful policy entrepreneurs were in
opportunistically coupling their corporate governance proposals to Enron's
collapse, offering as ostensible remedies for future "Enrons" reforms that
had minimal or absolutely no relation to the source of that firm's demise.
The most opportunistic coupling in response to Enron's collapse was the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 200211 (a campaign finance reform
measure that had been stalled prior to the scandal), because Enron's
campaign contributions had nothing to do with Enron's financial collapse,
nor were there allegations to that effect.
This Article does not, however, analyze the peculiar disjuncture
between the substantive corporate governance provisions of SOX and the
source of Enron's failure. Rather, it evaluates SOX's substantive
governance provisions and the political dynamics that produced them from
the perspective of the substantial body of empirical accounting and finance
literature related to those provisions.1 2 The existence of a literature that
addresses the efficacy of some of the SOX mandates highlights an even
more troubling feature of the legislative process than the opportunistic
packaging of initiatives as preventatives for future Enrons when their
relationship to the problem at hand was, at best, attenuated. The gist of the
literature, that the proposed mandates would not be effective, was available
to legislators while they were formulating SOX. Yet it went unnoticed or
was ignored. With the scholarly literature at odds with the proposed
Senate did not act on the House bill until after the WorldCom bankruptcy filing in July 2002. For
an example of the media's perception that election concerns figured prominently in the
consideration of SOX, see David E. Sanger, Bush, on Wall St., Offers Tough Stance, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2002, at Al (reporting a speech by President Bush to Wall Street on his approach to the
corporate scandals and noting that the "Democrats have now seized on [the need for drastic
legislative change in response to the corporate scandals] as a crucial issue for the November
elections," while emphasizing how "partisan the battle has become").
10. E.g., Shailagh Murray & John D. McKinnon, Senate Passes Tough Fraud Bill in
Unanimous Vote, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2002, at Al. As one television reporter put it, "This was a
stampede .... The House Republicans dropped their opposition to this legislation because there
was simply too much pressure on them to pass something." World News Tonight (ABC television
broadcast, July 24, 2002) (reporting of Linda Douglass).
11. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(116 Stat.) 81 (to be codified in scattered sections of2 and 36 U.S.C.).
12. The fact that SOX codified ideas that had been circulating in policy circles over many
years has two salutary consequences for such an analysis: Research motivated by prior policy
debates bears on the SOX initiatives, and variations in firms' practices related to the SOX
initiatives permit cross-sectional analyses that shed light on the probable efficacy of the
legislation.
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governance mandates being treated as though it did not exist, the quality of
decisionmaking that went into the SOX legislative process was, to put it
mildly, less than optimal.
The substantive corporate governance mandates in SOX that are the
focus of this Article consist of the provisions that require independent audit
committees, restrict corporations' purchases of nonauditing services from
their auditors, prohibit corporate loans to officers, and require executive
certification of financial statements. 13 In contrast to provisions in SOX
entirely within the bounds of traditional federal securities regulation, such
as the direction for increased disclosure of off-balance-sheet transactions,
4
or outside the scope of issuer regulation, such as the creation of a new
public board to oversee auditors, 15 the substantive corporate governance
provisions overstep the traditional division between federal and state
jurisdiction, although they did not have to do so. They could have been
formulated as disclosure mandates.16 Had that been done, those provisions
13. One substantive corporate governance provision-the forfeiture of CEO and CFO bonus,
incentive, and equity compensation in the event of a material restatement of the company's
financials, see SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745, 778 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243)-is not discussed because, although much research exists on
executive compensation, it is not helpful for evaluating the efficacy of the provision. (The
research does not bear on the relation between the form of compensation and accounting
misconduct.) Studies with results tangentially related to the issue are Jap Efendi et al., Why Do
Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation, Corporate
Governance, and Other Factors (May 17, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=547922 (finding that CEOs of firms restating earnings had a higher
number of "in-the-money stock" options then managers of nonrestating firms); and Shane A.
Johnson et al., Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud (Apr. 16, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-395960 (finding that executives of firms
charged with accounting fraud had higher equity-based compensation than executives at matched
firms). There may well be unintended negative consequences of this initiative. During the debates
over SOX, for example, some members of Congress contended that the federal legislation limiting
the tax deduction for managerial compensation to one million dollars unless performance based
caused firms to increase managers' stock and option compensation, the increased use of which
was now being identified as the reason for the accounting misconduct by the managers of Enron
and other scandal-plagued firms. E.g., 148 CONG. REC. S6628 (daily ed. July 11, 2002) (statement
of Sen. Gramm). This scenario further indicates the extreme difficulty of regulating compensation
effectively: Firms will adapt their contracts, while the adaptations come at a cost (because the
previously unregulated contracts optimized the compensation mix). See infra note 47 and
accompanying text. The SOX forfeiture provision, for example, appears to have resulted in an
increase in fixed-salary compensation. See Daniel A. Cohen et al., The Sarbanes Oxley Act of
2002: Implications for Compensation Structure and Risk-Taking Incentives of CEOs (July 2004)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-568483. It is therefore altogether
possible that, as with the governance mandates discussed in this Article, the forfeiture provision
will not function as Congress anticipated.
14. SOX § 401(j), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 786 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(j)).
15. Id. § 101, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 750-53 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
16. The loan prohibition, for example, was adopted without discussion or debate on the
Senate floor in an amendment offered by Senators Charles Schumer and Dianne Feinstein. In both
the Senate and House bills, there was a loan provision in the traditional form of a disclosure
requirement. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of
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would have fallen within the conventional regulatory apparatus. Instead,
they were imposed as substantive mandates, a different and more costly
regulatory approach. Moreover, none of the fifty states nor the District of
Columbia, whose corporate laws governed the matters covered by the new
SOX provisions, mandated the practices that Congress did in SOX. It is
instructive that the SOX initiatives are not to be found in any state
corporation codes. The message of the empirical finance and accounting
literature is that this absence is not fortuitous, because the literature
suggests that the mandates will not provide much in the way of benefit to
investors.
The fact that the literature indicates that the corporate governance
provisions in SOX are ill conceived raises the puzzling question of why
Congress would enact legislation that in all likelihood will not fulfill its
objectives. Simply put, the corporate governance provisions were not a
focus of careful deliberation by Congress. SOX was emergency legislation,
enacted under conditions of limited legislative debate, during a media
frenzy involving several high-profile corporate fraud and insolvency
cases. 17 These occurred in conjunction with an economic downturn, what
appeared to be a free-falling stock market, and a looming election campaign
in which corporate scandals would be an issue. The healthy ventilation of
issues that occurs in the usual give-and-take negotiations over competing
policy positions, which works to improve the quality of decisionmaking,
did not occur in the case of SOX. That is because the collapse of Enron and
its auditor, Arthur Andersen, politically weakened key groups affected by
the legislation, the business community and the accounting profession.
Democratic legislators who crafted the legislation relied for policy guidance
on the expertise of trusted policy entrepreneurs, most of whom were closely
aligned with their political party. Insofar as those individuals were aware of
a literature at odds with their policy recommendations, they did not attempt
to square their views with it. Nor did legislators of either party follow up on
the handful of comments that hinted at the existence of studies inconsistent
with those recommendations. Republican legislators, who tended to be
more sympathetic to the regulatory concerns of accountants and the
2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 6(a)(2) (2002); 148 CONG. REC. S6689-90 (daily ed. July 12,
2002).
17. The media coverage appears to have had an impact on congressional deliberations. The
debates are replete with members of Congress referring to newspaper editorials and articles
criticizing congressional action or inaction, presumably as a means of rationalizing their positions.
See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S6692 (daily ed. July 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Craig) (referring to a
Wall Street Journal editorial); id. at H1547-48 (daily ed. April 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Jones
of Ohio) (referring to a Washington Post editorial). Senator Gramm, a reluctant supporter of the
legislation, referred to its high profile and noted that it was impossible "[i]n the environment" in
which Congress was operating to correct what he considered serious flaws in the legislation. Id. at
S7353 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
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business community, dropped their bill for the Democrats', determining
that it would be politically perilous to be perceived as obstructing the
legislative process and portrayed as being on the wrong side of the issue.
The central policy recommendation of this Article is that the corporate
governance provisions of SOX should be stripped of their mandatory force
and rendered optional for registrants. The findings of the empirical
literature are consistent with the view that the more efficacious corporate
and securities law regimes are the product of competitive legal systems,
which permit legal innovations to percolate from the bottom up by trial and
error, rather than being imposed from the top down by regulators or
corporate governance entrepreneurs, who are far removed from the day-to-
day operations of firms. 18 In that regard it is important to point out that the
bulk of the provisions of competitive corporate codes are enabling,
permitting firms to tailor their internal organization to their specific needs.
The best path to ameliorating the misguided congressional promulgation of
substantive governance mandates through SOX is to conform them to the
states' enabling approach to corporate law. A plausible mechanism to
reduce the probability of future policy blunders on the scale of SOX is to
routinize a requirement of periodic review for any legislation enacted in
emergencies or similar crisis-like circumstances.
I. EVALUATING THE SUBSTANTIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MANDATES IN SOX
A considerable body of corporate finance and accounting research bears
on the efficacy of the substantive corporate governance mandates of SOX.
This Part briefly reviews the relevant empirical literature, which indicates
that the data do not support the view that the SOX initiatives will improve
corporate governance or performance. 19
A. Independent Audit Committees
Section 301 of SOX requires all listed companies to have audit
committees composed entirely of independent directors, as defined by
Congress. 20 The rationale for the rule is that such directors can be expected
18. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR
SECURITIES REGULATION (2002).
19. A detailed analysis of the studies summarized in this Part can be found in ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND THE MAKING OF QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
12-102 (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 04-37, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=596 101.
20. SOX § 301, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 775-77 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m)). To qualify as independent, the director may not "accept any consulting, advisory or other
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to be effective monitors of management and thereby reduce the possibility
of audit failure, because their financial dependence on the firm is limited to
directors' fees (misstating earnings will not, for example, increase their
income as could be the case for insiders with bonus compensation related to
earnings). Congress also mandated disclosure of whether any of those
directors are "financial expert[s]," along with an explanation-for firms
with no expert on the audit committee-of why no committee members are
experts.2'
A large literature has developed on whether independent boards of
directors improve corporate performance. Across a variety of analytical
approaches, the learning of that literature is that independent boards do not
improve performance and that boards with too many outsiders may, in fact,
have a negative impact on performance.22 There are fewer studies of the
relation between audit committee composition and firm performance (four
in total).23 None of these studies have found any relation between audit
committee independence and performance, using a variety of performance
measures including both accounting and market measures as well as
measures of investment strategies and productivity of long-term assets.
While not as extensive as the literature on board composition and
performance, many more studies have examined the impact of the
independence of audit committees on the probability of financial statement
misconduct than on performance. Table 4 (in the Appendix) compiles the
compensatory fee from the issuer" nor be an "affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary." Id.
2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 776. State law had no such requirement, although it encouraged
the use of independent directors, while as of 1999 the stock exchanges required listing firms to
have completely independent audit committees. See Audit Committee Disclosure, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-42,266, 64 Fed. Reg. 73,389 (Dec. 30, 1999) (codified in scattered sections of 17
C.F.R. pts. 210, 228-29, 240 (2004)). For a review of the relation between the SOX provisions and
preexisting law, see ROMANO, supra note 19, at 14-16. In implementing the SOX audit committee
independence provisions, which require the delisting of any firm that does not comply with them,
the SEC eliminated exemptions contained in the pre-SOX listing standards. See Standards
Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release No. 33-8220, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-47,654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) (codified in scattered sections of
17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 240, 249, 274 (2004)).
21. SOX § 407, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 790 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265).
SOX's substantive corporate governance mandates in this context are expressed as directions to
the SEC to adopt rules rendering the governance provisions mandatory.
22. For literature reviews, see Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship
Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999); and Roberta
Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277 (1996).
23. Julie Cotter & Mark Silvester, Board and Monitoring Committee Independence, ABACUS,
June 2003, at 211, 228-29; April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41
J.L. & EcON. 275, 287-301 (1998); Nikos Vafeas & Elena Theodorou, The Relationship Between
Board Structure and Firm Performance in the UK, 30 BRIT. ACCT. REV. 383, 398 (1998); Charlie
Weir et al., Internal and External Governance Mechanisms: Their Impact on the Performance of
Large UKPublic Companies, 29 J. Bus. FIN. & AcCT. 579, 606 (2002).
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findings of studies on audit committee independence.2 4 The definition of
independence used by researchers is the same as that adopted by Congress
in SOX, which excludes individuals employed by or otherwise affiliated
with the issuer or a subsidiary or those receiving consulting or other
compensatory fees from the issuer (other than for director service). 25 The
measures of financial statement misstatements are abnormal accruals,
26
financial statement restatements and fraud, SEC actions, third-party or
contract fraud allegations, and stock market responses to unexpected
earnings ("earnings informativeness"). The question raised by this research,
from the perspective of the SOX mandate on audit committee composition,
is whether Congress has accurately matched a problem with a solution.
24. The studies are KIRSTEN L. ANDERSON ET AL., BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, AUDIT
COMMITTEES, AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF EARNINGS (Univ. of Del. John L. Weinberg
Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 2003-04, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=444241; Lawrence J. Abbott et al., The Effects of Audit Committee
Activity and Independence on Corporate Fraud, 26 MANAGERIAL FIN. 55 (2000); Mark S.
Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and
Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REv. 443 (1996); Mark S. Beasley et al., Fraudulent
Financial Reporting: Consideration of Indusny Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms,
14 ACCT. HORIZONS 441 (2000); Jean B~dard et al., The Effect of Audit Committee Expertise,
Independence, and Activity on Aggressive Earnings Management, AUDITING: J. PRAC. &
THEORY, Sept. 2004, at 13; Cotter & Silvester, supra note 23; April Klein, Audit Committee,
Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 375 (2002);
Klein, supra note 23; Dorothy A. McMullen & K. Raghunandan, Enhancing Audit Committee
Effectiveness, J. ACCT., Aug. 1996, at 79; Hatice Uzun et al., Board Composition and Corporate
Fraud, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May/June 2004, at 33; Vafeas & Theodorou, supra note 23; Weir et al.,
supra note 23; Biao Xie et al., Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: The Role of the
Board and the Audit Committee, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 295 (2003); Lawrence J. Abbott et al., Audit
Committee Characteristics and Financial Misstatement: A Study of the Efficacy of Certain Blue
Ribbon Committee Recommendations (Mar. 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=319125; Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and
Accounting Scandals (Sept. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract-595138; and Andrew J. Felo et al., Audit Committee Characteristics and the Perceived
Quality of Financial Reporting: An Empirical Analysis (Apr. 2003) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=401240.
25. SOX § 301, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 775-77 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m)(3)). To the extent that the statutory language does not cover relatives of officers, the studies'
definition is broader because they exclude relatives, following the SEC's definition of
independence in its proxy disclosure rules. See Schedule 14A, Item 7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101
(2004) (referencing items 401 and 404 of Regulation S-K, id. §§ 229.401, .404). All but five of
the studies use this definition. For details on the exceptions, see ROMANO, supra note 19, at 18
n.36.
26. Accruals are an accounting convention to recognize changes in value (revenues and
expenses) independent of when cash flows into and out of the firm. Accounting researchers have
developed econometric models to determine firms' expected accruals. The difference between the
model estimates and actual accruals, called abnormal accruals, is considered a proxy for earnings
management, a practice by which firms manipulate their reported accounting figures to smooth
out earnings across reporting years. Although earnings management is often consistent with
generally accepted accounting principles, the SEC considers it inappropriate. See, e.g., Arthur
Levitt, Remarks at the New York University Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt (remarks as then-
SEC chairman).
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Of the sixteen studies collected in Table 4, ten (including the four
studies of explicit performance measures already noted) do not find that
complete independence of the audit committee improves performance-a
finding equally consistent whether performance is measured conventionally
or by the existence of accounting improprieties-and one study reports
inconsistent results (under one model formulation, independence improves
performance, but not under all other models tested).27 The data are mixed
on whether even a committee with a majority of independent directors
improves performance, 28 but the issue for SOX is whether complete
independence improves on the effect of a majority-independent committee,
not the efficacy of a majority of independent directors.
A few studies find that having a director with financial expertise
improves performance and, more specifically, that complete independence
is less significant than expertise with respect to the relation between audit
committee composition and accounting statement quality. 29 These results
are notable in that SOX does not mandate the presence of a financial expert
on the audit committee (it has only a disclosure requirement regarding
financial expertise on the committee), while it does mandate completely
independent audit committees.
It should be noted that these studies, as with all regression analyses,
cannot demonstrate causality. For example, the finding of statistical
significance for director expertise in relation to financial statement
restatements can be considered evidence that directors with expertise are
effective monitors of accounting controls and audit quality-the rationale
for reforming corporate governance in this regard. But it is also possible
that firms that are better managed, and hence less likely to restate their
financial statements, choose to have independent directors with expertise.
That is, a finding of significance may be a function of self-selection and not
of the efficacy of the corporate governance mechanism. Accordingly, if
selection effects explain the study results, then that would strengthen the
case against the mandate.
30
27. In addition, three of the five studies reporting that completely independent committees
improve performance are unreliable and are not a source for valid inferences because of
methodological flaws. See ROMANO, supra note 19, at 32-34 (discussing the methodological flaws
in the 2000 Abbott et al., Beasley et al., and McMullen and Raghunandan studies).
28. Compare Klein, supra note 24 (finding that firms whose audit committees have at least a
majority of independent directors have significantly smaller abnormal accruals, although finding
no significant relation between abnormal accruals and completely independent committees), with
Xie et al., supra note 24 (finding no relation between proportion of independent directors and
accruals), and Agrawal & Chadha, supra note 24 (finding no relation between proportion of
independent directors and earnings restatements).
29. E.g., Agrawal & Chadha, supra note 24; Felo et al., supra note 24.
30. Some (but not all) studies seek to test whether the alternative self-selection interpretation
is correct. Agrawal and Chadha, for example, who find that expertise but not independence
improves accounting performance, test for causality by examining whether operating performance
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The compelling thrust of the literature on the composition of audit
committees, in short, does not support the proposition that requiring audit
committees to consist solely of independent directors will reduce the
probability of financial statement wrongdoing or otherwise improve
corporate performance. Not only is that the case for the overwhelming
majority of studies, but also, and more importantly, that is so for the studies
using the more sophisticated techniques. It should further be noted that,
using conventional confidence standards with properly specified statistical
tests, false positives-statistically significant results-can be expected five
percent of the time, even though there is no significant relation between
variables. Indeed, a commonly expressed concern regarding literature
reviews that is not applicable to these data is that significant results are
overstated because papers finding insignificant relations between the
variables of interest typically do not get published in academic journals (the
"'file drawer' problem" 31). In the audit committee literature, by contrast, the
finding of insignificance was considered important enough by journal
editors to merit publication, and it is easy enough to grasp that significant
results in a small number of papers could well be false positives, the
product of random error.
B. Provision of Nonaudit Services
Section 201 of SOX prohibits accounting firms from providing
specified nonaudit services to firms that they audit.32 The banned services
include financial information system design and implementation, appraisal
or valuation services, internal auditing services, investment banking
services, legal and expert services unrelated to the audit, brokerage
services, and actuarial services. Although this provision is included in
SOX's cluster of provisions directed at the accounting profession, it is, in
fact, a substantive corporate governance mandate. Congress is substituting
its judgment regarding what services a company can purchase from its
auditor for that of corporate boards or shareholders. The rationale for the
ban was that the receipt of high fees for nonaudit services compromises
auditor independence by providing auditors with a financial incentive to
varies across the firms restating their fmancials and the nonrestaters in their study. Agrawal &
Chadha, supra note 24. The reasoning of the test is that operating performance is a proxy for
management quality. Because Agrawal and Chadha find that operating performance is not
significantly related to the presence of a director with financial expertise, they conclude that the
causality in their data runs from expert director absence to restatement and not the reverse.
31. T.D. Stanley, Wheat from Chaff: Meta-Analysis as Quantitative Literature Review, J.
ECON. PERSP., Summer 2001, at 131, 146.
32. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745, 771-72 (to be
codified as section 10A(g) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(g)).
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permit managers to engage in questionable transactions or accounting
practices in the audit.
SOX's nonaudit services prohibition had a history: In 2000, the SEC
required registrants to disclose the amounts paid to auditors for audit- and
nonaudit-related services, and some nonaudit services were identified as
compromising the auditor's independence and therefore prohibited (because
the securities laws require issuers' financials to be certified by independent
auditors). 33 This outcome was the best that then-SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt could obtain after a multiyear effort in which he failed to generate
sufficient political support for a total ban on auditors' provision of nonaudit
services. A further factor in Levitt's settling for a more limited ban than he
originally sought was that the Clinton Administration was about to turn
over, and, as a consequence, his term as chairman would soon end (the
compromise was reached and the rule issued in November 2000). 3 4 The
compromise was not due to Levitt's being a political novice or being inept:
He skillfully used the media in the debate over the auditor independence
rule to undermine the private-sector entities he had established to study and
regulate auditor independence (the Independence Standards Board and the
Panel on Audit Effectiveness) when it became evident that they would not
recommend restricting nonauditing services.
35
Because the provision of nonaudit services by auditors had been subject
to persistent efforts at elimination by the SEC prior to SOX's prohibition,
33. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008,
76,011, 76,055-56, 76,084-85, 76,087 (Dec. 5, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-02, 240.14a-
101 (2004)). Two services that the SEC had proposed to ban but had been unable to include in the
final rule because of significant opposition (financial information system design and
implementation, internal audit outsourcing) were included in the SOX prohibition. Of the nine
services prohibited by the rule, seven were already restricted under SEC guidelines and under
professional rules of conduct promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA). As noted in ROMANO, supra note 19, at 41, state law does not restrict
firms' purchase of services from their auditors, but directors could be subject to liability ex post
for any such decision that proved wrongful under fiduciary standards.
34. See Sandra Sugawara, Accounting Firms, SEC Agree on Audit Rule, WASH. POST, Nov.
15, 2000, at E l (reporting a compromise reached over the "controversial" rule that Levitt "ha[d]
been pushing to get enacted before the end of the Clinton administration").
35. See Zoe-Vonna Palmrose & Ralph S. Saul, The Push for Auditor Independence,
REGULATION, Winter 2001, at 18, 22 (recounting, according to members of the Panel on Audit
Effectiveness, how Levitt and the SEC staff used the press to generate public support for their
position and to counter findings by the Panel and the Independence Standards Board that there
was a lack of evidence of a problem regarding nonaudit services). The Panel on Audit
Effectiveness (also referred to as the O'Malley Panel after its chairman, Shaun O'Malley) was
created by the Public Oversight Board, a self-regulatory organization of the accounting
profession, to review the audit process at the request of Levitt. He requested the Panel as part of
his effort to prohibit nonaudit services, at the same time that he requested the stock exchanges to
appoint a blue-ribbon committee to undertake a similar review. See, e.g., 1 Accounting Reform
and Investor Protection: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 107th Cong. 71 (2002) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (prepared statement of David S.
Ruder, SEC Chairman, 1987-1989).
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numerous studies have sought to gauge whether the provision of such
services by the external auditor compromises audit quality (the rationale
advanced for banning the practice). The variables most frequently used to
measure the importance of nonaudit services to the auditing firm are the fee
ratio (the ratio of nonaudit to total fees or to audit fees paid to the external
auditor) and total fees (the sum of nonaudit and audit fees paid to the
external auditor); others include fee measures that adjust the amounts by
client to construct a proxy for the client's importance to the auditor and
percentile ranks, by auditor, of a firm's nonaudit and audit fees.36 Higher
values of the various fee variables are considered to represent a
nonindependent auditor (that is, the potential for auditor compromise is
expected to depend directly on the fees received for nonaudit services).
Several variables are used to measure audit quality, including abnormal
accruals, measures of earnings conservatism,
37  earnings surprises, 38
financial statement restatements, and issuance of qualified audit opinions.
The findings of the studies on nonaudit services are collected in Table 5
(in the Appendix).39 The overwhelming majority of the studies (nineteen of
36. Because the SEC only recently began requiring disclosure of auditor fees, see Auditor
Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,008
(requiring disclosures in proxies filed after the rule's effective date of February 5, 2001), many of
the studies are relatively recent, and the data are limited (the earliest available data are
expenditures from fiscal year 2000). The SEC required information on auditing and nonauditing
fees to be disclosed from 1978 to 1982, and some other countries have required such disclosure
for many years. A few studies make use of those alternative data sources.
37. Conservatism refers to a longstanding accounting principle of accelerating expenses and
deferring revenues (attained in practice by requiring a higher level of verification for revenue
recognition), which results in lower profits than would otherwise be reported; hence reported
earnings are "conservative." The principle has been operationalized in empirical research by
measuring whether bad news is incorporated in financial reports (and hence in stock prices) more
rapidly than good news.
38. Earnings surprises refer to a firm's exactly meeting or narrowly beating analysts'
forecasted earnings and are considered to be evidence of earnings management.
39. The studies are RICK ANTLE ET AL., THE JOINT DETERMINATION OF AUDIT FEES, NON-
AUDIT FEES, AND ABNORMAL ACCRUALS (Yale Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. AC-15,
2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=318943; PELHAM GORE ET AL., NON-AUDIT
SERVICES, AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT (Lancaster Univ. Mgmt.
Sch., Working Paper No. 2001/014, 2001), available at http://www.lums.co.uk/publications/
viewpdf/000126; Hollis Ashbaugh et al., Do Nonaudit Services Compromise Auditor
Independence? Further Evidence, 78 ACCT. REV. 611 (2003); Hyeesoo Chung & Sanjay
Kallapur, Client Importance, Nonaudit Services, and Abnormal Accruals, 78 ACCT. REV. 931
(2003); Allen T. Craswell, Does the Provision of Non-Audit Services Impair Auditor
Independence?, 3 INT'L J. AUDITING 29 (1999); Allen Craswell et al., Auditor Independence and
Fee Dependence, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 253 (2002); Mark L. DeFond et al., Do Non-Audit Service
Fees Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from Going Concern Audit Opinions, 40 J. ACCT.
RES. 1247 (2002); Michael J. Ferguson et al., Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management: U.K.
Evidence, 21 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 813 (2004); Michael Firth, Auditor-Provided Consultancy
Services and Their Associations with Audit Fees and Audit Opinions, 29 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 661
(2002); Richard M. Frankel et al., The Relation Between Auditors' Fees for Nonaudit Services and
Earnings Management, 77 ACCT. REV. (SUPPLEMENT: QUALITY EARNINGS CONF.) 71 (2002);
William R. Kinney Jr. et al., Auditor Independence, Non-Audit Services, and Restatements: Was
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twenty-five) suggest that SOX's prohibition of the purchase of nonaudit
services from an auditor is an exercise in legislating away a nonproblem.
The majority (fifteen) find no connection between the provision of nonaudit
services and audit quality. One finds no connection when the auditors are
the Big Five (including Arthur Andersen) accounting firms (the firms of
concern to Congress in enacting SOX, because they audit nearly all large
public companies). And three find that nonaudit services improve audit
quality (and two of the fifteen that find no relation also find that audit
quality improves in at least one model specification), which directly
contradicts the rationale for the SOX prohibition.40
Of the remaining six studies, five find that audit quality is
compromised, while one finds that audit quality is compromised in only one
of several model specifications. However, the results of the initial and
leading study by Frankel et al., which found that audit quality (measured by
abnormal accruals) is compromised by the purchase of nonaudit services,
are not robust. 4 1 Numerous studies, summarized in Table 5, have redone the
analysis of Frankel et al., refining the model in a variety of ways. These
include, among others, controlling for factors known to affect the audit
the U.S. Government Right?, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 561 (2004); David F. Larcker & Scott A.
Richardson, Fees Paid to Audit Firms, Accrual Choices, and Corporate Governance, 42 J. ACCT.
RES. 625 (2004); Clive S. Lennox, Non-Audit Fees, Disclosure and Audit Quality, 8 EUR. ACCT.
REV. 239 (1999); Lynn M. Pringle & Thomas A. Buchman, An Examination of Independence in
Fact When Auditors Perform Nonaudit Services for Audit Clients, 6 ACCT. ENQUIRIES 91 (1996);
J. Kenneth Reynolds & Jere R. Francis, Does Size Matter? The Influence of Large Clients on
Office-Level Auditor Reporting Decisions, 30 J. ACCT. & ECON. 375 (2001); Divesh S. Sharma &
Jagdish Sidhu, Professionalism vs Commercialism: The Association Between Non-Audit Services
(NAS) and Audit Independence, 28 J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 595 (2001); Agrawal & Chadha, supra
note 24; Mukesh Bajaj et al., Auditor Compensation and Audit Failure: An Empirical Analysis
(Feb. 27, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-387902; Carol
Callaway Dee et al., Earnings Quality and Auditor Independence: An Examination Using Non-
Audit Fee Data (Jan. 28, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-304185; Jere R. Francis & Bin Ke, Do Fees Paid to Auditors Increase a
Company's Likelihood of Meeting Analysts' Earnings Forecasts? (May 21, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author); Nicole Thorne Jenkins, Auditor Independence, Audit Committee
Effectiveness, and Earnings Management (Jan. 31, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); Gopal V. Krishnan, Are Audit and Nonaudit Services Associated with the Delayed
Recognition of Bad News? (Mar. 27, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=457960; Vivian Li et al., Non-Audit Services and Auditor Independence:
New Zealand Evidence (Sept. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=452260; K. Raghunandan et al., Are Non-Audit Fees Associated with
Restated Financial Statements? Initial Empirical Evidence (Apr. 11, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=394844; and Caitlin Ruddock et al., Non-Audit
Services and Earnings Conservatism: Is Auditor Independence Impaired? (Apr. 2004)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-303343.
40. A theoretical example that could explain why audit quality might improve because of a
nonaudit service is a client who hires the auditor to install an inventory control system; if the
system is effective, those nonaudit fees would lead to lower abnormal accruals. See ANTLE ET AL.,
supra note 39, at 9.
41. Frankel et al., supra note 39.
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performance measure used in the original study and using auditor
independence measures that take account of the importance of the client to
the auditor. When the model is refined by any of those methods, the
original results do not hold up. As a consequence, valid policy inferences
cannot be drawn from the Frankel et al. study. This could also be true for
the other studies finding a significant inverse relation between nonaudit fees
and audit quality. Less prominent than the Frankel et al. study but using the
same methodology, those studies have not been the objects of further
research.42
The conclusion that audit quality-and hence auditor independence-is
not jeopardized by the provision of nonaudit services is compelling not only
because it is the finding of the vast majority of studies but also because it is
the result of the studies using the most sophisticated techniques, as well as
those whose findings are most robust to alternative model specifications.
The absence of a systematic inverse relation between nonaudit fees and
audit quality (across all measures of audit quality) in the scholarly literature
is consistent with the Panel on Audit Effectiveness's failure to identify a
single instance of a compromised audit by auditors providing nonaudit
services in its field study of auditor independence.43 That finding no doubt
contributed to the Panel's decision, as well as to that of the Independence
Standards Board, not to recommend banning the provision of nonaudit
services and to opt instead for bolstering the audit committee function by
proposing that audit committees be composed of independent and
financially literate directors.
42. For a caveat regarding the appropriate inference to draw from one of the two studies
finding that nonaudit fees compromise audit quality using an alternative measure of audit quality
(issuance of a qualified opinion), acknowledged by the author, see ROMANO, supra note 19, at 78.
In this regard, it should also be noted that the most sophisticated study of qualified opinions
(DeFond et al., supra note 39) did not find an association.
43. The Panel conducted in-depth reviews of the quality of 126 audits of public firms
conducted by 28 offices of the 8 largest audit firms; in 37 of these engagements (29%) the auditor
also provided a nonaudit service other than tax work. PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, PUB.
OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1.14, 5.17 (2000). The reviewers
identified no case of a negative impact on an audit's quality and concluded that in one-quarter of
the cases the nonauditing services had a positive impact on the effectiveness of the audit. Id.
$ 5.18. While the Panel's report therefore found no evidence that nonaudit services impaired
independence in fact, it noted that "many people" were concerned that such services could impair
independence or give the appearance of the potential for impaired independence. Id. 1 5.20. The
studies summarized in Table 5 examine whether independence is impaired in fact. For a note on
the smaller number of studies that have been directed at the issue of perception, see ROMANO,
supra note 19, at 45 n.90.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2005] 1537
The Yale Law Journal
C. Executive Loans
Section 402(a) of SOX prohibits corporations from arranging or
extending credit to executive officers or directors (unless the corporation is
a financial institution offering credit in the ordinary course of business and
the terms of the credit are the same as those offered to the public).44 Loans
became a focus of congressional attention in the wake of disclosures that
executives at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International, and Adelphia
Communications had obtained extremely large loans (in some cases in the
hundreds of millions of dollars), personally benefiting from firms whose
shareholders and employees suffered devastating financial losses. The ban
was introduced at the end of the legislative process in the Senate as a floor
amendment substitute for a provision that was drafted and reported out of
the Senate committee as a disclosure measure. The blanket prohibition has
engendered concern among practitioners, because it appears to prohibit
standard compensation practices thought to be uncontroversial and
beneficial, such as the purchase of split-dollar life insurance policies and
the arrangement with brokers or other financial institutions for employees'
cashless exercise of stock options under incentive compensation plans.45
In contrast to other SOX corporate governance provisions, this
initiative had not been a component of recent policy discussions; the
permissibility of such transactions had been settled state law for decades
without generating scholarly controversy.46 As is true of all the SOX
mandates, this provision is in conflict with the state law approach. In this
regard, a practical reason for permitting executive loans should be noted: It
is extremely difficult to regulate managerial compensation, because if one
form of compensation is restricted, managers can renegotiate their contracts
to make up for the loss, undoing the legislative intent.47 As a result,
44. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 402(a), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745, 787 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)).
45. Scan A. Power, Sarbanes-Oxley Ends Corporate Lending to Insiders: Some Interpretive
Issues for Executive Compensation Surrounding the Section 402 Loan Prohibition, 71 UMKC L.
REV. 911, 924-35 (2003). In a split-dollar life insurance policy, the company pays the premiums
and is reimbursed out of the policy's payout to the officer upon its expiration at the officer's
retirement or death.
46. Even critics of the twentieth-century trend toward enabling provisions on executive loans
did not advocate a return to an absolute prohibition of such transactions but rather argued for
disclosure and limits on loans in specific contexts. E.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Loans to
Directors and Officers: Every Business Now a Bank?, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 237, 274-76. For a
discussion of the state law on executive loans, see ROMANO, supra note 19, at 87-88.
47. See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 13, at 19 (finding that after SOX, firms decreased
CEOs' incentive compensation and increased their nonforfeitable fixed salaries, thereby providing
insurance to managers for increased risk); Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance?
Government Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts 19-20 (June 2000)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-60956 (finding that firms changed
the mix of managerial compensation to reduce salaries and increase incentive pay to adapt to
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regulation of compensation, such as the federal loan ban, can be expected to
alter the form that compensation takes but is not likely to result in a
reduction in total pay, and it comes at a cost: Investors have to increase
another component of the manager's pay package to make up the loss in
utility from the removal of the now-restricted compensation option.
Moreover, the dollar value of the component that is increasing will be
higher than that of the one forgone. That is because had the manager valued
an increase in the unrestricted component more highly than the lost
compensation (the loan), the latter would not have been part of the original
compensation package in the first place.
Given that the extension of credit to corporate officers under state
corporate law has not been a contentious topic for decades, it is not
surprising that there is an absence of empirical research on the practice.
Motivated by the spotlight thrown on executive loans in the scandals
leading to SOX and by its ban on the practice, a recent study sought to
measure the efficacy of executive loans by analyzing whether they
accomplish the purpose of increasing managerial stock ownership, thereby
aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests.48 Table 6 (in the
Appendix) summarizes the study's results. The bulk of the sample loans
were made to assist in stock purchases and stock option exercises, with a
much smaller set consisting of relocation loans. The data are consistent with
the fact that most loans' purpose is one of incentive alignment: There is an
increase in executives' equity ownership after the extension of credit to
purchase stock or to exercise stock options, although the increase is small
relative to loan value.49
Because executive loans in many cases appear to serve their purpose of
increasing managerial stock ownership, thereby aligning managers' and
shareholders' interests, the blanket prohibition of executive loans in SOX is
self-evidently a public policy error. The provision in the original Senate
bill, which was consistent with the conventional federal regulatory
Congress's limitation on the tax deductibility of non-performance-based compensation over one
million dollars).
48. Kuldeep Shastri & Kathleen M. Kahle, Executive Loans, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 791 (2004).
49. On average, a loan enabling a manager to buy one hundred shares of stock increases the
manager's ownership by eight shares. Shastri and Kahle find that a higher number of options are
exercised in their sample than in a study of the effect of stock option plans on managerial stock
ownership, Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the
Evolution of Managerial Ownership, 55 J. FIN. 1367 (2000). They attribute the difference to the
presence of the loans: In their view, the loans permit the managers to hold onto more shares after
exercise because they do not need to sell shares to pay taxes and the exercise price. Shastri &
Kahle, supra note 48, at 808. That would again suggest that the loans are functioning as desired,
increasing management stock ownership. But it should be noted that Shastri and Kahle do not
evaluate the cost effectiveness of the loan program (that is, whether there is a cheaper mechanism
to increase stock ownership than through a stock option or purchase loan program).
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approach, required disclosure of executive loans but did not prohibit them.
Such an approach would have been far less problematic than the final
legislative product from the perspective of shareholder welfare. It would
have had the effect of facilitating the termination of loans most unlikely to
benefit shareholders, by highlighting their presence to investors who could
then put those loans' elimination on a corporate governance agenda (in the
many states where they would otherwise not be involved because
shareholder approval of loans is not required). Instead, the legislation is a
blunderbuss approach that prohibits all loans, whether or not they are useful
in facilitating the shareholders' objective of providing a sought-after
incentive effect.
D. Executive Certification of Financial Statements
Section 302 of SOX requires the CEO and CFO to certify that the
company's periodic reports do not contain material misstatements or
omissions and "fairly present" the firm's financial condition and the results
of operations. 50 The certification requirement contains substantive corporate
governance mandates. It imposes on the signing officers the responsibility
for establishing and maintaining internal controls and for evaluating the
effectiveness of those controls, along with the duty to disclose to the audit
committee any deficiencies in the internal control design or any fraud
involving any officer or employee with a significant role in the company's
internal controls. The officers' signature certifies both the undertaking of
those tasks and the veracity of the financial information. Section 404
contains a related filing requirement, a management report attested to by the
external auditor assessing the internal controls.5  A third provision,
section 906(a), is a new criminal statute that enumerates penalties for
knowingly violating a certification requirement similar to that of section
302.52
The certification provision, in contrast to the other corporate
governance provisions that have been discussed, is a less explicit
infringement on state corporate law: Although it is a corporate governance
mandate-it imposes duties on corporate officers-the required
50. SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745, 777-78 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241). Paralleling the audit committee mandate, this mandate directs the
SEC to adopt rules to implement it.
51. Id. § 404, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 789 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262).
52. Id. § 906(a), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) at 806 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1350).
The two sections-section 906(a) and section 302--differ in the certification language and
covered reports. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Form over Substance?: Officer Certification and the
Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 18-20 (2002).
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certification accompanies the filing of federally mandated documents that
are not part of the state corporate law regime.53 Nor is this an entirely new
type of federal requirement, although its specific form is of recent vintage.
Prior to the enactment of SOX, the SEC imposed a certification requirement
on the largest public firms.54 This requirement was one of the proposals
advanced by President Bush in his response to the Enron scandal, a ten-
point plan to make corporate executives more accountable to investors that
had been announced in March 2002. 55 But even before the promulgation of
the SEC rule, CEOs and CFOs had always been required to sign the annual
report and were liable for knowingly filing fraudulent reports as well as for
inadequate internal controls.
56
As indicated in Table 7 (in the Appendix), two studies have sought to
measure the efficacy of the SEC's rule requiring executive certification of
the financials of the largest firms, as a means of evaluating SOX's
expansion of the requirement to all firms, by examining stock price
reactions to timely and untimely certifications.57 The research question is
53. Given the mandatory federal reporting and disclosure requirements, there was no room
(or need) for state law to develop reporting requirements for publicly traded corporations,
although a few states required corporations to provide shareholders with annual reports and
financial statements. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501 (West 1990 & Supp. 2004). Before the
enactment of the federal securities regime in the 1930s, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
mandated financial disclosures; the federal disclosure regime displaced those listing requirements.
See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1466 (1997). After SOX
was enacted, California expanded its disclosure requirements to include, among others, SOX-
related items such as nonaudit services and loans to directors. See Roy J. Schmidt et al.,
Compliance with the New California Disclosures Act: Issues and Tips, WALL ST. LAW., Nov.
2002, at 11. For a brief discussion of the implications for state corporate law of the SOX
certification requirements, see ROMANO, supra note 19, at 94-95.
54. Order Requiring the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to Section 21(a)(1) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, File No. 4-460 (June 27, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/4-460.htm.
55. See Remarks at the Presentation of the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Awards,
38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 370 (March 7, 2002) (outlining proposals to improve corporate
responsibility); Press Release, White House, President's Ten-Point Plan (Mar. 7, 2002), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/corporateresponsibility/index2.html.
56. See Fairfax, supra note 52, at 20-42 (discussing prior law regarding signatures on
financial statements). Section 102 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act requires public
corporations to establish internal controls adequate to ensure that "transactions are recorded as
necessary" to permit the preparation of financial statements in accordance with "generally
accepted accounting principles." Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102, 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. (91 Stat.) 1494, 1494-95 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)
(2000)). Although the impetus for that legislation was to prohibit sensitive foreign payments, the
language imposing obligations on firms is not limited to the accounting for bribe-related
transactions.
57. The studies are BEVERLY HIRTLE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO.
170, STOCK MARKET REACTION TO FINANCIAL STATEMENT CERTIFICATION BY BANK HOLDING
COMPANY CEOs (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=425002; and Utpal Bhattacharya
et al., Is CEO Certification of Earnings Numbers Value-Relevant? (Nov. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=33262 1. The methodology, which evaluates the
impact of specific policies on the welfare of investors by examining changes in stock returns
(commonly referred to as an "event study"), is widely used and well accepted in financial
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whether the SEC requirement of certification provided new information to
investors about firms' financial conditions-as the literature puts it, was the
requirement "value relevant"?-and more specifically, did a failure to
comply, or early compliance, provide information to investors?
The informational effect of the requirement is ambiguous because the
results of the two studies are inconsistent. As Table 7 indicates, one study
finds that the certification requirement had no impact, suggesting that
investors did not obtain new information about firms from their failure to
certify-that is, that the earnings certification required by the SEC was a
"nonevent. ''58 But the other study finds that for a subset of firms considered
to be informationally opaque (bank holding companies), early certification
provided new, and positive, information to the market.
Two points should be made that caution against generalization from the
study finding no effect. First, the small number of firms that failed to certify
in time limits the power of the test. Second, by the time the SEC issued the
earnings certification order, the market had, in all likelihood, adjusted stock
prices for an "Enron effect," reducing the value of firms with opaque
financial statements and numerous off-balance-sheet transactions, and many
firms had reacted by voluntarily increasing their disclosure to provide more
transparent reports. 9 It is therefore possible that in the future, under
different market circumstances (for example, in a time of less investor
scrutiny of firms), a failure to certify earnings might provide new
information about the firm. But a similar caution applies against
generalizing from the study finding a price impact. It is an open question
whether the positive reaction was a one-time effect or whether in the future
certification will continue to provide new information to investors about
financial firms.
The contrary findings of the two event studies of the certification
requirement render it difficult to draw any definitive conclusion regarding
the efficacy of the provision for improving the ability of investors to
distinguish between high- and low-quality firms. There is a need for
considerably more research in order to draw strong inferences. 60 But one
economics. For an overview of the technique, see, for example, Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta
Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I.- Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 141 (2002).
58. In other words, the market could predict which firms would not be able to certify their
earnings. Many of the noncertifiers were well-known scandal firms, such as Enron and
WorldCom, that were not expected to certify and firms in financial distress that had restated their
earnings in the past year.
59. The SEC order was issued in June 2002. Firms that had opaque balance sheets like Enron
experienced stock price declines in the fall of 2001 upon the revelation of Enron's accounting
problems. See ROMANO, supra note 18, at 58-59.
60. In addition to the difficulty of drawing definitive policy implications from the studies
regarding the informative efficacy of the certification requirement, it should be noted that the
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policy approach that would reconcile the results would be to render the
certification regime optional. That would permit firms for which there is a
benefit to engage in special certifications rather than the conventional
financial statement signatures (for example, opaque firms such as bank
holding companies) to do so. Such an approach is supported by the
considerable compliance costs associated with certification that have been
reported or anticipated: 61 Firms would select into the regime when the
burden of compliance was more likely to produce a positive payoff to their
investors.
II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
SOX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MANDATES
The brief review of the empirical literature suggests that a case does not
exist for the principal corporate governance mandates in SOX. The decisive
balance of research indicates that those mandates will not benefit investors.
The policy implication of the literature presents a puzzle: What were the
political dynamics that produced legislation in which Congress enacted a
set of mandates that in all likelihood will not achieve the professed goal of
the legislation, an improvement in investor welfare?
Although much of the research reviewed in this Article was not
available to Congress during its deliberations, at the time there were
sufficient findings on independent audit committees and nonaudit services
to at least give pause about, if not caution against, the legislation's
approach.62 That this literature was not even cursorily addressed is
indicative of the poor quality of decisionmaking that characterized the
enactment of the SOX corporate governance mandates. The corporate
governance mandates stemmed from the intricate interaction of the Senate
Banking Committee chairman's response to the suggestions of policy
entrepreneurs and party politics in an election cycle coinciding with
spectacular corporate scandals, a sharp stock market decline, and the
studies do not address whether certification will alter management's behavior to reduce the
occurrence of accounting misconduct in the first place. Only studies with a longer window will
afford such a test.
61. See Patricia A. Vlahakis, Takeover Law and Practice 2003, in 2 35TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 673, 799-800 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Series No. B-1396, 2003) (describing the costly impact of the certification requirement
on acquisitions of private and foreign corporations); Adrian Michaels, Costs Rise as US
Businesses Act To Meet Governance Laws, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 25, 2003, at 15 (discussing
a survey indicating that the cost of being a public company doubled after SOX); infra notes 188-
194 and accompanying text.
62. Several of the sources cited in this Article with publication dates after 2002 were
circulating in manuscript form before 2002, including the one paper cited by a witness (Lynn
Turner) in support of the prohibition on nonaudit services, see infra note 180.
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consequent political collapse of the interest groups (the accounting
profession and the business community) whose policy position was most
consistent with the empirical literature. Moreover, those circumstances
contributed to a perception of a crisis, and SOX was enacted under
procedures applicable to emergency legislation. After detailing how those
dynamics reveal a Congress inattentive to the governance provisions and
hence unaware of the disconnect between legislative means and ends, this
Part considers (and rejects) characterizing the provisions' adoption as an act
of costless window dressing. SOX stands as an exemplar of low-quality
legislative decisionmaking in the context of a crisis, a feature that has been
repeated on other occasions when the federal government has intervened in
financial markets (the subject of Section E).
Legislators' lack of awareness or disregard of the empirical literature,
which resulted in low-quality decisionmaking, have to be realistically
evaluated, however. Even with a committee system permitting
specialization, legislators cannot be expected to have extensive technical
expertise: There are numerous demands on their time, and they must rely on
staff and the information provided by interested parties.63 Without doubt,
therefore, some of the shortcomings of SOX's corporate governance
mandates should be assigned to legislative staff. Whether that failure was
due to staff members' ideological commitments, a lack of the technical skill
necessary to evaluate the literature, or a combination of the two is
unknown. But members of Congress select their staff, and in that regard,
they bear responsibility for the poor performance of those individuals.
A. Background
SOX was adopted in July 2002, slightly less than a year after the Enron
scandal broke, amid a tanking stock market. A flurry of congressional
hearings were held on the company's collapse, its causes, and potential
legislative solutions, commencing in December 2001 and continuing
63. As John Kingdon notes (in a study of voting in the U.S. House of Representatives in
1969), legislators rarely rely on printed material in their voting decisions, and instead rely on other
members of Congress, particularly trusted, like-minded committee members, for voting cues.
JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS 74-90, 210-11 (3d ed. 1989). In the
case of SOX, the committee members whom one would expect to be informed were, as discussed
in the text, neither informed nor attentive to the literature relevant to the governance mandates.
This fact is perhaps explained in part by their not being on notice of the need to be so informed,
because the mandates appeared in the Senate bill that was drafted after the conclusion of the
Senate hearings. The late appearance of the mandates would also have made it difficult for the
other major influences on voting besides fellow legislators identified in Kingdon's research-
constituents and interest groups, id. at 17, 20, 22-23-to communicate the relevant information to
legislators (had they been aware of the literature).
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beyond the enactment of the legislation. 64 The House passed a bill in April
2002, after the House Financial Services Committee had held seven
hearings on Enron and proposed legislation. But legislation was not
considered by the Senate until shortly after WorldCom's collapse in July
2002. Only one of the corporate governance mandates adopted in SOX
appeared in the House bill, a more limited restriction on the provision of
nonaudit services by auditors than what was enacted.65 The other mandates,
along with a more stringent prohibition on nonaudit services, were
introduced in the Senate.
Some important institutional detail should be noted before examining
the legislative process in the Senate. First, in 2002 the Republicans
controlled the House, and the Democrats controlled the Senate. The House
bill was a Republican bill, although many Democrats voted for it.66 The
Senate Democrats substituted their bill for the House bill when the
legislation was brought up on the Senate floor. Second, the Enron scandal
was followed by revelations of accounting fraud and insider self-dealing at
several large corporations, nearly all of which were thereafter pushed into
bankruptcy: Adelphia Communications, Global Crossing, Tyco
International, and WorldCom. Third, and coincident with the revelation of
other corporate scandals, the stock market declined sharply throughout the
time frame in which Congress was considering the SOX legislation. The
economy had come out of a recession several months earlier, but
64. The Law Library of Congress identifies more than forty Enron-related hearings held by
ten different House and Senate committees from December 2001 to February 2003. Law Library
of Cong., Enron Hearings, http://www.loc.gov/law/guide/enronhrgs.htm (last visited Apr. 27,
2005).
65. See Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of
2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 2(c) (2002). This bill was introduced and referred to committee
on February 14, 2002, ordered reported on April 16, reported to the House on April 22, and passed
on April 24. One of the mandates, the executive certification requirement, was rejected by the
House committee (by a vote of 29-30 on the ranking Democrat's motion to amend the Republican
bill). H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 25 (2002). That requirement, as well as a more expansive
prohibition on nonaudit services, was included in the House Democrats' bill. Comprehensive
Investor Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 3818, 107th Cong. § 2 (2002); 148 CONG. REC. H1574
(daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (amendment no. 5, offered by Rep. LaFalce (the ranking Democrat) as a
substitute for the Republican bill). Finally, as noted earlier, the House bill required disclosure of
executive loans, as opposed to the prohibition adopted on the Senate floor. H.R. 3763 § 6(a)(2).
66. The vote on the bill's adoption was 334 to 90. 148 CONG. REC. H1592 (daily ed. Apr. 24,
2002). Thert were three votes on amendments, two of which were much closer votes following
party lines. See id. at H 1574 (recording a 39-3 18 vote on the question of creating a government
agency to conduct audits of public companies); id. at H1588-89 (recording a 202-219 vote on the
Democrats' substitute bill, which included a certification requirement); id. at H 1591-92 (recording
a 205-222 vote on the Democrats' amendment, which contained provisions endorsed by President
Bush that were not in the bill of the Republicans, who were likely to view the items as within the
SEC's authority). The one vote sponsored by the Democrats regarding instructions to be provided
to the members of the conference committee also followed party lines. Id. at H4846 (daily ed. July
17, 2002) (recording a 207-218 vote on the Democrats' motion to require House conferees to
accept certain provisions of the Senate bill not in the House bill).
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employment continued to decline through July 2002 from its pre-recession
peak in February 200 1.67
The environment in which Congress enacted SOX can be best
understood by reference to Figure 1. The figure plots the daily closing price
of the S&P 500 composite index from two months before Enron's
revelation of its earnings restatement through two months after the
enactment of SOX; the other major indices exhibited a similar pattern. After
declining from July 2001 through shortly before Enron's financial
restatements and collapse in the fall of that year, the market plunged
starting in April 2002, with the S&P reaching bottom in July 2002. The low
point, which represented more than a one-third loss in value of the index
over the preceding year, occurred on the day before the conference
committee reported out a bill (July 23), which was also the second trading
day after the bankruptcy filing of WorldCom (it filed on a weekend).
Congress was therefore operating in an environment in which investor
losses were staggering. A subsequent study by the GAO indicated that one
well-known measure of investor sentiment, which was inaugurated in 1996,
was at its lowest recorded level in June and July 2002.68 Members of
Congress, not surprisingly, were attentive to the situation: Senators
explicitly referred to the steep stock market decline in July as a rationale for
the need for legislative action.69 That response was certainly not out of the
ordinary. As Stuart Banner notes, most new major securities regulation in
67. The National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER), the nonprofit research
organization that is the official arbiter of the U.S. business cycle, identified a recession's start in
March 2001 (the end of the peak of the prior expansion that began in March 1991) and its end in
November 2001 (the trough in economic activity). See Bus. CYCLE DATING COMM., NBER, THE
NBER's RECESSION DATING PROCEDURE (2003), available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/
recessions.html. Note that employment rose slightly from July through November 2002 and then,
with the exception of January, declined until September 2003. Id.
68. GAO, NO. GAO-03-138, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET
IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES, AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 32-34 (2002) (citing the
UBS/Gallup Index of Investor Optimism, a survey-based index of investor sentiment). The GAO
attributed the loss of investor confidence to accounting scandals growing out of the large number
of financial statement restatements. The investor confidence indices of the International Center for
Finance at the Yale School of Management did not, however, register a consistent decline over
that period. Id. at 37. The "one-year" and "crash" confidence indices increased over the period,
and the "buy on dip" confidence index remained unchanged for institutional investors but declined
for individual investors. Id. at 37-38.
69. E.g., 148 CONG. REC. S6558 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Reid) ("[T]he
stock market dropped again today almost 300 points. We need to do something to reestablish
credibility and to reestablish . . . confidence .... This legislation goes a long way toward that
end."); id. at S6622 (daily ed. July 11, 2002) (statement of Sen. Nelson of Florida) (commenting
favorably on the "timing" of an amendment to the Sarbanes bill to enhance the SEC's sanctioning
authority, among other provisions, and noting that "yesterday when the market dropped almost
300 points, ... [it was] a reflection .... that confidence is sinking"); id. at S6744 (daily ed. July
15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Allen) ("[li]n today's climate, with the stock market dropping again
today .... it is axiomatic that there is a pressing need for accounting reform .... The bill, as it is
presented, is a very good bill.").
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the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, has followed stock
market crashes.
70
FIGURE 1. S&P 500 COMPOSITE INDEX CLOSING PRICE,













The downward spiral in the stock market ceased after the conference
committee reported its bill, but the upward drift was only temporary: By
October 2002, the S&P was back to about where it had been in July.
Consequently, it is difficult to attribute the change in market direction upon
70. Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence,
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997). The SOX governance mandates and Banner's observation are
consistent with the results of an interesting model of news media bias by David Baron, in which
issues receiving media attention produce increased regulation. DAVID P. BARON, PERSISTENT
MEDIA BIAS (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 1845, 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-516006. The model depends on a median-voter model of politics and the
assumption, supported by empirical evidence, that the news media is biased toward the left, a bias
Baron translates into the regulatory context as supporting more stringent regulation.
71. Data for the figure come from Global Financial Data, S&P 500 Composite Price Index
(w/GFD Extension), available at http://www.globalfinanciaidata.com.
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the conference committee's conclusion to the market's positive assessment
of the substantive provisions of SOX; if that had been the case, the upturn
following the conference report should not have been temporary. The same
interpretive difficulty is presented by Senator Phil Gramm's more jaded
take on the legislation: In supporting the conference report, he noted that
investors should have been reassured that the bill being enacted was not
worse.72 Event studies of the progress of the legislation present inconsistent
(and largely insignificant) results, except for the significantly negative
market reaction at the time of the WorldCom bankruptcy filing, which
overlapped with the start of the conference committee's deliberations.73 But
whether one considers the reconciliation across chambers as stemming a
negative market assessment of previously introduced legislation as too
lenient (the Democrats' view of the market decline after the House action in
April and that of one event study) or too strict (Gramm's view of the market
decline during the Senate deliberations and that of another event study), in
either scenario the upturn should not have faltered. This leads me to
conclude that the declining stock price pattern before enactment is best
explained as a reflection of investors' assessment of market fundamentals
and not of the legislation moving through Congress.
A possible interpretation of the resumption of the market decline soon
after SOX's enactment is that the market's initial positive evaluation of the
legislation changed to a negative one. Insofar as public opinion poll data are
informative on such matters-given that such polls do not solely measure
the views of investors-they are at best murky. In polls taken during and
after the Senate's deliberations but before the conference report, a majority
of respondents indicated that they thought the Senate's bill would have a
minor effect or no effect on reducing corporate wrongdoing. Shortly after
the legislation was enacted, a majority said it would have a major effect; yet
one month later, there was a shift back, as a smaller percentage (a bare
majority) opined that the legislation would make a difference.74 The
72. 148 CONG. REC. S7354 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm) ("If people
on Wall Street are listening to the debate and trying to figure out whether they should be
concerned about this bill, I think they can rightly feel that this bill could have been much worse. I
think if people had wanted to be irresponsible, this is a bill on which they could have been
irresponsible and almost anything would have passed on the floor of the Senate.").
73. For a discussion of event studies of the enactment of SOX, see ROMANO, supra note 19,
at 102-14.
74. The "Polling the Nations" database, which consists of more than 14,000 surveys
conducted by more than 700 polling organizations in the United States and other countries from
1986 to the present using scientifically selected random samples, contained five questions asking
respondents' views on the effect of the proposed or enacted legislation on corporate misconduct or
corporate corruption. The results were as follows:
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inconclusiveness of the polling data bolsters the view that the market trend
during the legislation's consideration and after its enactment is best
understood as randomly fluctuating in line with market fundamentals rather
than evincing investors' reactions to SOX.75 Of course, members of
Congress did not have the benefit of hindsight, and rightly or wrongly, with
an election looming, they interpreted the market decline from April through
July 2002 as requiring legislative action.
B. The Legislative Process
The corporate governance mandates were neither a principal nor a
subsidiary focus of legislative consideration. With the exception of the
restriction on the provision of nonaudit services by auditors, for all practical
purposes they were not even discussed. The legislation in both houses was
considered within a narrow time frame: Only one day, for instance, was
allocated for the House's consideration of the Financial Services
Committee's bill. The Senate debate, which lasted a week, was conducted
under a Republican press for a cloture motion that succeeded, restricting the
time for legislative consideration as well as permissible amendments.
7 6
Hence, the usually key role of committees in the formulation of legislation
was virtually absolute, and in the committees, the Democrats' drafting was
heavily informed by the views of former SEC Chairman Levitt and his
former SEC chief accountant Lynn Turner."
Pon Field dates, Sample Size Major effect Minor (no)
2002 effect
Newsweek July 11-12 1000 26% 48%(14%)
Newsweek July 17-19 1004 27% 48% (14%)
Gallup/CNN/USA Today July 29-31 1003 66% 30%
NBC News/WSJ Sept. 3-5 1011 50% 44%
Three polls asked whether respondents thought the legislation would have a "major" effect or a
"minor/no" effect. The figures for the NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll were obtained using
slightly different language. Half of the respondents were asked whether it would make a "real
difference" or "not make a real difference" (the figures cited in the table above). The other half
were asked whether, when the legislation was enacted, "enough will have been done" (24%) or
"more should be done" (71%). Data were obtained from Polling the Nations,
http://www.orspub.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
75. Peter Wallison has advanced another plausible explanation of the stock market's
movement, also unrelated to SOX: its reaction to an anticipated war in Iraq. See Peter J. Wallison,
Sarbanes-Oxley: A Review (May 5, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040506-Wallisonlntroduction.pdf.
76. After cloture is invoked, debate on a bill is limited to "a maximum of thirty additional
hours.., before a vote must be taken." SAMUEL KERNELL & GARY C. JACOBSON, THE LOGIC OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 228 (2d ed. 2003).
77. For example, in introducing the bill and summarizing its content, the floor manager,
Senator Paul Sarbanes, referred to Levitt's testimony regarding the kind of regulatory board that
was needed. 148 CONG. REC. S6331 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes). In
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In a remarkable turn of events, Levitt was able to revive his agenda for
accounting regulation (particularly the prohibition on nonaudit services),
which had failed less than two years earlier when confronted with
bipartisan congressional support for the accounting profession's position
against Levitt's proposals. 78 Levitt had ready-made solutions for perceived
problems with the accounting profession. In conjunction with his longtime
support of and affiliation with the Democratic Party, his background in the
securities industry and as a regulator who took on the accounting profession
made him a natural and trusted source for advice and guidance among
Democrats. 79 To understand how the governance mandates appeared in
SOX, this Section examines the floor debates, which establish legislators'
general lack of interest in, and inattention to, the mandates. The next
Section then identifies the source of the mandates at an earlier point in the
introducing and describing his committee's bill, the floor amendment to SOX containing the
criminal provisions discussed infra Subsection II.B.2, Senator Patrick Leahy stated that Levitt and
his predecessor as SEC chairman supported the provision expanding the statute of limitations for
private securities actions. 148 CONG. REC. S6440 (daily ed. July 9, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Leahy); see also id. at S6525 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (discussing
his support in 2000 of Levitt's failed effort to restrict nonaudit services and characterizing
Sarbanes's bill as largely implementing that agenda ("[Levitt's] solution looked a lot like what is
in this bill.")). The ranking House Democrat, Representative John LaFalce, also acknowledged his
debt to Levitt and his staff. E.g., H.R. 3763-The Corporate and Auditing Accountability,
Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
107th Cong. 163 (2002) [hereinafter House CARTA Hearings] (statement of Rep. LaFalce)
(noting that Turner discussed and approved LaFalce's bill's provisions); The Enron Collapse:
Implications to Investors and the Capital Markets: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Mkts., Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 19
(2002) [hereinafter Enron Hearings II] (statement of Rep. LaFalce) (urging consideration of
Levitt's recommendations). Levitt's influence on the Democrats" legislation was widely reported
in the press. E.g., Michael Schroeder, Arthur Levitt Finds Himself on the Outs, WALL ST. J., Nov.
29, 2002, at A4 (noting Levitt's "strong role in formulating" the accounting provisions and his
former staff's help in drafting the Democrats' bill).
Barbara Sinclair discusses how the legislative process has come to vary considerably from
the textbook view of a bill's progress within one committee's tight control, which underscores
more starkly the influence exerted by the Senate Banking Committee chairman with respect to the
governance mandates in SOX. See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW
LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 10-26, 36-41, 48-56, 70-81 (2d ed. 2000)
(describing lawmaking processes since the 1970s in which bills are referred to multiple
committees, bypass committees entirely, are included in omnibus legislation, are subject to
marathon amendment sessions on the Senate floor and complex or restrictive rules on the House
floor, and are drafted in legislative summits attended by the President and party leaders rather than
committee chairs). It should be noted that with the exception of House consideration under a
restrictive rule, the other features that she considers common, albeit "unorthodox" from the
textbook perspective, were not part of SOX's legislative process.
78. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
79. See ARTHUR LEVITT WITH PAULA DWYER, TAKE ON THE STREET: WHAT WALL STREET
AND CORPORATE AMERICA DON'T WANT You To KNOW: WHAT YOU CAN Do To FIGHT BACK
3-4, 7, 10 (2002) (describing his political background, including his father's elected position as a
Democratic state comptroller of New York and his own fundraising efforts for Bill Clinton's 1992
presidential campaign and lobbying activities for the American Stock Exchange). Levitt was a
textbook policy entrepreneur, with the appropriate expertise, connections, persistence, and
readiness to seize the opportunity presented, as described in KINGDON, supra note 5, at 189-91.
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legislative process, the committee hearings, which served as the incubator
for policy entrepreneurs' proposals that resonated with the key legislator.
1. The Debate in the House
The majority party exercises strict control over the legislative process
in the House, and the adoption of Representative Michael Oxley's Financial
Services Committee bill was no exception: The Republican Party
shepherded the bill through the floor with one day of debate. In that debate,
Democrats objected to the absence of provisions that subsequently appeared
in the Senate bill. Two of these were substantive corporate governance
mandates, the expansion of prohibited nonaudit services and the
certification requirement, both of which appeared in a House Democratic
bill that was offered as a substitute amendment and defeated on the floor.
But the bill passed with broad bipartisan support. For most Democrats, the
easy calculation was that in their upcoming reelection campaigns, a vote
against the Republican legislation on the grounds that the bill was not
"tough enough" and that they had voted for a preferable alternative that had
been defeated might be difficult to explain.8 °
As indicated in Table 2, at no point in the House debate did anyone
mention audit committee independence or executive loans, the subjects of
the SOX corporate governance mandates most intrusive on state law
jurisdiction, nor did those mandates appear in House Democrats' bills.81 In
fact, few representatives participated in the debate at all; of those who did,
virtually all were members of the Financial Services Committee that had
produced the bill.
80. A similar dynamic eventually operated in the Senate. Senate Republicans, who had to
make an analogous calculation, voted for the Democratic bill and, it should be noted, did not have
the opportunity for an up-or-down vote on their own bill as a substitute, as did the House
Democrats. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
81. The House bill contained a provision requiring disclosure of executive loans. See supra
note 65. The minority views included in the report accompanying the House bill in April,
however, objected to the bill's not having any provision restricting the definition of directors'
independence to exclude their acting as "consultants," citing in support the views of Turner,
former SEC chief accountant under Levitt. HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., CORPORATE AND
AUDITING ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2002, H.R. REP.
No. 107-414, at 49-50 (2002). The substitute bill offered by the Financial Services Committee's
ranking Democrat, Representative LaFalce, had a provision that instructed the SEC to adopt rules
requiring independent directors to be nominated by nominating committees consisting solely of
independent directors, with the definition to follow that used by stock exchanges in their rules on
audit committees. See HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 3763,
CORPORATE AND AUDITING ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY ACT OF
2002, H.R. REP. No. 107-418, at 35 (2002).
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TABLE 2. CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES ON SOX82
A. Senate: Sarbanes Bill, July 8-12, 15, 2002
B. House ofRepresentatives: Oxley Bill, April 24, 2002
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82. Data for the table were tabulated from the Congressional Record. Speakers may be
counted in more than one panel as appropriate. All speakers in Panel D were also speakers in
Panel B. Eleven of the speakers in Panel C were also speakers in Panel B. Seven of the speakers in
Panel C were also speakers in Panel D.
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C. House of Representatives: Judiciary Committee Bill, July 16, 2002
D. House ofRepresentatives: Motion on
Conference Committee Instructions, July 17, 2002
As Table 2 indicates, the issue that attracted the most attention during
the House debate was the creation of an accounting industry regulator.
Given the absence of corporate governance provisions in the House
Financial Services Committee's draft legislation, this is unexceptional,
because the creation of a new regulator (as advocated by then-SEC
Chairman Harvey Pitt) was the bill's most significant alteration of the status
quo. The table shows a related pattern, however, when action in the Senate
three months later triggered further activity on the legislation in the House:
None of the governance provisions that had been introduced in the Senate
bill was even mentioned in the House debate over the Senate bill.83
83. Over two days of consideration, House members raised neither the Senate's additions of
the governance provisions regarding audit committees and loans nor the differences between the
Senate and House bills on the matters earlier debated in the House (regarding restrictions on
nonaudit services and the new overseer of the accounting profession). Rather, the issues debated
paralleled the issues debated in the Senate, discussed infra Subsection II.B.2. The July 16 floor
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Political scientists have characterized House floor debate as for "public
consumption" rather than for persuasion of members on the other side of an
issue. 84 Even from that perspective, the lack of reference to the corporate
governance reforms that were included in the final bill is notable, because it
indicates that members of Congress did not consider those provisions to be
matters that would serve either to justify their votes or to demonstrate to
constituents how legislation was solving the "Enron problem." The
governance provisions therefore would appear to have been of principal
interest to corporate governance policy entrepreneurs, individuals "inside
the Beltway," at least as far as House members were concerned.
2. The Debate in the Senate
While committee deliberations are conventionally considered key to the
making of legislation, floor action is often more important for shaping
legislation in the Senate than in the House.85 This is because Senate rules
permitting nongermane amendments and filibusters provide individual
senators with considerable ability to affect-and delay-legislation. To
obtain an orderly and timely consideration of a bill, the party leadership
therefore "routinely negotiate[s] unanimous consent agreements" that
determine what amendments will be allowed and what other procedures
will be followed.86
That process changes with a successful cloture motion, because once
cloture is invoked, debate and amendments are severely restricted.87
Because under the Senate rules a cloture motion requires the vote of three-
fifths of the Senate, the leadership of both parties typically must agree on
the content of a bill (and line up support from enough party members) to
sustain a successful cloture motion. In the absence of the successful cloture
debate summarized in Panel C of Table 2 concerned a House Judiciary Committee bill drafted by
the Republicans in response both to the House Democrats' bill, which was similar to the bill of the
Democrat-controlled Senate Judiciary Committee (being enacted in the Senate at the time), and to
remarks by President Bush calling for harsher criminal sanctions for securities fraud. Much of the
debate on that day consisted of Democrats objecting to what they considered to be improper
political maneuvering by Republicans to rush the Republicans' bill to the floor and prevent a vote
on the Democrats' alternative. The July 17 floor debate in Panel D of Table 2 was over a motion
by the Democrats to instruct the House members of the conference committee to support the
Senate version over that of the House with respect to extending the statute of limitations for
private securities actions and certain other criminal and civil provisions; that motion was defeated
on a party-line vote of 207 to 218. 148 CONG. REC. H4846 (daily ed. July 17, 2002).
84. KERNELL & JACOBSON, supra note 76, at 229.
85. See, e.g., id.
86. Id. at 228.
87. Only amendments that are germane to the bill are permissible once cloture is invoked.
This contrasts with the ordinary Senate procedures, by which any amendment can be added to a
bill. Under House rules for considering a bill, by contrast, amendments must be germane. Id. at
227, 229.
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motion on SOX, a more extensive unanimous consent agreement would
have been necessary instead. Such an agreement might have been difficult
to achieve, given the many members seeking to attach their issues to the
legislation. 88 The successful cloture motion's limitations on the Senate
debate over SOX accordingly meant that matters unresolved in committee
would never reach the floor and that compromises in committee could not
be recrafted without unanimous agreement. As a consequence, none of the
governance mandates in the committee bill, nor the one mandate included
as a floor amendment, was subject to any scrutiny on the floor.
a. The Committee Compromise and Impetus to Cloture
The Senate bill was drafted by the Democrats, but the Republicans had
some input because their support was needed to move the legislation.
Because the Democrats had a bare floor majority of one vote, major
legislation such as SOX required some degree of bipartisan support in
committee to have any possibility of success on the floor (let alone for
legislation to proceed to an expedited vote with the Senate operating under
cloture). The authorization for up to two members of the new accounting
regulator's board to be (or to have been) certified public accountants is the
most prominent instance of the Republicans' ability to affect the legislation.
The inclusion of practicing accountants on the new regulator's board
was of particular concern to Senator Michael Enzi, a Republican who was
the only certified public accountant in the Senate and a member of the
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee; his support of the
88. Because everyone recognized that a bill would be enacted given the perceived public
demand for action, a large number of senators saw the amendment process as an opportunity to
implement favored initiatives. For a sense of the problem, see, for example, 148 CONG. REC.
S6633 (daily ed. July 11, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm) (responding to a senator proposing to
debate all amendments for half an hour each). Senator Gramm explained,
[W]e have 36 Republicans who want to offer an amendment. My amendment is next on
the list. I am the ranking member of this committee, and it appears I am not going to get
an opportunity to offer an amendment.... There are 58 Democrat amendments.
... If we sat here and tried to do [all of them]-and some of them having to do
with things such as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and bankruptcy law-we would
literally spend 3 or 4 months.
Id. Senator Sarbanes also explained,
I know there are a lot of amendments pending, but we have now been on this
legislation a full week....
There are a number of amendments that are relevant to the bill but not germane.
Once cloture is invoked, they will fall. I know that is a matter of some concern to those
who are proposing those amendments, but I do not know how we can handle this
differently and move along towards a resolution.
In addition.., there are also amendments that are not even relevant ....
I am frank to say to my colleagues, I do not see how we can progress and move
towards a final vote and resolution on this issue without invoking cloture this morning.
Id. at S6684 (daily ed. July 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
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Democratic bill, which was crucial to its reaching the floor, depended on
that provision's inclusion. Legislation had been stalled in the Senate
committee because the Democrats who controlled the Senate favored
greater regulation than the Republicans, but a Democratic bill that passed
on a party-line vote in committee was not considered likely to succeed on
the floor. Accounts of the Senate committee deliberations indicate that it
took until the end of May for the committee chairman, Senator Paul
Sarbanes, to draft a bill acceptable to all of the Democrats on the committee
and another month to reach agreement with Enzi. 89 Their compromise
ended the committee stalemate because Enzi had been sponsoring the
alternative Republican bill, and his shift in support brought over other
members of his party. That action enabled Sarbanes to achieve a bipartisan,
albeit nonunanimous, committee vote in favor of his bill and bring it to the
Senate floor.90
Still, the Republicans' input into the committee draft was peripheral.
Republican committee members submitted more than one hundred
proposed amendments to Sarbanes's bill, stalling its progress, and the
compromise with Enzi released the bill without including the substance of
those proposals. 9' The dispute between the parties over the regulatory
sweep of the bill (with the Republicans favoring a narrower bill similar to
that passed by the House) was the reason action in the Senate was
protracted compared to the House, whose rules enable the majority party to
implement its will.
92
During the course of the legislative process, however, the Republicans'
strategy changed from what the press characterized as delaying tactics and
efforts to kill the bill to attempts to expedite action. After the bill reached
the floor, the Republican leadership sought a cloture motion (and thereby
supported the bill's adoption), although they had opposed the bill
throughout the committee process. The Republicans' explanation for the
shift was that they expected to be better positioned to influence the
89. See David S. Hilzenrath et al., How Congress Rode a 'Storm' to Corporate Reform,
WASH. POST, July 28, 2002, at Al.
90. The committee vote was 17 to 4; 6 of the 10 Republicans on the committee voted for
Sarbanes's bill. On the floor, Enzi acknowledged Sarbanes's compromise on the accounting
board's composition. See 148 CONG. REC. S6338 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi).
91. Hilzenrath et al., supra note 89; Senate Democrats Forced To Lower Expectations on
Accounting Reform Bill, SEC. WK., May 27, 2002, at 1. Most of the amendments were offered by
the ranking minority member, Senator Gramm, who was opposed to Sarbanes's bill. See Douglas
Turner, SEC Chief To Impose 'Stringent' Rules on Accountants, BUFFALO (N.Y.) NEWS, May 24,
2002, at A9 (explaining that Gramm, who "opposes increased regulation of the accounting
business," introduced 77 of 123 amendments to the bill at the "last minute").
92. The Republicans also had a larger margin of control in the House than the Democrats did
in the Senate (although it was still a narrow one).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1556 [Vol. 114: 1521
Quack Corporate Governance
legislation in the conference committee, which would have to reconcile the
Senate bill with the House bill that they preferred.93
But the calculation of a better outcome in conference does not explain
why the Republicans sought to expedite the legislative process-after all,
the bill would end up in conference whether it took a week or a month on
the Senate floor. The political science literature suggests an answer:
Emergency legislation is more likely to be considered under restrictive rules
such as a cloture motion than is other legislation. Political scientists
attribute that finding to legislators' having high discount rates in such a
context; that is, in a situation calling for emergency action, legislators have
strong preferences for "earlier rather than later passage. 94 The hypothesis
that SOX was emergency legislation has plausibility in explaining the
Republican switch that led to the agreement on cloture.
Initially, Enron's collapse in the fall of 2001 generated a crisis situation
and a media frenzy, as every congressional committee that could find some
jurisdictional basis held a hearing on the scandal. But by April, the sense of
an emergency had lessened, such that the members of the Senate Banking
Committee did not feel any urgency to agree on a bill in response to the
House action. Indeed, even after Sarbanes took several months to craft a bill
that met bipartisan committee approval, it appeared that the bill would not
progress. The best that Senate Majority Leader Thomas Daschle could do
was to try to schedule a vote on the bill for sometime after the August
recess, and legislators opposed to the bill expressed the view that "Enron's
moment as a galvanizing issue ha[d] quickly passed., 95 When the
93. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S6684 (daily ed. July 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
Gramm explained,
[W]e need to pass a bill. We are going to conference with a House bill that is
substantially different from this bill .... The amendments that are being offered now
are largely non-germane....
It is very important that we get on with our business and that we pass this bill. I
intend to vote for it today. I do not think it is the bill we need in the end, but it gets us
to conference where we can get the bill we need in the end. I urge my Republican
colleagues to vote for it, not because in the end they are for this version but because
they want to do something. We need to bring this debate to a close....
So I urge my colleagues to vote to end the debate.
Id. The agreement on the expanded statute-of-limitations provision producing the cloture vote, see
infra note 111 and accompanying text, further illustrates this description of the Republicans'
position. The first person to mention the possibility of a cloture motion on the floor of the Senate
was Enzi, a Republican, in his initial remarks on the legislation on the first day of debate. See 148
CONG. REC. S6340 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Enzi) ("As we get into this bill,
there are virtually no limits on what amendments can be put on-at least unless there is a cloture
motion. I hope people will recognize the need to have something done, the need to get it done
quickly, and not try and make this a vehicle for everything they ever thought needed to be done
with corporations.").
94. Keith Krehbiel, Legislative Organization, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2004, at 113, 125.
95. Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Enthusiasm Waning in Congress for Tougher
Post-Enron Controls, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at Al.
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WorldCom scandal broke on June 26, the political environment changed
dramatically once again, and Daschle, now predicting eighty votes in
support of the bill, was able to move it up on the calendar for a Juiy vote.
Senator Gramm, the ranking Republican on the committee, who opposed
the bill and had earlier thought the feeding frenzy was over and the
movement for legislation stopped, now did not even attempt to stem the
bill's progress to the floor and a vote. 96 This chain of events suggests that
circumstances had altered senators' perception of the situation to be one
calling for emergency action.9 7 The Senate thereupon moved on the
legislation rapidly, agreeing to cloture after having taken no action on the
House bill for months.
b. Action on the Floor
As detailed in Table 2, only one of the corporate governance mandates
(the restriction on nonaudit services) was the focus of significant debate on
the Senate floor. It was one of two provisions in the House bill that Senate
Democrats had flatly rejected and that were consequently a matter of
controversy in the Senate; the other was the accounting regulator. The
House bill left the organizational structure of the new accounting regulator
as a matter for the SEC to determine and maintained the language of the
SEC's existing rule restricting nonaudit services, simply adding two
services to the list.98 Although most of the senators mentioning matters in
the table did so in laundry list statements of support for the bill,
Republicans also expressed a preference for the form that the nonaudit
services and accounting regulator provisions took in the House bill. The
House provisions dovetailed with then-SEC Chairman Pitt's proposals for
96. Hilzenrath et al., supra note 89.
97. This view is also held by legislators. For instance, Senator Jon Corzine, a member of the
Banking Committee, was described as having "said the [Senate] bill would have lost momentum
without WorldCom and the other scandals that followed Enron." Spencer S. Hsu & Kathleen Day,
Senate Vote Spotlights Audit Reform and Sarbanes, WASH. POST, July 15, 2002, at A 1.
98. The two services now proscribed by Congress (internal audit and financial information
systems) were not included in the rule the SEC adopted in 2000 because of opposition by the
accounting profession. In the atmosphere of corporate scandals, the profession now acquiesced in
the ban, and the House bill proscribed the services in its codification of the SEC rules. The House
Democrats objected that the Republican bill "include[d] no real limits on the non-audit services"
and that it "reference[d] the existing SEC rules in a way that includes only the limited restrictions
that the SEC currently places," "codifying existing regulatory carve-outs" and "mak[ing] no
change in existing law." HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., CORPORATE AND AUDITING
ACCOUNTABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2002, H.R. REP. No. 107-414,
at 48 (2002). The Senate bill enumerated all of the nonaudit services restricted by the SEC rule
along with internal audit and financial information systems. It also relocated the rulemaking
authority regarding those services to the new accounting regulator. In addition, the Senate bill did
not leave the details of the accounting regulator to the SEC but established them itself, giving the
SEC only the power to appoint the members of the new entity's board.
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regulatory reform, which had been vetted with the accounting profession;
accordingly, the accounting profession supported the House legislation.
That process created an additional barrier to reaching a compromise,
because the failure of Arthur Levitt's regulatory effort a few years earlier
was attributed to Pitt's successful advocacy, as counsel to the accounting
profession, which orchestrated political support for the industry against the
SEC. No doubt the Democrats' displeasure with Pitt-and the Republicans'
support for him-was a factor contributing to their differing positions on
both the organization of the entity regulating accounting and the nonaudit
services provision.99 It is possible that the parties' positions might have
been otherwise had there been a different SEC chairman or if Democrats
had controlled the executive branch.
The debate over the nonaudit services prohibition was, therefore, in
large part a replay of a battle over the regulation of the accounting industry
fought two years earlier when Levitt was SEC chair. But the environment
this time was markedly different. There was a media frenzy, heightened by
a sharply declining stock market and high-profile accounting frauds and
business failures, in the middle of an election year. For example, the major
network evening news coverage between January and July 2002 contained
613 stories on business, of which 471 (77%) were about corporate scandals;
of those stories, 195 connected corporations to Congress (individual
members or the institution itself), while 188 connected corporations to the
Bush Administration. These figures compare to a total of 489 business
stories, of which only 52 (11%) were about scandals, in the same period the
prior year. 00 Moreover, more than 80% of the scandal-related stories
looked to government action to address the problem. 01 In this charged
atmosphere, Levitt's earlier reform proposals now seemed prescient (at
least to the Democrats for whom Levitt was a source of expertise), and the
accounting industry had lost its public credibility with the audit failures. 102
99. In this regard, the House Republicans generally sought to delegate as much authority as
possible to the SEC to organize the regulation of the accounting profession, while the Democrats'
objective was to create an entity with greater independent authority and to provide it with
instructions about its role. Despite the House Republicans' ability to exercise strict control over
the legislative process, the antagonism toward Pitt was so intense that at the committee hearings,
Democrats successfully insisted that he be sworn in as a witness. That posture irritated
Republicans, who contended that formal swearing-in was conventionally reserved for witnesses
representing organizations under investigation. See Enron Hearings II, supra note 77, at 2-9.
100. Video clip: Karlyn H. Bowman, Sarbanes-Oxley and Public Opinion After Enron and
WorldCom, Presentation at Sarbanes-Oxley: A Review (May 5, 2004) [hereinafter Bowman],
available at http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.809,filter.all/event-detail.asp (follow "Video"
link, at 00:13:45) (discussing data compiled by the Media Research Center).
101. Id.
102. See Top of Their Game: Lobby Leaders in 2002, LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 16, 2002, at 14
(noting that the accounting industry's "lobbying effectively stopped the day WorldCom hit"). The
impact of media pressure on the congressional bandwagon for the Levitt-Turner approach is
apparent in Senator Gramm's floor remarks. While criticizing the bill's prohibition of an
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There was a near-total absence of discussion on the Senate floor of the
other three corporate governance mandates-the independent audit
committee provisions, the executive loan ban, and the certification
requirement-that were included in the Senate but not the House bill. Table
2 makes clear that legislators perceived those provisions as unproblematic.
Only a minority of senators (twenty-eight) referred to any of those
provisions on the floor, and nearly all those references were part of laundry
lists, in which senators expressed support for the legislation by enumerating
specific provisions in the bill. 0 3 Besides the two House provisions altered
by the Senate bill as noted earlier, the other topics commonly raised on the
floor as indicated in Table 2 were raised either in conjunction with
consideration of a Senate Judiciary Committee amendment to the bill or
individual senators' attempts to propose amendments to the bill that the
leadership would not permit. One of the more contested failed amendments
involved the efforts of Senators John McCain and Carl Levin to add a
provision on the accounting treatment of stock options. Given a lack of
consensus on the issue, the leadership had agreed not to include such a
provision in the bill because it could have threatened adoption of
legislation. 0 4 This was not a partisan controversy: To obtain support in
committee from members of his own party, Senator Sarbanes had agreed to
eliminate a provision in his original bill on the expensing of stock
options.
105
The Senate Judiciary Committee bill (the Leahy Amendment) consisted
of provisions involving criminal penalties (because these were not within
the Banking Committee's jurisdiction), protection for whistleblowers, and a
provision extending the statute of limitations for private securities fraud
actions. 106 The statute-of-limitations extension overruled a Supreme Court
decision 10 7 setting the statute of limitations, which had been left unchanged
by Congress's 1995 private securities litigation reform despite lobbying at
enumerated set of nine nonaudit services, in contrast to his proposal that would have left the
decision to the new accounting regulator, Gramm referred to having "read editorials" that said the
provision "makes the bill tougher, but I don't think it makes it better," 148 CONG, REC. S6335
(daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm). He also lamented "that the media has decided
that the tougher bill is the bill with more mandates." Id. at S6333.
103. The number twenty-eight eliminates double counting of senators who referred to more
than one of the governance provisions in their remarks; no senator referred to all four mandates.
ROMANO, supra note 19, at 134 n.261. For details on the distribution of senators' remarks,
including the discussion of the conference committee report (not tabulated), see id. Two of the six
Senate references to loans in Table 2, Panel A were references to the disclosure requirement in the
bill and bore no relation to its final form as a loan prohibition.
104. For an overview of Congress's involvement in the nearly decade-old controversy over
the accounting treatment of stock options, see id. at 138 n.268.
105. Hilzenrath et al., supra note 89.
106. The criminal certification requirement was added by another Senate Judiciary
Committee proposal, known as the Biden-Hatch Amendment.
107. Lampfv. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
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the time by the SEC and the plaintiffs' bar to overturn the decision. The
Democratic Senate majority bundled the statute-of-limitations provision
with the bill's extensions of criminal penalties for securities fraud, which
enjoyed broad support. In contrast to the penalty provisions, the civil
statute-of-limitations provision was controversial and had a partisan tinge,
given Republicans' general support for and Democrats' opposition to
litigation reform that restricted liability-positions that paralleled the
perspective of key party constituencies, the business community for the
Republicans and the plaintiffs' bar for the Democrats. 10 8 The measure,
understandably, was not in the Republican-controlled House's version of
the criminal penalty bill. The 1995 securities reform legislation was
bipartisan legislation (it withstood a veto by President Clinton), although it
had been vigorously opposed by the plaintiffs' bar, which was said to have
influenced the President's action. 109 After the Republicans gained the White
House in 2001, Senate Democrats blocked litigation reform initiatives,110
and many Republican legislators and the business community viewed the
effort to "repeal" the 1995 limitations on securities litigation (the only
litigation initiative that had been adopted at the federal level) with
considerable ire.
108. For a discussion of these groups' campaign contributions, especially with regard to
conference committee members, see ROMANO, supra note 19, at 193-98. The Senate Judiciary
Committee voted against a Republican amendment to exclude the provision expanding the statute
of limitations on a 7-11 party-line vote (with one Republican crossover), and then approved, by
voice vote, an amendment lowering the bill's expansion of the statute of limitations, from the
earlier of three years from the date of the discovery of the fraud or five years from the date of the
fraud, to the earlier of two years from the date of the discovery of the fraud or five years from the
date of the fraud. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 22 (2002). The 1995 Securities Litigation Reform Act
and Supreme Court decisions cutting back on liability were mentioned by witnesses during the
hearings as factors contributing to the accounting scandals. E.g., 2 Senate Hearings, supra note
35, at 1008 (statement of Howard Metzenbaum, Chairman, Consumer Fed'n of Am.); 2 id. at
1018-19 (statement of Damon A. Silvers, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, AFL-CIO). A related proposal
promoted by the same witnesses, to reestablish aiding-and-abetting liability under the federal
securities laws (which would have similarly overturned a Supreme Court decision left intact by
the 1995 law that was of interest to the plaintiffs' bar), was not included in the bill. E.g., 2 id. at
1008 (statement of Howard Metzenbaum); 2 id. at 1018-19 (statement of Damon Silvers). Given
the omission from the bill of the one provision and not the other, it is most plausible to conclude
that there was not sufficient support among senators of either party for such an expansion of
liability, and that the latter provision was excluded to ensure the legislation would move forward.
109. The President's veto was unexpected. William Lerach, one of the leading securities class
action plaintiffs' lawyers, met with Clinton at a political dinner the weekend before the veto, but
White House officials stated that the two did not discuss the legislation. See Neil A. Lewis,
Securities Bill Becomes Law as the Senate Overrides Veto, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1995, at 39.
110. Clinton had vetoed other tort reform legislation passed by the Republican Congress, see
Don Van Natta Jr. with Richard A. Oppel Jr., Memo Linking Political Donation and Veto Spurs
Federal Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2000, at A1, and President Bush ran on tort reform, among
other issues, see Leslie Wayne, Trial Lawyers Pour Money into Democrats' Chests, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2000, at Al. When the Democrats took control of the Senate in 2001, tort reform was
"written off as dead" by lobbyists. Leslie Wayne, Senate Shifts, So Lobbyists Who Seek To
Influence Its Legislation Scramble To Shift, Too, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2001, at A16.
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The inclusion of the statute-of-limitations provision provided an
opening for a Republican legislative maneuver leading to cloture. Senator
Gramm moved to separate the statute-of-limitations provision from the
other provisions in the Leahy Amendment, which he was able to do as a
matter of right under the Senate rules. This move jeopardized the bill's
progress. Shortly thereafter, the two sides reached an agreement to clarify
the language regarding the extension of the statute of limitations and to file
a cloture motion on the bill, and the division of the Leahy Amendment was
withdrawn.'II
In the limited time for consideration of the bill following the cloture
motion, a few amendments agreed to by both parties were added on the
floor without debate, including the prohibition of loans to executives. There
was no discussion of that amendment when it was offered by Senator
Charles Schumer: It was immediately unanimously agreed to without a roll-
call vote.1 12 A few days earlier in a speech on Wall Street, President Bush
had called on corporate boards to prevent officers from receiving company
loans. 113 Schumer referred to the President's remarks when introducing the
amendment, and noted that he had "spoken to the people in the White
House who were supportive of [the] amendment."' 14 Just why the President
made the suggestion is unknown. Perhaps he was seeking to immunize
himself from criticism of loans that he had received when he was in
business. 1 5 But whatever the reason, his remarks appear to have been a
decisive factor in the inclusion of this provision, because such a provision
had previously been rejected by the Banking Committee. Senator Sarbanes,
the manager (and drafter) of the legislation, stated, when introducing the
bill on the Senate floor, that the Banking Committee did not "go [as] far" as
prohibiting loans to executives, as some had argued, but instead opted for a
11. See 148 CONG. REC. S6534 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (motion dividing the Leahy
Amendment); id. at S6535 (colloquy between Sens. Sarbanes and Gramm) (linking the division
and cloture motions); id. at S6538 (statement of Sen. Gramm) (describing agreement).
112. Id. at S6690 (daily ed. July 12, 2002). Because the Senate was operating under the
cloture time limits, this was essentially the only way new amendments could be made to the bill.
113. See Press Release, White House, Summary: A New Ethic of Corporate Responsibility
(July 9, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2OO2/O7/2OO20709.html.
The White House's press release on the issue did not seem to indicate that the President was
seeking a statutory rather than a voluntary termination of loans to executives, because his "call" to
cease the practice was addressed to corporate compensation committees. The part of the release
addressed to Congress was a request for action on a proposal for additional funds for the SEC.
114. 148 CONG. REC. S6690 (daily ed. July 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Schumer).
115. In an attempt to tie Bush to the corporate scandals, some Democrats had picked up on
press reports that pointed out that he had received loans as a corporate officer in the 1980s. E.g.,
id. at S6608 (daily ed. July 11, 2002) (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("I ask.., to have printed in the
Record an article from today's Washington Post titled 'Bush Took Oil Firm's Loans as Director';
and an article from today's Washington Times titled 'Cheney Named in Fraud Suit."'
(capitalization altered)).
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disclosure requirement, because "[s]ome testified there are some good
reasons" for providing loans to officers "on occasion."
' 16
The near-total absence of considered discourse on SOX's governance
provisions in the Senate is consistent with the characterization of the
corporate governance issues as being "below the radar screen" and "inside
the Beltway." In the limited time frame available for legislative debate,
senators did not focus any attention on the corporate governance provisions.
Thus, as in the House, legislators who could not possibly be informed on
technical issues and who felt that they had to act under the pressure of
mounting corporate accounting scandals simply accepted the bill that was
presented. That bill consisted of measures advocated by policy
entrepreneurs (former government officials aligned largely with one
political party), as filtered by the Banking Committee chairman. Many of
those individuals were advancing proposals that they had previously
advocated and that they believed would improve the quality of financial
reporting, despite a virtually complete lack of data supporting their beliefs.
With little attention accorded to the proposals in the committee hearings
and even less attention on the floor, the disjuncture between the
recommended policies and the empirical literature was never even
acknowledged, as might have been possible if the legislative process had
not been operating in a crisis atmosphere.' 17
The policy entrepreneurs on whom the Democrats relied in the context
of the highly publicized and time-restricted deliberation over SOX-Arthur
Levitt, the former SEC chairman, and Lynn Turner, who had been chief
accountant during Levitt's tenure-are the key to understanding why
Congress enacted a series of provisions that are ill matched to fulfill their
stated objectives. During Levitt's term as chairman, empirical research was
accorded little weight in the setting of regulation. This fact is made plain by
the SEC's response while he was chairman to the Panel on Audit
116. Id. at S6332, S6332-33 (daily ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
117. The committee hearings are discussed infra Section II.C. Corporate governance
proposals were often suggested in witnesses' written statements but not emphasized in their oral
testimony, and consequently such proposals did not receive much attention from the legislators
participating in the hearings. The Chamber of Commerce lobbied against several provisions of the
bill, see, e.g., Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President, Government Affairs, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, to Members of the United States Senate (July 15, 2002) [hereinafter
Chamber Senate Letter], available at http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2002/
020715s2673.htm (discussing the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection
Act of 2002), but when WorldCom collapsed the lobbying process shut down, and the
Republicans, who had up to then taken seriously the business community's objections, reversed
course and accepted the Democrats' bill. See Top of Their Game, supra note 102. As one
commentator put it, "[T]he Chamber [of Commerce] called on Congress to be 'cautious' in its
final considerations of the measure. Congress' answer: fat chance in an election year." Peter
Mayberry & Jessica Franken, Legislation Targets Stock Scandals, NONWOVENS INDUSTRY, Sept.
2002, at 20, 22.
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Effectiveness's failure to find that the provision of nonaudit services
compromised audit quality. In the release on the proposed auditor
independence rules restricting nonaudit services, the agency summarily
dismissed the concern raised by the accounting profession that, in light of
the Panel's report, there was no evidence of a connection between the
provision of nonaudit services and accounting fraud or audit compromise.
The SEC stated that "[s]tudies cannot always confirm what common sense
makes clear."'1 8 The Panel, it should be recalled, was created at Levitt's
request. Not surprisingly, a statute informed by Levitt's perspective would
not be responsive to the concerns of a literature that did not fit with his
preconceptions.
c. Why Did the Republicans Support the Democrats' Bill?
The difficult political environment provides the context for why the
Republicans voted for a bill influenced by Democratic policy advisers
whose views were at odds with their own political viewpoint and that of
important constituents. That environment would have limited Republicans'
ability to use the empirical literature supporting their position, had they
recognized or assimilated it. But there was another important factor
affecting the Republicans' resolve to maneuver against the Democrats' bill.
A united business community can be a powerful political force, although its
political clout is often misunderstood and overstated,119 but SOX was not,
in the end, a unifying issue. The business community split over the Senate
bill: The Business Roundtable, whose membership consists of large
corporations, supported that bill, while the Chamber of Commerce, which
has many small-firm members, 120 did not.
118. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg.
43,148, 43,155 (July 12, 2000).
119. Mark Smith has carefully demonstrated that when business unites behind legislation,
labor tends to be united on the other side. As a consequence, if business "wins" it is because
public opinion and election outcomes are tilting toward business's policy position and not because
of financial leverage exerted by business over legislators. MARK A. SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS
AND POLITICAL POWER: PUBLIC OPINION, ELECTIONS, AND DEMOCRACY (2000). As Smith
details, issues that unify business tend to be ideological (the issue separates liberals and
conservatives), partisan (the issue separates Democrats and Republicans), and salient (the issue is
highly visible to the public). Thus, Smith finds that in these issue contexts, direct resources or
forms of power wielded by business (through campaign contributions and lobbying capacity) do
not explain legislative outcomes, but public opinion polls reflecting attitudes toward business and
the partisan composition of elected lawmakers do.
120. The overwhelming majority of the Chamber's members are small firms, although larger
firms provide more of the organization's revenues (because dues are payable on a sliding scale)
and have dominated its board of directors. Id. at 49. Smith considers the Chamber's positions "in
their entirety" to "demonstrate a reasonable balance between big and small business." Id.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
Quack Corporate Governance
The different positions of the business umbrella organizations on the
Senate bill can plausibly be explained by the disparity in expected
compliance costs for the organizations' members regarding the accounting
and certification measures: The small and medium-sized firms that are the
membership base of the Chamber of Commerce were expected to find it far
more costly to meet the proposed legislative mandates than large firms.
2 1
Accordingly, the Chamber supported an amendment proposed by Senator
Gramm to permit the new accounting regulator to exempt small businesses
from the nonaudit services prohibitions (it was not enacted). 22 A further
source of divergence between the positions of the Business Roundtable and
the Chamber of Commerce may have been the accounting scandals'
concentration among the largest public corporations. Roundtable members
may have thought that by supporting the legislative proposal perceived to
be tougher on corporate crime and accountability, they would be distancing
themselves in the public mind from scandal-tinged firms, a factor of little
moment to smaller businesses.
When core constituents are divided on an issue, there is no obvious
winner or loser for a legislator to support. With the media criticizing the
Republicans' bill, compared to the Democrats' bill, as too lax toward
corporate wrongdoers (accountants and executives), the split among key
business constituents gave Republicans little reason to insist on their bill
and risk alienating other constituents, individuals whose pension and stock
portfolios had declined precipitously in the wake of the corporate scandals.
It is possible that many Senate Republicans had closer connections to
the Chamber than to the Roundtable (because all states have many Chamber
members) and voted for the Democratic bill consistent with their stated
reason for seeking its quick adoption, to get to conference and negotiate a
final bill closer to the House bill that the Chamber preferred. But there were
some other plausible benefits for Republicans from expediting the process.
121. For example, several members of Congress expressed concern that the nonaudit services
prohibition would adversely affect small businesses, which relied on their outside accountants
more for a variety of services than large firms. E.g., 148 CONG. REC. S6335 (daily ed. July 8,
2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm); id. at S6339 (statement of Sen. Enzi); id. at S6693 (daily ed.
July 12, 2002) (statement of Sen. Santorum). For evidence that the expectation that SOX would be
costlier for small firms was correct, see infra notes 188-193 and accompanying text.
122. Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President, Government Affairs, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, to Members of the United States Senate (July 11, 2002), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2002/02071 1s2673a.htm ("Support Senator Gramm's
Amendment to S. 2673"). Gramm's amendment was introduced with the stated purpose of
"provid[ing] the Board with appropriate flexibility in applying non-audit services restrictions to
small businesses." 148 CONG. REC. S6537-38 (daily ed. July 10, 2002) (amendment no. 4184 to
division 1 of amendment no. 4174). The amendment was introduced in conjunction with Gramm's
motion to divide the Leahy Amendment, as an amendment to the amendment calling for the
division. Id. But the amendment was never voted on in the wake of the compromise that followed
Gramm's motion: Grammn withdrew his amendments in exchange for the agreement to vote on
cloture. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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The issue of corporate accountability that was implicated by the accounting
scandals was considered a Democratic issue, and Republicans feared that
Democrats would gain in the midterm elections if no legislation was
enacted and Republican candidates could be portrayed as "soft" on
corporate crime. 123 In addition, an expedited process limiting the time spent
considering the bill would provide one less reason for the public to have a
negative view of Congress. Political scientists have found that public
opinion is least approving of Congress when members engage in open
partisan debate and conflict over legislation-that is, attitudes toward
Congress are influenced not simply by the policies produced but by the
processes that make those policies. 24 Limited consideration and quick floor
passage of the bill curtailed partisan debate and shifted discussion of the
issues out of the public spotlight. Electoral concerns were thereby
addressed at the cost of a comprehensive consideration of the implications
of the legislation.
It is far from clear how realistic the Republicans' expectation of
achieving a better result in the conference committee was at the time of the
floor debate: Some studies by political scientists, for example, have
suggested that the Senate has the upper hand in conference. 25 But whatever
123. E.g., Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee, Accounting: Congress Only Looks like It's
Getting Tough, BUS. WK., Apr. 29, 2002, at 51. Democrats actively sought to associate
Republicans, and especially the Bush Administration, with corporate crime. E.g., 148 CONG. REC.
S6749 (daily ed. July 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. Grassley). Grassley explained,
I have heard... during... news conferences... Democrats wishing to use Enron
and WorldCom events very much as, I think, political issues. I think maybe the
Democrats are hoping for a "November storm" in which our economy is weak and no
progress is made on accounting reforms.
... [T]he distinguished majority leader on "Face the Nation" recently attributed
the current crisis to the alleged "permissive" attitude in the Bush administration
towards business.
Id. For a summary of efforts to connect the Bush Administration to the corporate scandals and
suggestions about why the scandal-stoking efforts failed, see ROMANO, supra note 19, at 131-32
& nn.254-57.
124. John R. Hibbing & James T. Smith, What the American Public Wants Congress To Be,
in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 45, 46-52, 58-63 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds.,
7th ed. 2001). It should be noted that the idea that partisan debate produces negative consequences
may be limited to modem Congresses (the data from which the hypothesis is derived and tested
are from post-World War II Congresses, so the relation may not hold historically). Moreover,
many members of Congress appear to behave as if this were not true, because they often engage in
intensive partisan debate.
125. For a review of studies indicating Senate dominance in conference, see WILLIAM J.
KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES
181-82, 204 nn.35-39 (8th ed. 1993). The studies reviewed do not provide much in the way of a
theoretical explanation for this phenomenon, except to note that, in the appropriations context in
some of the studies, the Senate is required to move second. Keefe and Ogul caution that it is
difficult to tell who "wins" given the complexity of legislation. Other political scientists
emphasize that the Senate's rules give it an advantage in conference: The greater power of
individual senators to hold up legislation translates into a supermajority vote necessary for that
chamber's adoption of the conference's output, compared to only a majority in the House. Barbara
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the merits of the strategy, with hindsight, the calculation proved to be
seriously mistaken. The conference compromise strategy unraveled as a
rapidly changing environment made the political landscape considerably
more hostile to the Republicans' less regulation-oriented position once the
conference committee convened. That is, events overtook them: Intensive
scrutiny by the media, calling for government action and attacking the
House bill as inadequate, 126 took a toll in the wake of additional revelations
of accounting irregularities at WorldCom, its subsequent bankruptcy filing,
and the continued tanking of the stock market. Members of Congress feared
that there might be additional revelations of corporate misconduct that
would further depress the market and make corporate scandals a potent
reelection issue. Internal polls indicated that public confidence was
dropping, which contributed to Republican concern that any delay in acting
on corporate governance legislation (i.e., not adopting the Democrats' bill)
would be "politically perilous."'' 27 As a lobbyist for the Chamber of
Commerce, which opposed the Senate bill, put it, "When the WorldCom
scandal hit, it became, to me, a bit of a-a very different attitude and
atmosphere, if not a political tsunami ....28
These factors-a media frenzy and the precipitous drop in the stock
market, in conjunction with reelection concerns-led the conference
committee to act quickly and report a bill virtually identical to the Senate
bill, with only a few minor changes (such as inclusion of the House's
lengthier criminal sanctions). 129 That is, the Republicans capitulated to the
Democrats' bill. As House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt put it, the
Republicans' action was "'an unconditional surrender."", 130 This may well
have been a prudent decision for Republicans from the perspective of their
electoral ambitions. As commentators have suggested, the electoral gains
Sinclair, The New World of U.S. Senators, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 124, at 1, 17.
But it is most likely impossible for there to be any long-term, predictable, systematic institutional
difference in conference success rates. That is because the losing chamber would become
cognizant of that fact and adapt its legislative strategies to offset the disadvantage, such as by
revising the initial content of proposed bills to alter the nature of the conference bargaining
process to its advantage or by otherwise redesigning its procedural rules.
126. E.g., Editorial, Mr. Oxley Punts, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2002, at A28. The intensified
national network news coverage of the corporate scandals framed the issue as a "national and
systemic problem" rather than one of "individual or corporate misdeeds," thus necessitating
government action. Bowman, supra note 100.
127. Gail Russell Chaddock, Congressmen, Too, Feel Pocketbook Panic, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 25, 2002, at 2.
128. World News Tonight, supra note 10 (remarks of R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice
President, Gov't Affairs, U.S. Chamber of Commerce). For a discussion of lobbying expenditures
on SOX, see ROMANO, supra note 19, at 198-201.
129. Business groups advocated three changes to the bill: The two that limited the
applicability of the certification requirement were adopted in conference, but the third, to
eliminate the statute-of-limitations extension, was not. Hilzenrath et al., supra note 89.
130. Jim Drinkard, Deal Reached on Business Reform, USA TODAY, July 25, 2002, at IA.
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Republicans made in the 2002 election were due to national security
(especially September 11) being the public's dominant concern rather than,
as had been expected, corporate scandals, which were thought to be an issue
favoring the Democrats.' 3' The enactment of SOX may have contributed to
a shift in public focus by removing corporate scandals from the public
policy agenda.
C. The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs
Given the general lack of interest in the SOX corporate governance
mandates shown by legislators during the floor debate, to understand how
those mandates came into being one must examine the deliberation process
of the committees with legislative jurisdiction: the House Financial
Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee. Congressional
hearings serve multiple functions in the formulation of public policy, often
educating the public about proposed legislation more than legislators. As
this Section details, public policy entrepreneurs, who were mostly former
government officials, and the Senate Banking Committee chairman, Senator
Sarbanes, were key formulators of SOX's corporate governance provisions.
This may not have been fortuitous, because government officials (present
and former) were the group consulted most often by the originating
committees during the legislative process in seven House and ten Senate
committee hearings held from December 2001 to April 2002, as indicated
in Table 3. Virtually all of these individuals were associated in some
capacity with the SEC.
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TABLE 3. WITNESSES AT HEARINGS OF THE SENATE BANKING,
HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND THE HOUSE
FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE, 2001-2002132
House
HueHouse Senate
Witness type hearing minority Senatehearing hearing
Academics and policy analysts 1 1 6
Accounting industry 1 0 5
Accounting regulators 0 0 6
Business groups 3 0 0
Consumer groups 1 0 1
Enron/Arthur Andersen officials 3 0 0
Federal government officials 6 2 10
(current or former)
Institutional investors 3 0 2
Other 33  1 0 5
Securities analysts 1 0 2
Securities industry 1 0 1
Unions 134  1 1 1
Total witnesses 22 4 39
Two important differences between the Senate and House committees'
hearings should be noted at the outset, because they suggest why the Senate
bill would have been more likely to contain governance mandates than the
132. Data for the table were tabulated from House CARTA Hearings, supra note 77, and
Senate Hearings, supra note 35. The House committee hearings were held on December 12, 2001;
February 4 and 5, 2002; and March 13 and 20, 2002; the witnesses at the committee's hearing on
Global Crossing on March 21, 2002 (one government official and seven executives from the
company and industry) are not included in the table. The Democratic House minority held a
hearing on April 9, 2002. The Senate committee hearings were held on February 12, 14, 26, and
27, 2002 and March 5, 6, 14, 19, 20, and 21, 2002. Two House witnesses (a government official
and an Arthur Andersen official) appeared at two different House hearings and are therefore
counted twice.
133. The House witness in this category was an attorney. The Senate witnesses in this
category were the former head of the FDIC, an accountant; an investment banker who chaired the
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees; a
lawyer who served on the Blue Ribbon Committee; an accountant/investment bank partner who
was deputy chair of the 1978 Cohen Commission on accounting; and an accountant who chaired
the Panel on Audit Effectiveness.
134. The union witness was invited to the House committee hearing at the request of the
ranking minority member.
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House bill, even controlling for the difference in majority party. First, while
two House committee hearings were held on draft legislation (the majority
and the minority bills), no Senate committee hearing was held on any bill,
including the bill introduced on the floor. 135 By holding hearings on specific
legislative proposals, the House process tightly focused witnesses' remarks.
By contrast, Senate witnesses could range far more freely, because they
were not directed to comment on particular bills. This may well have
affected policy entrepreneurs' effectiveness, because they had greater
ability to set the agenda of their testimony and could thereby more actively
seek to shape legislative policy.
Second, the composition of the witnesses differed across the chambers.
Remarkably, the Senate committee heard no witnesses from the business
community, in contrast to the House, even though business was an
anticipated object of regulation and ostensibly among the potential
beneficiaries of the legislation. The business community would, for
instance, benefit from any improvement in the quality of auditing
accomplished by legislation. Instead, the Senate was more focused on the
accounting profession; it heard from a larger number of accounting industry
regulators and members than did the House.136 Of course, it should be noted
that witness lists are obviously not random. Committees select their
witnesses. The presence or absence of a specific class of witnesses in a
chamber is a conscious choice related to specific policy objectives. 137 The
135. Most of the ten hearings the Senate committee held on Enron-related concerns focused
on issues that were ultimately included in the reported bill, such as the structure of a new
oversight agency for accountants and the prohibition on nonaudit services.
136. Because all five of the Senate witnesses from the accounting industry were affiliated
with the AICPA and testified on the same panel, the industry was not as well represented as it
might appear. By segregating all of the industry's testimony into one session, with individuals
expressing one institution's policy perspective, the potential impact of the testimony on senators
and the public (through the media covering the hearings) was subtly diluted. By contrast,
accounting regulators were also grouped together on panels, but they testified over several
sessions, and consequently there was a greater opportunity for legislators to assimilate their
positions and for the media to showcase their perspective. It should be noted that the SEC chief
accountants are classified in Table 3 as government officials, not accounting regulators. Thus, the
number of accounting regulators testifying (as compared to industry representatives) is even
higher than appears in the table.
137. Institutional differences may also have been a factor: In the House, as noted, the
majority party exercises far greater control over the legislative process than in the Senate. Thus,
the selection of witnesses might be expected to be more one-sided in the House than in the Senate.
In this regard, it is instructive that the House minority demanded a hearing, which they had of
right under the House rules. House CARTA Hearings, supra note 77, at 127 (statement of Rep.
LaFalce). The focus of that hearing was a comparison of the Democrats' bill with that of the
majority. It was held after the full committee's hearings were completed, immediately before the
committee was to mark up the Republican bill. By contrast, the Senate minority expressed its
satisfaction with the hearings conducted by Senator Sarbanes. E.g., 148 CONG. REC. S6333 (daily
ed. July 8, 2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm) ("I would like to say for the record that no one can
object to the hearings we had, the approach the chairman has taken."); id. at S6338 (statement of
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choice is significant because a hearing provides an opportunity to showcase
potential legislation and may therefore be "orchestrated to make a record
for (or against) a particular proposal." 138 Given that the chambers were
controlled by different political parties, it is not surprising that their
witnesses differed or that the corporate governance mandates were
introduced in the Senate process, because the parties' policy objectives
differed. 139
1. Executive Loans
The origin of the executive loan provision in the Senate bill is the
easiest of the corporate governance mandates to trace. At the initial Senate
hearing, one witness expressed concern about executive loans. This was
former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, who recommended that all loans
be disclosed in corporate proxies and, when above a specified amount,
subject to shareholder approval.1 40 This resonated with Senator Sarbanes,
who proceeded to ask six other witnesses (witnesses on two panels
considered to have expertise in corporate governance) what they thought of
Breeden's testimony regarding loans. Only one witness, former Democratic
Senator Howard Metzenbaum, representing the Consumer Federation of
Sen. Enzi) ("Had it been my choice to call the witnesses, I would have chosen nearly every person
who testified.").
138. KERNELL & JACOBSON, supra note 76, at 225. Hearings may also be used "to generate
publicity for committee members as well as issues." Id. The hearings of other committees (not
summarized in Table 3) investigating Enron's collapse, which summoned as witnesses Enron
executives whom they knew would invoke their Fifth Amendment rights, tend to fall in this latter
category.
139. There was, in fact, little overlap between the House and Senate witnesses. Only six of
sixty-three witnesses testified before both the House and Senate committees. Five were current or
former government officials: Harvey L. Pitt (then the SEC chairman), Roderick M. Hills (SEC
chairman, 1975-1977), and Lynn E. Turner (SEC chief accountant, 1998-2001, during Arthur
Levitt's term as chairman) testified to both chambers' committees; Richard C. Breeden (SEC
chairman, 1989-1993) and David M. Walker (comptroller general of the United States, serving a
fifteen-year term as head of the GAO, to which he was appointed in 1998) testified at a Senate
committee hearing and at the hearing held at the request of the minority of the House committee.
The sixth witness, union official Damon A. Silvers (associate general counsel, AFL-CIO),
testified to both committees, although his appearance before the House committee was
specifically identified as having been at the request of the ranking minority member. Not included
among the six are two organizations that were represented by different individuals in the two
chambers, the Consumer Federation of America (whose representative for the Senate hearing was
the chairman, a former senator) and TIAA-CREF. However, TIAA-CREF's Senate witness,
Chairman John Biggs, appears to have been called not as a representative of that specific
institutional investor but as a corporate governance expert because of his participation on the Blue
Ribbon Committee (along with the other witness on his panel) and the Public Oversight Board
(the other members of which testified on a subsequent Senate panel). See 1 Senate Hearings,
supra note 35, at 342 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
140. 1 id. at 62 (prepared statement of Richard Breeden). Breeden also suggested prohibiting
the use of stock to repay loans. No other witnesses included the regulation of loans in their
prepared statements.
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America, thought that loans to officers should be banned.14' The other
witnesses queried-a prominent corporate governance attorney and
representatives of institutional investors and the AFL-CIO---expressed
support only for a disclosure provision. 142 Indeed, one of the witnesses
noted that company loans originated for the legitimate purpose of assisting
relocations and argued that it would "get[] very messy" if Congress were to
say, "[Y]ou cannot ever lend money to an employee."
143
The importance of the difference across the chambers in structuring
witness testimony is well illustrated by the testimony on executive loans:
Breeden was also a witness at the House hearing on the minority bill, but he
did not mention the issue of executive loans in his House testimony. 144 His
written statement responded to specific questions posed by the committee to
the witnesses in advance, none of which explicitly mentioned loans.
Although the questions mentioned corporate governance and disclosure of
conflicts of interests, Breeden did not take the opportunity to include a
recommendation regarding loan disclosure in any of his responses. Because
his testimony to the House occurred two months after he had testified to the
Senate, whatever the reason for the omission, it was not because the issue
had not occurred to him. It is possible that Breeden did not refer to loans
because the House bill contained a loan disclosure provision, but he
specifically addressed other provisions in the bill to commend or criticize
their inclusion, so that would not appear to be a satisfactory explanation for
the omission. This suggests an additional possibility: Corporate loan
regulation was not high on Breeden's agenda. Indeed, disclosure of
executive loans was only one of a number of proposals that Breeden had
suggested to the Senate committee, and he raised one of those other ideas in
his written House responses.145 Sarbanes mulled over Breeden's proposal
141. 2 id. at 1024 (statement of Howard Metzenbaum).
142. 1 id. at 370 (statements of John H. Biggs, Chairman, TIAA-CREF, and Ira M. Millstein,
Attorney and Co-Chairman, Blue Ribbon Comm. on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate
Audit Comms.); 2 id. at 1024, 1026 (statement of Sarah Teslik, Executive Dir., Council of
Institutional Investors); 2 id. at 1025 (statement of Damon A. Silvers, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, AFL-
CIO); 2 id. at 1026 (statement of Thomas A. Bowman, President, Ass'n for Inv. Mgmt. &
Research).
143. 2 id. at 1026 (statement of Sarah Teslik).
144. In the House hearings, executive loans came up only once, at an early hearing held
before a bill had been drafted (and before Breeden's testimony to the Senate), when a
representative asked Pitt whether he thought a "more efficient disclosure mechanism" was needed
for insiders selling stock back to their companies and, more generally, for all executive loans.
Enron Hearings II, supra note 77, at 44 (statement of Rep. Bentsen). Pitt replied that the SEC
needed to take a closer look, because more disclosure might be needed, and that the agency
probably had sufficient authority to take care of disclosure issues, but he added that he could
"understand why Congress might deem it appropriate to legislate here." Id. (statement of Harvey
Pitt).
145. Among Breeden's other proposals were moving to multiyear contracts for auditors with
serious periodic review, instituting a cooling-off period before public corporations could hire a
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regarding executive loans with other witnesses and adopted that approach in
his bill, paralleling the provision in the House bill, which was neither
inspired nor discussed by Breeden (nor any other House witness).
Whether Sarbanes would have included a disclosure provision if he had
foreseen its transformation into an outright ban on the Senate floor cannot
be ascertained in hindsight. It is probable that the prohibition would have
been included as an amendment to the Senate bill even had there been no
provision touching on loans. Given the timing of the President's remarks, it
is unlikely that any senator would have objected, and the subject matter
would surely have been deemed germane. But it is ironic that the avenue
facilitating its inclusion-the loan disclosure provision-was an idea that
appealed more to the committee chairman than to its originator, Richard
Breeden, for whom it was one, and in all likelihood not the most important,
of a series of proposals, most of which were not pursued by the committee.
2. Independent Audit Committees
The origin of the Senate provision requiring independent audit
committees is a bit harder to trace than that of the loan provision. The
composition of the audit committee was a concern emphasized by former
SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills in both chambers' earliest hearings,
although his specific proposal was to require that members of the audit
committee be appointed by nominating committees consisting exclusively
of independent directors. 146 It should be noted that the initial stock
exchange requirement of an audit committee occurred on his watch as SEC
chairman, in 1974, in the wake of a corporate scandal involving sensitive
payments to foreign officials. 147 Hills perceived his recommendation as
being a timely and necessary follow-up to that legislation, that is, as the
member of the outside audit team for a senior financial position, and requiring accounting firms to
have independent boards of directors. 1 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 62, 65 (statement of
Richard Breeden). Only the first of these was mentioned in his House statement, in response to a
question regarding mandatory rotation. House CARTA Hearings, supra note 77, at 476 (statement
of Richard Breeden). In response to a question regarding what corporate governance reforms were
necessary, Breeden suggested disclosure of waivers of company ethics or conflicts codes and of
any conflict of interest involving a senior officer. Id. at 473. Breeden was not the only witness to
refer to a cooling-off period in the Senate hearings, and it was included in the bill.
146. House CARTA Hearings, supra note 77, at 263 (statement of Roderick Hills); 1 Senate
Hearings, supra note 35, at 83 (prepared statement of Roderick Hills).
147. 1 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 78 (prepared statement of Roderick Hills). The
foreign payment scandal also produced federal legislation, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. (91 Stat.) 1494 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.), which prohibited such payments and required public companies to adopt a system of
internal controls.
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provision of a "legislative endorsement" or of a more formal legal status for
audit committees. 1
48
Other witnesses on the Senate panel with Hills also referred to the
importance of independent audit committees or to a vague need to
"enhance" their independence, but they did not provide specific
proposals. 49 In later sessions, however, witnesses made more concrete
recommendations on independence similar to the provisions included in the
Senate bill. Most notably, Lynn Turner stated that the stock exchange rules
permitting exceptions to the requirement that all audit committee members
be independent should be eliminated.150  Another former SEC chief
accountant, Michael Sutton, also recommended requiring completely
independent audit committees.1 5' The third former SEC chief accountant
who testified on the panel, Walter Schuetze, stated that Enron's problems
were inherent to current accounting rules (that assets and liabilities are not
marked to market) rather than due to lack of auditor independence or
oversight. He also provided copies of his articles discussing how
accounting ought to be reformed, one of which referred to another article's
"excellent discussion and analysis" of why the presence of independent
audit committees cannot improve the quality of an audit.' 52 He did not,
however, challenge his copanelists' recommendations on audit committee
composition, nor was he asked for his views on that matter, and the
suggestion in his articles that independent audit committees would not
148. 1 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 92 (letter from Roderick M. Hills to Steve Harris,
Majority Staff Dir., Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs); see also House CARTA
Hearings, supra note 77, at 48 (statement of Roderick Hills).
149. E.g., I id. at 67 (written statement of Richard Breeden) (suggesting that states should
"enhance audit committee independence" but offering no specific proposal); I id. at 73 (written
statement of David S. Ruder, SEC Chairman, 1987-1989) (noting that the role of the audit
committee is "particularly important" but providing no specific proposal); I id. at 75 (written
statement of Harold M. Williams, SEC Chairman, 1977-1981) (noting the "need[] to address,"
among other topics, the composition of the board and audit committees but advancing no specific
proposal).
150. 1 id. at 198-99 (statement of Lynn Turner). Turner also advocated changing the
definition of independence to prohibit payments on behalf of a director to charitable
organizations. Audit committee independence did not come up in his testimony to the House, but
his proposals to eliminate exceptions from the stock exchange rules on audit committee
independence and to modify the definition of director independence were included in his written
statement. House CARTA Hearings, supra note 77, at 288 (written statement of Lynn Turner).
151. Sutton did not refer to this recommendation in his oral remarks but opined in his written
statement that audit committees "should be made up of entirely independent directors." I Senate
Hearings, supra note 35, at 243 (written statement of Michael H. Sutton, SEC Chief Accountant,
1995-1998). The written recommendation was picked up by Senator Zell Miller, who asked
another witness, a corporate governance expert, what he thought of it. I id. at 362 (statement of
Sen. Miller) (addressing Ira Millstein ("Yesterday, Mr. Sutton went so far as to recommend that
the audit committee ought to be made up entirely of independent directors. What do you think
about that?")).
152. 1 id. at 291 (lecture given by Walter P. Schuetze, SEC Chief Accountant, 1992-1995);
see I id. at 189-91 (statement of Walter P. Schuetze).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
Quack Corporate Governance
alleviate the problem was not picked up by any senator. It was simply
ignored.
The recommendation of the other two former SEC chief accountants
regarding audit committee independence was not ignored, however. Senator
Sarbanes. for example, stated at the outset of the Senate hearing that came
after their testimony that suggestions had been "brought to [the
committee's] attention to require stock exchanges to toughen board and
committee independence standards." 153 The objective of that subsequent
hearing was, in fact, "to consider numerous corporate governance issues
raised by recent corporate difficulties," and among the issues Sarbanes
identified as receiving "widespread attention" was the independence of
directors and audit committees. 154 That day's panel was composed of two
witnesses called as experts on corporate governance: Ira Millstein, a
prominent corporate lawyer who was co-chair of the Blue Ribbon
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees,
and John Biggs, the chief executive of the activist institutional investor
TIAA-CREF who was a member of the Blue Ribbon Committee and the
Public Oversight Board.
Neither of the corporate governance expert witnesses' statements
referred to audit committee composition. When asked whether audit
committees should consist solely of independent directors, both witnesses
replied that that was already the practice (a reason, presumably, for their not
addressing the matter in their prepared remarks). 5 5 Millstein had
recommended requiring (through the SEC's encouragement of a new stock
exchange listing requirement) a substantial majority of the board, and all
the members of the nominating and compensation committees, to be
independent.1 56 In this regard, Millstein echoed the position of former SEC
Chairman Hills concerning the need for independent nominating
committees. But a more relevant comparison is the similarity of his
approach to policy proposals with that of former Chairman Levitt. Millstein
in his testimony never referred to the existence of a literature at odds with
153. 1 id. at 342 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
154. 1 id. at341.
155. 1 id at 362 (statement of Ira Millstein) (stating that independence is already required by
stock exchanges); I id. (statement of John Biggs) (stating that independence is "pretty standard
now").
156. 1 id. at 354, 362 (statement of Ira Millstein). Although Congress did not pick up on this
suggestion, the stock exchanges thereafter amended their listing requirements to require listed
companies to have a majority of independent directors on their boards and completely
independent nominating and compensation committees. Self-Regulatory Organizations, NYSE
and NASD, Order Approving Proposed Rules Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48,745, 68
Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 4, 2003) (approving NYSE Final Rule, Final Corporate Governance
Listing Standards (to be codified at NYSE Listing Manual § 303A) and NASD Amendments to
Rules 4200 and 4350(c)).
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his position on board independence, of which he was fully aware, given that
he had coauthored an article at variance with the literature on the point.
157
The literature was instead treated as though it did not exist. The committee
bill did not follow his further suggestions, however; it focused solely on
audit committee composition.
As with the issue of executive loans, Sarbanes also asked the witnesses
on the second panel devoted to corporate governance their views on the
need to strengthen audit committee independence, referring to Hills's
testimony regarding the relation between audit and nominating committees.
The reaction of this panel was similar to that of the prior panel. None of the
witnesses offered specific responses directed at the composition of the audit
committee. 158 But in written documents provided to the committee, they
recommended requiring that a majority of the board be independent. 5 9
Finally, four Senate witnesses raised the independence of the audit (or
nominating) committee in their testimony, but only one actually
recommended complete independence of the audit committee, and that was
a circumspect recommendation.1 60  An equal number of witnesses
157. Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance
of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1296-98 (1998).
158. Their written statements referred to tightening the definition of independence, as had
Millstein's testimony. 1 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 354, 362 (statement of Ira Millstein)
(advocating standardizing the definition of director independence to the stock exchange definition
for the audit committee, which followed the Blue Ribbon Committee's definition); 2 id. at 1040
(prepared statement of Howard M. Metzenbaum, Chairman, Consumer Fed'n of Am.) (advocating
that stock exchanges adopt the entire independence recommendation of the Blue Ribbon
Committee); 2 id at 1057 (response of Sarah Teslik to written questions of Sen. Akaka)
(advocating tightening the independence definition). Their responses to Sarbanes's question
regarding audit committee independence were not directly on point: Metzenbaum's response was
to suggest that a procedure be developed whereby "outside sources" would recommend whom to
put on the audit committee, rather than have management select them, while Teslik's response
was to suggest having audit committees select the auditor and certify their firm's financials. 2 id.
at 1022-23 (statement of Sarah Teslik).
159. 2 id. at 1040 (prepared statement of Howard Metzenbaum) (recommending that
exchanges be pressed to adopt a listing requirement that a majority of the board be independent,
and tighter definitions of independence); 2 id. at 1048 (prepared statement of Thomas A.
Bowman, President and CEO, Ass'n for Inv. Mgmt. & Research) (recommending requiring that at
least half of the directors be independent, along with board rather than management appointment
of the members of the audit, nominating, and compensation committees); 2 id. at 1057 (response
of Sarah Teslik to written questions of Sen. Akaka) (recommending requiring that two-thirds of
the board be independent). Arthur Levitt also expressed the opinion that stock exchanges should
adopt listing standards requiring a majority of independent directors on boards, but he did not
advocate that as a legislative reform. l id. at 14 (statement of Arthur Levitt).
160. 2 id. at 533 (statement of Joel Seligman, Dean, Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law) (stating that
he was "struck by the testimony" of Hills and recommending strengthening the independence of
the audit committee and creating an independent nominating committee to appoint the audit
committee); 2 id. at 554-55 (prepared statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller Gen. of the
United States, GAO) (including, in a list of questions Congress needed to consider, whether
independence rules for audit committees were adequate); 2 id. at 876 (prepared statement of
Robert E. Litan, Vice President & Dir., Econ. Studies Program, The Brookings Inst.) (noting that
the "best" available option for increasing auditors' incentives to improve performance was to
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emphasized the need for audit committee members to have greater auditing,
finance, and accounting expertise.1 6 1 None of the witnesses expressed the
slightest awareness of a literature bearing on whether director independence
(on the audit committee or on the board as a whole) or expertise matters for
either audit quality or corporate performance. It is therefore understandable
that an audit committee independence requirement was viewed as
unproblematic: The idea had been advanced by former high-ranking
government officials who were well regarded by many members of the
Senate Banking Committee, the committee chairman found the idea
attractive, and the committee never had to confront the inconvenient reality
that there was a relevant literature whose learning was starkly at odds with
this regulatory focus. As far as the committee was concerned, the literature
did not exist.
Again, a comparison with the more focused House hearings is
instructive. In the House hearings, only a few witnesses raised the issue of
audit committee independence, and none advocated requiring a majority of
independent directors on the board.162 Hills testified to the House
committee as he had to the Senate committee, and although he again
emphasized the importance of the audit committee, his proposal focused on
the nominating committee, noting his concern that an audit committee
could not be independent unless it was appointed by an independent
nominating committee.163 In the House hearings, only one witness
suggested a need for completely independent audit committees, and a few
require all members of audit committees to be independent but cautioning that this option was not
perfect because management influences who is on the committee and because committees would
have to spend much more time than in current practice and be compensated more highly); 2 id. at
968 (prepared statement of L. William Seidman, former Chairman, FDIC, and former Chairman,
Resolution Trust Corp.) (noting there are many independence rules in place for audit committees,
arguing for the need to take care not to unduly burden those committees because doing so would
reduce the availability of good directors to serve, and recommending independent nominating
committees).
161. See 2 id. at 691 (statement of Arthur R. Wyatt, Professor of Accountancy, Emeritus,
Univ. of Ill., and former Chairman, AICPA Accounting Standards Executive Comm. & Int'l
Accounting Standards Comm.); 2 id. at 819 (statement of James G. Castellano, Chairman,
AICPA); 2 id. at 826 (statement of Olivia F. Kirtley, former Chairman, AICPA, and retired Vice
President and CFO, Vt. Am. Corp.); 2 id. at 920 (statement of John C. Whitehead, Co-Chair, Blue
Ribbon Comm., former Co-Chairman, Goldman Sachs & Co., and former Deputy Sec'y of State).
162. The written statement of the witness representing TIAA-CREF noted the organization's
position in favor of majority-independent boards and completely independent audit,
compensation, and nominating committees, but the statement did not include requiring director
independence in its list of needed reforms. House CARTA Hearings, supra note 77, at 399, 401
(prepared statement of Peter C. Clapman, Senior Vice President & Chief Counsel, Corporate
Governance, TIAA-CREF).
163. Id. at 55 (testimony of Roderick Hills). On this occasion Hills also noted that Enron, as
it happened, had an independent nominating committee. Id.
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witnesses emphasized a need for greater expertise. 164 Again, no witness
referred to or indicated any awareness of the existence of a scholarly
literature on director independence. In addition, two witnesses who were
asked by House Democrats for their opinion of Hills's testimony did not
directly endorse his position. 165
No doubt, the difference in testimony and emphasis on audit committee
independence across the chambers reflects the difference in party control:
This was not a top concern of Republicans in the House, and the witnesses
they called either were also not interested in the issue or determined it was
best to direct their attention to matters the majority deemed a priority. In
fact, even the ranking Democrat, Representative John LaFalce, who
considered reform of boards' and audit committees' independence a top
priority, in contrast to the Republicans who did not mention the issue,
indicated that he believed legislation unnecessary because committee
independence was within the SEC's rulemaking authority. 166 Accordingly,
the difference in agenda control and dynamics across the chambers on the
issue of audit committee independence sheds light on the difference in the
content of the chambers' bills: No witnesses before the House explicitly
advocated legislation on independent audit committees, fewer witnesses
164. Id. at II (statement of Barry C. Melancon, President and CEO, AICPA) (stating that
audit committees "should be composed of outside directors with auditing, accounting, or financial
expertise"); id. at 104 (statement of Philip B. Livingston, President and CEO, Fin. Executives
Int'l) (advocating tougher requirements for financial expertise for audit committee members); id.
at 113, 388-408 (statement and written testimony of Jerry J. Jasinowski, President, Nat'l Ass'n of
Mfrs.) (indicating support for the idea in the ranking Democrat's bill on independent nominating
committees, while opining that legislation might not be necessary, but not including, in the written
testimony, any proposed reforms regarding any board committee's independence, although stating
that audit committee members should have expertise); id. at 229 (prepared statement of Ted
White, Dir. of Corporate Governance, CalPERS) (advocating requiring more than one audit
committee member with expertise).
165. Id. at 76 (testimony of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC) (responding, to a question from
Representative LaFalce for his opinion on Hills's testimony regarding independent nominating
committees, that he considered the suggestion "constructive" and noting that the SEC had asked
the stock exchanges to "come forward with corporate governance standards"); id. at 118
(statement of Franklin D. Raines, Chairman and CEO, Fannie Mae, and Chairman, Corp.
Governance Task Force, Bus. Roundtable) (responding, to a question from Representative
Carolyn Maloney for his opinion on Hills's testimony regarding the need to give "legal status" to
audit committees and to have independent audit committees appointed by independent nominating
committees, that audit committees already have status in corporations; objecting to designating
any committee as independent of the board; and noting that audit committees "should be
populated by independent directors" and that directors should be appointed by board nominating
committees). The Business Roundtable's Statement on Corporate Governance advocates that a
"substantial majority" of the board be independent, although it considers appropriate a less
restrictive definition of independence for the full board than the stock exchanges require for audit
committee members. Id. at 339 (written statement of the Bus. Roundtable).
166. See id. at 4, 55 (statement of Rep. LaFalce). Thus there was no provision regarding audit
committee composition in LaFalce's substitute bill. See HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, PROVIDING
FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 3763, CORPORATE AND AUDITING ACCOUNTABILITY,
RESPONSIBILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY ACT OF 2002, H.R. REP. NO. 107-418, at 7 (2002).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1578
Quack Corporate Governance
raised the issue there than in the Senate, and the House committee chairman
did not latch onto the idea as worthy of pursuit.
3. Executive Certification of Financial Statements
The origin of the executive certification requirement can be related
briefly, because it presents a similar pattern to the other two provisions,
although it was a focus of less attention. In the Senate, former SEC chief
accountant Turner was the first to recormnend the requirement, which he
noted was a practice followed in foreign jurisdictions. 167 Thereafter, three
other witnesses expressed support for a certification requirement as an
incentive device to improve reporting.' 68 These endorsements were
volunteered, because Senator Sarbanes did not seek other witnesses' views
on Turner's proposal. Sarbanes's lack of follow-up on Turner's suggestion
may well have been a function of a lack of interest in the recommendation.
The certification requirement was, in fact, the one governance mandate to
which Sarbanes did not refer in his remarks on the Senate floor during the
deliberations on SOX. A week after Turner's testimony, President Bush
announced a ten-point plan for improving corporate responsibility, which
included a similar certification requirement, and the SEC indicated that it
intended to implement that proposal on its own. 169 These comments were,
without doubt, critical to the certification requirement's inclusion in the
committee bill, given Sarbanes's low level of personal interest in it. The
legislative history notes that the bill "in effect" adopted Bush's proposal,
while crediting the precise formulation to Senator Zell Miller,' 70 who was a
crucial committee vote in Sarbanes's effort to produce a bipartisan bill.,7'
167. 1 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 199 (statement of Lynn Turner).
168. 2 id. at 943 (prepared statement of Charles A. Bowsher, Chairman, Pub. Oversight Bd.,
and former Comptroller Gen. of the United States) (stating that management should have to attest
to compliance with internal controls in an annual SEC document, which the auditor would review,
as a procedure to improve the quality of audits); 2 id. at 1023, 1041 (testimony and prepared
statement of Sarah Teslik) (stating that the CEO and the audit committee should have to sign
fmancials to make them think twice, just as individuals do when signing tax returns); 2 id. at 1068
(statement of Harvey Pitt) (stating that the SEC intended to implement the President's directive to
require executive certification of financials in order to improve financial reporting by increasing
individual accountability for disclosure). In addition, one witness, who advocated more frequent
financial reporting despite objections that the information would be unaudited, referred to the
Administration's proposal to require certification of quarterly as well as annual financials as one
that might mitigate the objection, depending on the sanctions, even though the quarterly data
would still be unaudited. 2 id. at 878 (prepared statement of Robert E. Litan, Vice President and
Dir., Econ. Studies Program, The Brookings Inst.).
169. 2 id. at 1068 (statement of Harvey Pitt); Press Release, supra note 55.
170. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 25 (2002).
171. Hilzenrath et al., supra note 89. As noted in ROMANO, supra note 19, at 150 n.294, 163
n.326, 184 n.364, Miller appears to have been the median voter on the committee, the voter whose
preferences determine the outcome in standard political science voting models of two-party
systems.
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In contrast to the Senate, only one witness at the House hearings raised
the issue of executive certification of financials. That witness was once
again Turner, who now endorsed the Administration's suggestion of
certification in response to questions by ranking member LaFalce on how to
improve auditor independence and on the need to restructure audit
committees. 172 The House hearing was held after the President had
announced his corporate responsibility proposals, but also after the
Republicans had drafted their bill, which did not include a certification
provision. Because the President's proposal did not require legislative
action-the SEC could (and did) implement it under its own rulemaking
authority-the House Republicans did not have to amend their bill for the
proposal to move forward. Nor did Republicans need to include a
certification requirement in their legislation to distinguish themselves from
the Administration, which might have been a concern for Democrats.
In fact, many of the points in President Bush's ten-point plan did not
require legislative action because they were hortatory or could be executed
by the SEC (and some were already on the SEC's agenda).1 73 Four of
Bush's ten points did call for action, which the SEC began to implement,
but in contrast to the certification requirement these proposals also appeared
in the House bill: the call for an independent regulatory board for
accountants (Harvey Pitt's plan), the SEC's ban on officers who "abuse
their power" from serving on corporate boards, forfeiture of executive
bonuses based on financial statements if the statements were false, and
more timely disclosure of insider trading. 
174
A plausible conjecture explaining the difference between the House
bill's posture on these provisions and on the certification requirement is that
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce supported the forfeiture provision and the
172. House CARTA Hearings, supra note 77, at 55 (testimony of Lynn Turner). Although at
the time LaFalce expressed skepticism about whether certification would be adequate, id. at 56
(statement of Rep. LaFalce), the only other reference to a certification requirement in the House
hearings was by the congressman himself, when he referred in passing to such a provision's
inclusion in the bill that he had just introduced at the April hearing called at his request, id. at 129.
173. These included a call for investors' access to necessary information on a quarterly basis,
a call for investors' "prompt access to critical information," a call for the "authors of accounting
standards" to be responsive to investors' needs, a call for auditors to compare firms' accounting
systems with "best practices" and not "minimum standards," and the statement that "[i]nvestors
should have complete confidence in the independence and integrity of companies' auditors." Press
Release, supra note 55. It should be noted that the rather vaguely formulated point regarding
investor confidence in auditors was articulated differently in President Bush's speech that
introduced the plan: In his remarks he called on the SEC to do "more to guard against conflicts of
interest, requiring, for example, that an external auditor not be permitted to provide internal audits
to the same client." Remarks at the Presentation of the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality
Awards, supra note 55, at 372. As discussed earlier, the accounting profession had agreed to that
restriction. See supra note 98.
174. Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002,
H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002); Press Release, supra note 55.
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officer ban but was concerned about the certification requirement. 175 The
Chamber sent a letter on the House bill the day of the floor debate
expressing opposition to any amendment that would weaken or repeal the
1995 legislation that made private securities lawsuits more difficult to
pursue. 176 Because the letter did not voice any concern regarding any
provision in the bill, it is plausible to assume that the Republicans had
factored in the Chamber's position in crafting their bill, and that the
noticeable absence of a certification requirement-which was included in
the ranking Democrat's bill paralleling the plank in the President's
corporate governance program-reflected the Chamber's position at the
time. This explanation is purely conjectural, however, because the Chamber
took a public position on those issues in conjunction with its lobbying effort
on the Senate's bill, at which time it expressed support for the forfeiture,
officer ban, and certification provisions. 177 Still, representatives of the
Chamber had earlier voiced concern over the certification requirement but
not the other two proposals.
4. Provision of Nonaudit Services
The restriction of auditors' provision of nonaudit services attracted
considerably more attention from witnesses in both chambers than the other
mandates, because it had a history as a political issue. This would appear to
have been an issue of greater concern to the Democrats than the
Republicans, because the hearings in their control had a much higher
number (as well as proportion) of witnesses speaking to the issue: thirty
Senate witnesses compared to fourteen House witnesses, three of whom
testified at the minority's hearing. But only about half of the witnesses
addressing the issue in either chamber expressed a view supporting
175. See Thomas S. Mulligan, Reaction to Pitt's Proposal Is Mixed, L.A. TIMES, June 28,
2002, at C4 (describing concern over whether the certification requirement was workable on the
part of the president of the Chamber and other business leaders).
176. Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President, Government Affairs, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, to Members of the House of Representatives (Apr. 24, 2002), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2002/020424hr3763.htm. This issue was also raised in
two letters to the Senate during its consideration of the legislation. Chamber Senate Letter, supra
note 117; Letter from R. Bruce Josten, Executive Vice President, Government Affairs, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, to Members of the United States Senate (July 11, 2002), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2002/0207 11 s2673c.htm.
177. Mulligan, supra note 175; Chamber Senate Letter, supra note 117. The Chamber
opposed the Senate bill's prohibition on the provision of nonaudit services by auditors and its
institution of the new accounting regulator as duplicative or in conflict with the SEC's oversight.
Chamber Senate Letter, supra note 117. The Chamber had expressed opposition to Pitt's specific
proposal for a new accounting oversight entity, which was unveiled after the House enacted its
bill but prior to the Senate's action. Walter Hamilton, SECs Oversight Proposal Derided, L.A.
TIMES, June 21, 2002, at C1.
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prohibition or a more restrictive approach to the matter than the accounting
profession's position, which was embodied in the House Republicans'
bill. 178 The testimony of the witnesses does not have to be examined,
however, to identify the policy entrepreneur behind the nonaudit services
provision. Its source, as mentioned earlier, was Arthur Levitt, who led the
SEC's initiative on the issue two years before.
Levitt was able to advance his agenda of a total ban on the provision of
nonaudit services by auditors now that the accounting profession had
landed in Congress's cross hairs with the apparent involvement in Enron's
financial statement fraud of its auditor, Arthur Andersen. Levitt and Turner
displayed the skills of expert legislative-agenda-setting entrepreneurs:
Through their testimony during the hearings (and additional off-stage
communication, including considerable media exposure), they were able to
link the scandal with Levitt's position on auditors' provision of consulting
services and with the accounting profession's successful opposition to his
agenda to ban such services while he was SEC chairman. Members of
Congress who had supported the accounting industry against Levitt's
efforts to ban nonaudit services in the rulemaking process less than two
years earlier hastily abandoned that position in the aftermath of Enron.
179
But in contrast to the other corporate governance mandates, the testimony
on this provision underscores the problematic relation between
entrepreneurial policymaking, issue salience, and the quality of legislative
decisionmaking implicated by SOX. Three of the witnesses who opposed
expanding the restrictions on nonaudit services made reference to data-
that there was no evidence that the provision of nonaudit services
compromises audit quality-to support their position. 80 However, only one
178. For details regarding the classification of the witnesses' positions, see ROMANO, supra
note 19, at 166 n.333.
179. E.g., 2 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 1061 (statement of Sen. Bunning) ("I was one
of those who urged [Levitt] to slow down a little on the auditor independence issue. I thought he
was trying to ram a major rule through and taking side in an industry fight without the proper
vetting. Though I still think that we were moving just a little too fast at the time, I think that we
must have a true auditor independence. Although the firms have split off their consulting arms, we
should codify that split into law. If you audit someone, you should not be able to do their business
consulting.").
180. Of sixty-three witnesses in the seventeen hearings held by the House and the Senate
committees, only five witnesses referred to any data on the relation between nonaudit services and
audit quality. The three witnesses opposing greater regulation who referred to data showing that
audits were not compromised by nonaudit services were a Senate witness from a Big Four
accounting firm representing the AICPA, the professional accounting organization, 2 id. at 822,
864 (statement of James E. Copeland, CEO, Deloitte & Touche) (testifying for the AICPA that
"several recent studies" had "demonstrated that there is no correlation between the provision of
nonaudit services and audit failures," referring to the findings in the report of the Panel on Audit
Effectiveness and to DeFond et al., supra note 39); a House witness from a policy institute, House
CARTA Hearings, supra note 77, at 12 (statement of James K. Glassman, Resident Fellow, Am.
Enter. Inst.) (citing an article by members of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, Palmrose & Saul,
supra note 35, to indicate that "the issue of auditor independence has been extensively studied
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of the witnesses testifying in favor of prohibition or greater restrictions on
nonaudit services even acknowledged the existence of empirical findings
contrary to that position, let alone attempted to distinguish them.
The position of that witness, Lee Seidler, was unique: He had served on
a 1978 AICPA commission that did not prohibit consulting services
because it found no evidence that such services compromised audits, and he
had been asked to testify on a panel with the chairman of the more recent
Panel on Audit Effectiveness, which had reached the same conclusion. In
contrast to other witnesses, circumstances appear to have compelled Seidler
to address the data inconsistent with his policy stance, but he did so
obliquely: He stated, in support of his position to restrict nonaudit services,
that his "conclusion [was] not based on empirical evidence." 18' It should be
noted that other witnesses who advocated a prohibition, such as Levitt,
were, without question, fully aware of both reports, but one would not have
known that from their testimony. The lack of candor is embarrassing.
with almost no empirical evidence of abuse"); and another Senate witness, the chairman of the
Panel on Audit Effectiveness and former chairman of Price Waterhouse, 2 Senate Hearings, supra
note 35, at 683 (statement of Shaun F. O'Malley, Chairman, Panel on Audit Effectiveness)
(summarizing the Panel's finding of no instances of nonaudit services affecting audits or
impairing audit performance but noting that a survey indicated that there was a perception of such
an effect). A fourth witness, discussed infra note 181, recognized that data existed but took a
contrary position in support of the prohibition. After his testimony, a fifth witness, Turner,
submitted a copy of Frankel et al., supra note 39, in support of the restriction, 1 Senate Hearings,
supra note 35, at 302 (letter from Lynn Turner to Steven B. Harris, Staff Dir. and Chief Counsel,
Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs). Turner submitted the study to the Senate a
few days after his testimony to refute what he had noted in his written testimony-that there were
those who "have suggested" that there is no "'smoking gun' that provides a basis for changes in
regulation and laws." Id.
The Frankel et al. study was, in fact, the only study on any of the mandates mentioned by
any member of Congress in the congressional debates over and the seventeen hearings leading up
to SOX. Representative Maloney entered in the record an "MIT, Michigan State and Stanford
study" that was "cited in Business Week" that "showed that companies that use their auditors as
consultants tend to manage earnings" and argued "that steps need to be taken statutorily." House
CARTA Hearings, supra note 77, at 90 (statement of Rep. Maloney). She did so in response to
testimony of then-SEC Chairman Pitt on an unrelated question that she had asked him. In
response to her question whether he supported mandatory rotation of accounting firms, Pitt had
stated that studies showed that most "frauds occur in the first 2 years of an audit-client
relationship." Id. at 89 (statement of Harvey Pitt).
181. 2 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 687 (statement of Lee J. Seidler, Deputy Chairman
of the 1978 AICPA Comm'n on Auditors' Responsibilities and Managing Dir. Emeritus, Bear
Steams). In his written statement, Seidler referred to the Panel on Audit Effectiveness's report, as
well as a similar finding by the 1978 Cohen Commission on which he had served, that the "theory
[that consulting services compromised audit quality] was not supported by empirical evidence";
he therefore offered an alternative "theory" that the problem was created not by the provision of
consulting services but by the receipt of fees. Id. at 733-34. The contention makes no sense,
because the auditors in the Panel's data set received fees for their nonaudit services, so the effect
of the fees was captured in the analysis (and of course, all of the scholarly research discussed in
the text uses fee data to study the question). It should be noted that when Turner submitted the
Frankel et al. study (then an unpublished manuscript) to the committee after his testimony in
support of his position on prohibition, he did not attempt to distinguish, let alone refer to, the
empirical literature inconsistent with his position.
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Legislators only compounded the problem, however, by failing to
follow up on the rare occasional references that were inconsistent with the
direction in which the legislation was heading. The passing references by
three witnesses to studies at odds with prohibiting nonaudit services were
ignored. This fact is striking because the accounting profession was not yet
considered politically radioactive at the time of the hearings, in contrast to
the situation when the conference committee convened.
The adoption of the nonaudit services restriction illustrates the critical
entrepreneurial role of the committee chairman. With the bulk of his career
in the public sector and a very liberal voting record, 182 Senator Sarbanes's
priors would make him favorably disposed to greater regulation of business,
such as the use of mandates rather than disclosure as the corporate
governance approach for SOX, and to adoption of a nonaudit services
prohibition that was stricter than the House's (i.e., Pitt's SEC's) version. It
is altogether understandable why the few references to data inconsistent
with the recommendations to restrict nonaudit services by witnesses such as
Levitt, who for the most part shared Sarbanes's worldview, did not enter
into the senator's calculation and influence his adoption of their
recommendations. Because the objective was to produce a bill that was
acceptable to his party and that would get through the Senate, Sarbanes also
had to be open to compromise on at least some hotly disputed issues
regarding the regulation of the accounting profession (such as permitting
accountants to serve on the new accounting regulator's board) and the
expensing of stock options. Having forged a sufficient compromise in
committee on those matters, on the contested issue of nonaudit services he
was able to adopt the policy recommendation closest to that of Levitt, the
expert whose judgment he trusted. On the shape of the other corporate
governance provisions, and particularly audit committee independence,
Sarbanes had even greater room to maneuver as the drafter of the
legislation, given its low visibility during the legislative process.
It should be noted that then-SEC Chairman Pitt sought to limit the
scope of the nonaudit services regulation by advocating caution and waiting
to ascertain the impact of the SEC's recently adopted rule on nonaudit
services. 183 In extensive testimony before both the House and Senate
182. Senator Sarbanes began his career in public service in 1966, after a few years of law
practice. Richard A. Oppel Jr., A Point Man on Corporate Change, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2002,
§ 3 (Money & Business), at 2. His "lifelong pursuit" was of "liberal economic policies," Hsu &
Day, supra note 97, and he was perceived as a "formidable liberal force" by the media, Oppel,
supra. For a comparison of his ideological position with that of other legislators, as calculated by
political scientists from his voting record, see ROMANO, supra note 19, at 171-72 & nn.342-43,
175 & n.349. Sarbanes's liberal ideological score places him to the left of the median member of
his party, both in the chamber and on his committee, and therefore to the left of the full chamber
and committee medians.
183. See, e.g., 2 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 1070 (statement of Harvey Pitt).
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committees, he endorsed neither the independent audit committee
requirement nor the executive loan ban, although several provisions in SOX
originated in his agenda (in particular, the new accounting regulator and the
certification requirement). However, many of the witnesses who advocated
those policy proposals were former SEC officials, and the proposals were
typically extensions of agendas they had advanced at the agency.
Accordingly, in the assessment of one former SEC commissioner who is
critical of SOX, the SOX corporate governance mandates are the successful
culmination of a multidecade effort by the agency's personnel to assert
authority over public corporations in areas long considered the jurisdiction
of the states. 84 Pitt's position on those issues was simply at variance with
longstanding institutional objectives that, in the crisis environment in which
the legislation was drafted, resonated with the Senate Banking Committee
chairman.
D. Were the SOX Governance Mandates Symbolic Politics or Window
Dressing?
The SOX corporate governance mandates were not carefully considered
by Congress; in particular, they were not evaluated in light of the empirical
literature questioning their efficacy. Before drawing policy inferences from
this apparent mismatch of means and ends, there is a remaining question to
address: Would Congress still have adopted those mandates had members
been alerted that they were not likely to improve audit quality or otherwise
benefit investors? An affirmative response would require viewing the SOX
mandates as symbolic politics or, more cynically, as window dressing of
particular importance in an election year. Though this is certainly a possible
explanation, descriptively it does not accord well with the legislators'
behavior.
The contention from a symbolic politics perspective is that despite the
mandates' known probable ineffectiveness, their enactment provided an
expressive or symbolic benefit: Congress's demonstration to a concerned
public that it was remedying a serious problem. There is a fundamental flaw
in this argument, however. If the rationale for supporting the governance
provisions were symbolic, then we would expect legislators to have claimed
some credit for those provisions (in contrast to other provisions or the more
184. See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REALIZING THE DREAM OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS-THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TAKES CHARGE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 12-
16, 25, 36-37, 42, 50, 52 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 7, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-525522 (relating SOX
provisions to the history of thwarted SEC initiatives to regulate corporate governance matters,
such as director independence and compensation, shareholder voting, fiduciary duties, and the
accounting and legal professions).
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general symbol of passing any legislation, regardless of its content). 185 That
is, senators and representatives should have been widely publicizing the
corporate governance mandates in their floor speeches on the bill, or
focusing on those initiatives when questioning witnesses at hearings, to
communicate to their constituents how they were solving problems through
those features of the legislation.
Yet as Table 2 and the discussion of the progress of those provisions
through the hearings indicate, members of Congress did not do so. In fact,
far more speakers addressed the provisions enhancing criminal penalties for
corporate misconduct and establishing a regulator for the accounting
profession than three of the governance mandates combined, with only the
restriction on nonaudit services attracting attention equal to that of the
provisions for a new accounting regulator. The attention to that provision,
in all probability, is better explained by its being a revision of what was
only a two-year-old compromise on a controversy between the accounting
profession, which had been backed by members of Congress, and the SEC
rather than by its saliency to voters and its usefulness as a symbol.
Indeed, the increased criminal sanctions fit more squarely with a
characterization as symbolic politics (if there was an aspect of symbolic
politics in the enactment of SOX): They were highlighted by half of the
legislators taking part in the legislative debate and are consistent with a
pattern of Congress's raising criminal penalties in election years., 86 In
addition, the criminal penalties were perceived as a central component of
185. In a classic of American politics, David Mayhew described the election-related activities
of members of Congress of "advertising," "credit-claiming," and "position taking," which are
important for reelection in order to identify the incumbent with benefits to constituents and with
popular messages containing little content or controversy. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION 49-76 (1974). While the activities he identifies-roll-call votes,
signatures on discharge petitions, bill amendments-may be easier for constituents to inform
themselves about than the floor speeches considered here, the symbolic effect is the same, and
there were essentially no opportunities to engage in those other activities with respect to SOX
(amendments were severely restricted, and there were few roll-call votes).
186. For example, in 1990, during the escalating cost of the bailout of the savings and loan
industry, Congress enacted enhanced banking crime penalties, even though it had increased
banking crime sanctions in the banking reform package only a year before. And from 1982 to
1994 Congress enacted increased criminal sanctions in most election years (albeit for violent
rather than white-collar crimes). Brian T. FitzPatrick, Congressional Re-Election Through
Symbolic Politics: The Enhanced Banking Crime Penalties, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13-15, 39-40
& n.229 (1994). Increasing criminal penalties is arguably symbolic politics because, as several
reputable scholars have contended, the severity of sanctions does not appear to be among the most
influential factors affecting crime rates. See id. at 2 nn.2-3. Vik Khanna puts a further spin on the
symbolic politics explanation of corporate criminal legislation: He maintains that such laws
satisfy Congress's need to react to a public outcry over corporate scandals at minimal cost to
corporations. That is, corporations prefer such legislation because, he contends, it deflects liability
from individual officers to entities and avoids more detrimental forms of legislative responses,
such as facilitating private civil litigation. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation:
A Political Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 97-98 (2004).
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the legislation by the media. Opinion polls administered by the press
seeking the public's view of the efficacy of the legislation moving through
the Senate to deal with corporate misconduct referred specifically to its
tightening of criminal sanctions. 87 Given the substantial stock losses of
members of the voting public in the corporate scandals, from a legislator's
perspective, claiming that corporate executives would be sent to jail for
lengthy intervals would be eminently more useful as a reelection vehicle
than highlighting a provision rearranging the source of accounting firms'
income.
One could instead disregard the legislators' choice of emphasis and
express the cynical view of SOX as window dressing that deliberately
offered ineffective solutions to a gullible public in order to benefit
corporations or accountants, contending that many of the mandates were
not that different from the prevailing state of the law. Executives had to
sign SEC filings prior to SOX, the stock exchanges required independent
audit committees, and the SEC had prohibited most of the nonaudit services
banned by SOX. An observer could contend, along with Senator Gramm,
that SOX was not a terrible regulatory outcome compared to what could
have been enacted, and go further than the senator to contend that it was
therefore costless window dressing.
In my judgment, however, that would be an incorrect assessment, even
if much worse legislation could have been produced and was avoided and if
the legislation is, in that respect, accurately characterized as symbolic. This
is because the mandates are not costless (as one would expect legislation
that is intentionally symbolic to be). In particular, compliance costs to meet
the certification requirement appear to be considerable, especially for
smaller firms. For example, a recent survey of companies' projected
expenditures to meet the SOX internal controls provisions by the financial
officers' professional organization shows that companies with annual
revenues over $5 billion projected external consulting, software, and
additional audit fees of $2.9 million per company, compared to a projection
of $222,200 by companies with annual revenues under $25 million.'
88
187. For summaries of the polls, see supra note 74. While before enactment the
overwhelming majority of respondents expected the legislation to have either a minor effect or no
effect on corporate misconduct, thereafter the proportion expecting an effect increased. Of course,
to the extent that the public did not come to hold the view that Congress's proposed solution
solved the problem at hand, it would have been difficult for members of Congress to obtain an
electoral benefit from claiming to have crafted a solution.
188. The survey was conducted by Financial Executives International (FEI), the professional
organization of CFOs, treasurers, and controllers. FEI, FEI Survey on Sarbanes-Oxley Section
404 Implementation (Jan. 2004) (unpublished document), available at http://www.fei.org/
download/Section404_summary.pdf, see also Large Companies Expect To Spend Millions To
Meet SOXA Internal Controls Requirements, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 315 (Feb. 16, 2004)
(reporting the results of the FEI survey). Large companies projected an average expense of
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Taking the revenue thresholds as a benchmark, smaller companies'
projected outlays as a proportion of revenue are an order of magnitude
greater than larger companies' (0.009 compared to 0.0006). Another
survey, of firms going private, reported that the cost of being public more
than doubled after SOX, rising on average from $900,000 to $1.95 million,
with the increase attributed primarily to higher audit, insurance, and
outside-director fees. 189 These data indicate that SOX imposed a far more
significant burden on small than on large firms.
Smaller firms are also experiencing indirect costs from business
disruption and quality control issues raised by having to find new auditors
from the ranks of small and mid-sized accounting firms, because Big Four
accounting firms have been dropping their smaller clients due to staffing
shortages and the increased time and cost of audits under SOX.' 90 In
addition, small firms are more likely to be burdened by the mandates on
audit committee composition. A recent study by James Linck et al., for
instance, finds that after SOX, the size of boards and the proportion of
directors that are independent significantly increased for all firms, but that
the effect was disproportionately experienced by small firms (which before
SOX had fewer outside directors than did large firms). 191 The study also
finds that smaller-sized firms' expenditures on directors' compensation
appear to have massively increased. It reports two measures of expenditures
for a small sample of firms stratified by size: The cash compensation that
roughly $1.8 million on 35,000 hours of "internal manpower" to satisfy the requirements, whereas
small companies expected to incur an "average of 1,150 people hours" (the data-for-dollar
conversion was not provided). FEI, supra, at 1. The results should be read with considerable
caution because fewer small firms responded than did large firms (ten compared to sixty-one
firms, or three percent compared to twenty percent of solicited participants, respectively), and it is
unclear to what extent the survey responses represent one-time start-up costs of creating adequate
compliance systems.
189. Stanley B. Block, The Latest Movement to Going Private: An Empirical Study,
J. APPLIED FIN., Spring 2004, at 36, 37. Block does not provide revenue data for the sample firms,
so these firms' figures cannot be compared precisely with the FEI survey data, in which the
reported cost increase was smaller. In all likelihood, Block's sample would fall at the smaller end
of the FEI survey: Block's sample's median market capitalization was $61.7 million, and twenty-
seven firms had negative earnings over the prior year. In addition, a survey by a law firm
estimated that the cost of being a public company increased 90% the year after SOX and found
that the increase disproportionately affected small and mid-cap firms. THOMAS E. HARTMAN,
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, THE INCREASED FINANCIAL & NON-FINANCIAL COSTS OF STAYING
PUBLIC 6, 15 (2004), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040505-Hartman.pdf. Moreover,
in a follow-up survey, the law firm found that costs continued to increase substantially (by 130%)
in 2004, although given the low response rate, the figures must be treated with great caution.
THOMAS E. HARTMAN, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, THE COST OF BEING PUBLIC IN THE ERA OF
SARBANES-OXLEY 2 (2004), available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl s3 1Publications/
FileUploadl 37/2017/Public%20Study%20Results%20FINAL.doc.pdf
190. See Lynnley Browning, Sorry, the Auditor Said, but We Want a Divorce, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2005, § 3 (Money & Business), at 5.
191. James S. Linck et al., Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
on Corporate Boards 16-18 (March 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-687496.
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medium-sized firms paid to outside directors increased from $21,688 to
$40,783 between 2001 and 2004 (the effective date for compliance with
most SOX rules), and small firns' compensation to outside directors
increased from $7.25 per $1000 in net sales to $9.76 over the same period,
compared to a trivial increase ($0.20) for large firms.' 92 Furthermore, SOX
appears to have affected the rate at which small firms stay public.' 93 But it
should be noted that the costs imposed by SOX on all public firms appear to
be substantial. 1
94
In addition to direct compliance costs, there are some costs that are
difficult to quantify but that could prove to be substantial, such as the
contraction in financing opportunities for small and mid-sized businesses,
as public firms are deterred from acquiring private and foreign firms
(because the acquisition will make the acquirer responsible for certifying
the accuracy of the entity's not-yet-certified books and records) or as those
firms do not go public because of the SOX mandates. 95 To the extent that
acquirers' transaction risk has increased because of the certification
requirement, the efficiency of the market for corporate control could be
affected-a potentially serious, and unintended, cost of the legislation.
Finally, there are also potential long-run costs for U.S. stock exchanges
and consequently U.S. investors from fewer foreign listings, as foreign
firms shift to the principal competitor venue-the London exchange-to
avoid SOX. The cost and difficulty for foreign firms of complying with
SOX's requirements may well be greater than for smaller U.S. firms, or at
192. Id. at 25-26.
193. See Ellen Engel et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Finns' Going-Private Decisions 2-3
(May 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-546626 (finding that
going-private transactions almost doubled after SOX, with smaller firms particularly affected). A
study by the accounting firm Grant Thornton comparing going-private transactions the year before
and the year after SOX similarly found that the number of companies seeking to go private
increased (by 30%) post-SOX, while deal size decreased substantially (the median deal size
decreased by half). CONO FUSCO, GRANT THORNTON LLP, SARBANES-OxLEY: A REVIEW:
PANEL III: DO THE COSTS OF THE ACT OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS? 8 (2004), available at
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040505_Fusco.pdf. Grant Thornton suggests that the change is due
to SOX's having increased the cost of remaining public for small companies. Id. at 1-11.
Moreover, according to Stanley Block's survey, the most common reason for going private was to
avoid the cost of being public (30%), and the frequency of that response as the reason was higher
for firms going private post-SOX (60%). Block, supra note 189, at 37. The second-most-frequent
reason, top management time, was also related to SOX: Survey respondents indicated that this
factor became "especially burdensome" after SOX due to the certification requirement. Id.
194. In the financial officers' association survey, for example, the projected increase in
external audit fees from the new requirement-that auditors attest to management's certification
of internal controls-was similar across firm size, averaging a 38% increase. FEI, supra note 188,
at 2.
195. See supra notes 61, 193. As David Silk and David Katz note, SOX has "beyond
question" increased the risks to acquirers of doing deals. David M. Silk & David A. Katz, Doing
Deals 2004: Keeping Pace with a Rapidly Changing Market, in TAKEOVER LAW AND PRACTICE
2003, at 1139, 1267 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. BO-025Q,
2004).
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least much less worthwhile when balanced against the benefit obtained
from a U.S. listing. This is not simply speculation, because many foreign
firms are contemplating delisting. 96 U.S. investors, as well as exchanges,
would be disadvantaged by such a trend, because while they will still be
able to purchase such firms' shares abroad, transaction costs will be higher.
(Besides higher trading fees, the transactions will not be in U.S. dollars.)
More important, the extent of the full cost of the SOX governance
mandates still cannot be ascertained because much depends on the SEC's
implementation of the mandates and on whether it will be able to use SOX
as a springboard to assert a more expansive regulatory authority. This is a
real possibility. The SEC's implementation of the audit committee
independence rules has already raised operating costs for small companies
beyond those of the previous regime, by restricting the stock exchanges'
exclusion for small businesses and provision for exceptions from complete
independence within a board's discretion.' 97 In addition, the SEC has
recently proposed a significant incursion into corporate governance that
mandates shareholder nomination of directors under specified
circumstances, an initiative that utterly disregards state law and has no
connection to Congress's specific derogation of state law in the corporate
governance provisions in SOX. 1
98
Finally, the form of the mandates in SOX, compared to their prior
permutations, creates a set of hidden costs that further renders problematic
the innocuous window-dressing interpretation. The audit committee
composition and nonaudit services requirements have now been codified,
whereas before SOX they were contained in stock exchange and SEC rules.
It is far easier to revise exchange or agency rules than to amend a federal
statute if dynamic business conditions regarding organizational or
accounting practices necessitate a rule change or if it turns out that a chosen
rule was mistaken. In sum, given the available information, it is not credible
to characterize SOX's governance mandates as no- or low-cost window
dressing whose adoption made sense in order to calm the media frenzy over
196. See Daniel Epstein, Goodbye, Farewell, Auf Wiedersehen, Adieu .... WALL ST. J., Feb.
9, 2005, at A10 (discussing how European companies with U.S. cross-listings are investigating
delisting because of costly compliance under SOX). Congress explicitly refused to exempt non-
U.S. firms from SOX, although other federal regulations do not apply equally to domestic and
foreign firms. Although the SEC thus cannot exempt foreign firms, under pressure from foreign
regulators, and perhaps to stem the tide of delistings and new listings of foreign companies in
London rather than New York, the agency has indicated that it will consider delaying the statute's
effective date for foreign firms and revising a rule that prevents delisted firms from also
deregistering, thereby subjecting foreign firms to SOX even if they are no longer publicly traded
on a U.S. exchange. See id.
197. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Release
No. 33-8220, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47,654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,795 (Apr. 16, 2003)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 240, 249, 274 (2004)).
198. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003).
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corporate scandals, even if more costly governance proposals could be
imagined.
E. Placing SOX in Context: Financial Legislation in Times of Crisis
The dismal saga of the SOX governance mandates demonstrates that
congressional lawmaking in times of perceived emergency offers windows
of opportunity to well-positioned policy entrepreneurs to market their
preferred, ready-made solutions when there is little time for reflective
deliberation. The low quality of congressional decisionmaking regarding
the inclusion of the mandates in SOX is not, however, unique or necessarily
surprising when it comes to financial regulation. Much of the expansion of
federal regulation of financial markets has followed a similar pattern,
occurring after significant economic turmoil. Although this pattern has been
noted by many, it has not been systematically examined or explained, either
empirically or theoretically. I offer no explanation here beyond observing
the relationship and the parallel between SOX and the circumstances of the
initial federal forays into financial market regulation.
The Future Trading Act of 1921,'99 the first federal statute regulating
commodity futures markets, was enacted in the wake of the most severe
recession in the United States up to that time. Farm prices collapsed and
farm foreclosure rates increased as the United States eliminated price
controls and European agricultural products returned to the world market
with the end of World War 1.200 In this economically depressed
environment, farm groups that had been lobbying to end commodity
speculation for many years succeeded in obtaining legislation (although not
the absolute prohibition they sought). They had helped to elect a new
Republican majority in Congress, which enacted the legislation even
though, at hearings, opponents of the legislation (grain trade witnesses,
including a professor of agricultural economics) provided a cogent
explanation of the economics of speculation and the grain market that made
plain the proponents' fundamentally flawed understanding of the problem
and its solution.201
But even had economic theory and econometric techniques been as
sophisticated and widespread then as they are today, it would have been to
little avail given the political circumstances: Many legislators were hostile
to the grain market, paralleling their constituents' views. Hence, there were
199. Future Trading Act of 1921, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187.
200. See Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation,
14 YALE J. ON REG. 279, 286-87 (1997).
201. Id. at 294. The far more sophisticated analyses of modem economic theory and
empirical research indicate that the legislation's opponents' analyses were correct.
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some genuine electoral concerns, and legislators spent much of the hearings
impugning the personal integrity of witnesses critical of market regulation
rather than addressing the substance of their testimony. As a
consequence, the 1921 legislation that regulated futures trading was not a
solution even remotely addressing the problem at hand. That is because
short selling and grain middlemen were generating more accurate grain
prices rather than contributing to the farmers' economic plight, which was
due to an increased supply of grain. Not surprisingly, the agricultural crisis
persisted for many years thereafter.
The federal securities laws enacted in the 1930s were a prominent piece
of the New Deal legislation that was a response to the 1929 stock market
crash and the Great Depression. In contrast to SOX, this legislation was
enacted after a crisis of considerable duration, following multiyear Senate
hearings, in conjunction with a critical election that changed the
administration and Congress. The Pecora hearings (named after the
committee's counsel, Ferdinand Pecora) were orchestrated to develop an
explanation of the market crash as having been caused by market
manipulation, fraud, and abuse by financial firms, in order to implement an
agenda for market regulation. 0 3 Pecora was without question a founding
and prototype policy entrepreneur for financial market regulation.
Present-day research has shown that market manipulation, fraud, and
abuse were not widespread leading up to the crash. 4 In fact, consistent
with that research's findings, much of the Pecora hearings focused on data
"irrelevant to an investigation of the causes of the crash"-financiers' large
salaries and income tax returns-rather than identifying the occurrence of
widespread abuses.20 5 In the extended financial crisis following the 1929
202. For examples of such conduct at the hearings, see id. at 294-95. It should be noted that
opponents of regulation outnumbered proponents at the first hearings because the committees had
permitted all interested parties to testify; under the influence of committee members supporting
the legislation, the number of witnesses was restricted at subsequent hearings. Id. at 292. Prior to
the election of 1920, when they helped elect a Republican majority, farm groups had supported
independent farm party candidates. As the farm recession continued into 1922, Republicans lost
several seats to farmer-backed candidates, although their national defeat has been explained as a
function of the success of the Progressive Party. Id. at 288.
203. Joel Seligman, an advocate of the federal regulation, characterizes the Pecora hearings
as having an "obvious political purpose": to "diminish [the majority of the voters'] faith in the
nation's financial institutions." JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE
2(1995).
204. For a summary of the literature, see ROMANO, supra note 18, at 44-45. Although there
was no such scholarly literature at the time that could have countered Pecora's highly orchestrated
hearings, given the political climate any inconsistent data would no doubt have been ignored, as
occurred with SOX and with the Future Trading Act.
205. SELIGMAN, supra note 203, at 2. The Enron hearings, see supra note 138, more closely
resemble this aspect of the Pecora hearings than do those conducted by the SOX originating
committees, which were not principally investigatory in focus.
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crash, electoral change, combined with Pecora's effective advocacy, led to
the implementation of far-reaching legislation that had eluded proponents
of market regulation during the Hoover Administration.2 °6 But this is yet
another case, tracking the futures regulation of 1921, of a remedy not
directed at solving an economic problem: The securities legislation did not
restart the economy or reinvigorate the stock market, because the principal
source of the 1930s economic crisis was catastrophic mistakes in monetary
policy. Moreover, a persuasive case can be made that the benefit of the
federal regulatory regime produced by the Pecora hearings has not been
worth the cost.
20 7
Stuart Banner's historical research suggests that these examples are not
exceptions but rather are the template for financial regulation. Examining
the conditions for securities market regulation in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries in the United Kingdom and United States, he reports
that legislation was adopted only after stock market declines, which, by
1837, coincided with economic contractions.2 °8 Banner contends that the
reason for the association is that deep-seated popular suspicion of
speculation comes in bad financial times to dominate otherwise popular
support for markets, resulting in the expansion of regulation.20 9 That is to
say, financial exigencies embolden critics of markets to push their
regulatory agenda. They are able to play on the strand of popular opinion
that is hostile to speculation and markets because the general public is more
amenable to regulation after experiencing financial losses. A regulatory
agenda, in short, does not generate popular support in a booming market.
Due to greater sophistication in our understanding of market processes,
there is far less popular suspicion of trading speculation today than in prior
centuries. But we can still identify in Banner's formula for new
regulation-the conjunction of the impact of a stock market downturn on
public attitudes and the presence of political entrepreneurs with off-the-
shelf regulatory proposals (Banner's ever-present critics of free markets)-
a pattern largely consistent with the making of SOX.
210
206. SELIGMAN, supra note 203, at 2-18.
207. See ROMANO, supra note 18, at 14-45.
208. STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND
POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690-1860, at 257 (1998). His discussion of legislation in the United States
includes state regulation.
209. As Banner puts it, in good times, people do not complain about speculators because "too
many people have been making too much money to favor regulation," and so legislation does not
get introduced. Banner, supra note 70, at 851.
210. A similar dynamic-the public's conflicting and changing views of speculation as either
immoral gambling or legitimate commercial enterprise--is also present in the context of futures
trading (as opposed to Banner's focus on securities markets), as detailed in ANN FABIAN, CARD
SHARPS, DREAM BOOKS, & BUCKET SHOPS: GAMBLING IN 19TH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990).
Larry Ribstein makes a related argument: Stock market bubbles facilitate fraud, and therefore,
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To be sure, as Banner reports, not all stock market declines in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resulted in new regulation. 211 This has
also been true in more recent times: The October 1987 stock market
break-the largest one-day decline in market history up to then-was not
followed by a significant increase in regulation. The SEC did attempt to use
the crisis to further its agenda and obtain control over financial derivative
markets, which it had sought for decades, but legislation expanding its
regulatory jurisdiction was not forthcoming.212 In contrast to the legislative
situations in the 1930s and in the debate over SOX, the 1987 market break
was not coincident with scandal or revelations of corporate misconduct.213
However, the significance of this factor is difficult to gauge, because no
such scandals accompanied the 1920 futures regulation either. Financial
turmoil thus appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the
enactment of market regulation, and the quality of federal legislative
decisionmaking in such an environment has consistently left much to be
desired.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The analysis of the empirical literature and the political dynamics
relating to the SOX corporate governance mandates indicates that those
provisions were poorly conceived, because there was no basis to believe
they would be efficacious. Hence, there is a disconnect between means and
ends. The straightforward policy implication of this chasm between
Congress's action and the learning bearing on it is that the mandates should
be rescinded. The easiest mechanism for operationalizing such a policy
when investors' gains disappear as the bubble bursts and frauds are revealed, increased market
regulation typically follows. Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HoUs. L. REv. 77, 80-81 (2003).
211. E.g., Banner, supra note 70, at 850.
212. Those products are under the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and are subject to a less restrictive regulatory regime. The efforts of the SEC
to shift jurisdiction from the CFTC before the market crash are summarized in Romano, supra
note 200, at 356-59. The SEC intensified that effort after the 1987 ,crash, maintaining that
derivatives (and its lack of regulatory authority over them) contributed to the crash. The SEC's
failure was not, however, due to legislators' consideration of economic research on the issue.
Rather, the status quo of dispersed regulatory authority was matched by divergent congressional
committee jurisdictions, which legislators protected, in keeping with the opposing financial
market interests they represented. See id. at 359-77.
213. The insider trading scandals of the 1980s began more than a year earlier, with the
indictment of Dennis Levine in May 1986, see Nathaniel C. Nash, An Insider Scheme Is Put in
Millions, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1986, at Al, and the indictment and plea bargain of Ivan Boesky
in November 1986, see James Sterngold, Boesky Said To Aid Inquiry by Taping of Wall St. Talks,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1986, at Al. Congress increased the penalties for insider trading in 1984
and 1988. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 1264 (codified
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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change would be to make the SOX mandates optional, i.e., statutory default
rules that firms could choose whether to adopt. An alternative and more far-
reaching approach, which has the advantage of a greater likelihood of
producing the default rules preferred by a majority of investors and issuers,
would be to remove corporate governance provisions completely from
federal law and remit those matters to the states. Finally, a more general
implication concerns emergency legislation. It would be prudent for
Congress, when legislating in crisis situations, to include statutory
safeguards that would facilitate the correction of mismatched proposals by
requiring, as in a sunset provision, revisiting the issue when more
considered deliberation would be possible.
A. Converting Mandates into Statutory Defaults
Were the SOX corporate governance mandates treated as defaults,
corporations would be able to opt out by shareholder vote. In this way, for
example, small firms for which the audit committee composition, nonaudit
services, and certification requirements pose substantial costs would be able
to sidestep coverage-in contrast to larger firms with lower compliance
costs, whose owners might perceive an attractive cost-benefit ratio from the
mandates and wish to retain them. This would be the easiest way to revamp
Congress's misconceived corporate governance provisions, because it could
be done by the SEC under its general exemptive authority, without
congressional action.
2 14
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 78mm (2000). It is, however, exceedingly unlikely that the SEC would
exercise its exemptive authority regarding SOX requirements for all firms. At the outset, when it
began to implement the statute, it did not appear that the SEC would contemplate doing so even
on a narrow basis for small firms, as exemplified by the agency's implementation of SOX's
independent audit committee requirement. Prior to SOX, the stock exchange rules that mandated
completely independent audit committees gave boards the discretion to have a nonindependent
director on the committee. The SEC's implementation of SOX not only restricted that discretion,
but also rejected even a de minimis exception, proposed by issuers, that would have exempted
trivial sums paid directly to a director or relatives or the business with which the director was
affiliated (because the SEC's definition of independence prohibits both indirect and direct
payments to the director). Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities
Act Release No. 33-8220, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47,654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788, 18,792-93
(Apr. 16, 2003) (codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29, 240, 249, 274 (2004)).
The SEC adopted the position of union and public pension funds, which opposed any exception,
even though SOX specifically provided the agency with exemptive authority regarding the
statutory definition of independence of audit committee members for "particular relationship s]"
as it deemed fit, SOX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 745, 775-76 (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-I(m)(3)(C)). Thus, when presented with the opportunity to mitigate
the effect of Congress's misconceived mandate on audit committee independence, the SEC in fact
compounded the error.
However, there has been a political backlash, intensified by the high costs of SOX
compliance, regarding several post-SOX expansive regulatory initiatives (unrelated to SOX)
undertaken by the SEC by a nonunanimous vote of the commissioners. In the aftermath of the
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State corporate law consists principally of enabling provisions that
operate as defaults from which firms opt out if tailoring better suits their
organizational needs. Firms can therefore particularize their corporate
charters, as well as pick the state code that best matches their requirements,
so as to minimize the cost of doing business, thereby increasing the return
to their investors. The defaults incorporated in state codes are those
expected to be selected by the vast majority of firms, which further reduces
transaction costs (because most firms need not incur the cost of
particularizing their charters). Transforming the SOX mandates into
optional defaults for firms would move the federal regime closer to the state
law approach to corporate governance.
From a transaction-cost-reducing perspective on corporate governance
regulation, it is questionable whether all, or even most, of the SOX
mandates would be chosen by a majority of firms and, consequently,
whether they should be structured as opt-in or opt-out default provisions.
Some pertinent facts lend support to an opt-in approach. States, for
instance, could have enacted similar requirements to SOX as statutory
defaults, but none chose to do so. Indeed, in the case of executive loans,
state corporation codes contained the opposite substantive default rule,
specifying the criteria for undertaking such transactions. The most
reasonable and straightforward inference to draw is that there was no
demand for the SOX mandates: If there had been a significant demand, then
the provisions would have appeared in at least some state codes.
In addition, despite state corporation codes' silence, firms could have
declined to purchase nonaudit services from auditors, refused to make
executive loans, and created completely independent audit committees
(prior to the stock exchange requirement of such committees). Many firms
chose not to do so, and the literature suggests they had good reasons:
Completely independent audit committees add no significant benefit over
2004 election, the backlash has taken the form of questioning the wisdom of reappointing current
SEC Chairman William Donaldson. Donaldson, in turn, has announced the formation of an
advisory committee to examine the impact of SOX on small firms. Jackie Calmes & Deborah
Solomon, Snow Says 'Balance' Is Needed in Enforcing Sarbanes-Oxley Law, WALL ST. J., Dec.
17, 2004, at Al. He also appears to have altered his position on a controversial initiative on
shareholder access, because the regulation's promulgation has been delayed. At the same time that
he announced the advisory committee's formation, however, Donaldson said that the SEC had no
current plans to review the statute's impact on larger firms. In addition, the senior staff's view is
that cost-benefit analysis of SOX provisions is inappropriate. Alison Carpenter, Complete,
Current Section 404 Disclosure Will Lessen Negative Reaction, Experts Say, 3 Corp.
Accountability Rep. (BNA) 62 (Jan. 21, 2005) (reporting on a panel at which Alan Belier, director
of the SEC's corporate finance division, responded to a panelist's proposed cost-benefit analysis
of the certification requirements in section 404 of SOX by stating that it was "wrong to focus on
analyzing the costs and benefits"). It is therefore highly doubtful that the agency will undertake a
full-fledged review of the SOX requirements, particularly if Donaldson's actions are considered
sufficient by the administration to justify his retention despite important constituents' opposition.
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majority-independent committees (and the benefit from even majority-
independent committees is an open question), purchasing nonaudit services
from auditors does not diminish audit quality, and executive loan programs
can serve bona fide purposes that benefit shareholders. Were the SOX
mandates rendered optional, firms that found them beneficial would be
unaffected, because they could continue to follow the SOX strictures.2 15 For
example, firms that did not wish to purchase nonaudit services from their
auditors could follow such a policy without its being mandated, and to
demonstrate a continuing commitment to that policy, they could opt into the
federal default provision.' 6
B. Returning Corporate Governance to the States
The absence of state codes or corporate charters tracking the SOX
mandates further suggests that board composition, the services that
corporations purchase from their auditors, and their credit arrangements
with executives-the substance of the SOX mandates-are not proper
subjects for federal government action, let alone mandates. Accordingly,
rendering them optional would not be as optimal as outright repeal.21 7 The
states and the stock exchanges are a far more appropriate locus of
regulatory authority for those governance matters than Congress and its
215. The menu approach is consistent with research suggesting that the optimal composition
of the board, and hence the audit committee, varies with firm characteristics and, in particular, that
firms operating in more complex or uncertain environments benefit from the presence of inside
and affiliated directors (individuals with firm-specific knowledge) and therefore from less
independent audit committees (because committee composition is a function of board
composition). See April Klein, Economic Determinants of Audit Committee Independence,
77 ACCT. REv. 435, 438-39, 445, 447-50 (2002) (providing theoretical and empirical support for
variation in audit committee independence by firm characteristics, such as growth opportunities).
216. Even before SOX, there were firms that appear to have followed such a practice
voluntarily. For example, many firms in the Kinney et al. study of audit firms' services did not
purchase any of the subsequently prohibited nonaudit services from their auditors, and a small
number of firms purchased no nonaudit services, including the tax- and audit-related services the
purchase of which SOX continued to permit. Kinney et al., supra note 39, at 574-75. It is possible,
however, that those firms were not deliberately shunning the use of their auditor as required by
SOX, but simply had no need for such services. For a discussion of nuances in the choice between
opt-in or opt-out default provisions because of asymmetrical effects of the state law charter
amendment process on managers and shareholders, see ROMANO, supra note 19, at 209-12 &
nn.405-08.
217. A basis for rendering optional the certification requirement is the disparate event study
data that suggest that only some firms' investors benefited from the information provided by the
certification. See supra Section I.D. One cannot draw any inference from the absence of such a
provision in state codes because the regulation of audited financial statements has been a matter of
federal, not state, law since the 1930s. Given its relation to the federal filing requirement, in
contrast to the recommendation to repeal the other federal corporate governance mandates, the
certification provision should be maintained as part of the federal regulatory system, albeit
rendered optional.
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delegated federal regulatory agents.2 8 They are closer to the affected
constituents (corporations and investors) and are less likely to make
regulatory mistakes. This is because they operate in a competitive
environment: Corporations choose in which state to incorporate and can
change their domicile if they are dissatisfied with a legal regime, just as
corporations choose, and can change, their trading venue.219 Moreover, any
regulatory mistakes made' will be less costly, because not all firms will be
affected.
Regulatory competition offers an advantage over a single regulator
because it provides regulators with incentives and the necessary
information to be accountable and responsive to the demands of the
regulated. That is because there is a feedback mechanism in a competitive
system that indicates to decisionmakers when a regime needs to be adapted
and penalizes them when they fail to respond: the flows of firms out of
regimes that are antiquated and into regimes that are not.220 This is an
218. For a more detailed explanation of why state competition for corporate charters is
preferable to exclusive federal regulation, see, for example, ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). The SEC's exercise of authority over exchange rules would
need to be eliminated or severely restricted for the stock exchanges to become an effective source
of corporate governance standards. This is because the SEC now uses its authority to force the
exchanges to adopt uniform standards that it considers desirable, which undermines the benefit of
exchange-based governance stemming from the market-based incentives for competing exchanges
to offer rules that enhance the value of listed firms. A better approach to exchange standards
regarding corporate governance is that taken by the London Stock Exchange, which follows a
"disclose and explain" approach: Listed firms are required to disclose whether they comply with a
code of best practices or, if they do not comply, to explain why they do not. SOX's audit
committee expert provision, section 407, takes a similar form. It is difficult to determine the
explanation for the difference in approach between the U.K. and U.S. exchanges, given the
institutional differences in the regulatory and market environments. That is, it is not clear whether
the difference is due to the SEC's preferences (because the agency can impose its desired form of
listing mandates through its oversight authority) or to the presence of multiple exchanges, the
competition among which could foster a product-differentiation strategy in which an exchange
benefited from adopting mandatory standards through which listed firms could signal quality to
investors. However, Jonathan Macey and Maureen O'Hara contend that stock exchanges such as
the NYSE no longer provide a reputational function (at least for domestic firms), which undercuts
the latter explanation. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Economics of Stock Exchange
Listing Fees and Listing Requirements, 11 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 297, 301-03 (2002).
219. Until recently, it was difficult to delist from the NYSE. See, e.g., David Alan Miller &
Marci J. Frankenthaler, Delisting/Deregistration of Securities Under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Oct. 2003, at 7 (noting the further easing of NYSE
delisting requirements in 2003); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal To Replace
Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 992 (1999)
(noting the recent dilution of the NYSE delisting rule, which, in contrast to other exchanges,
required shareholder approval for delisting). By contrast, a corporation could avoid the federal
regime by moving its operations to a foreign country or going private, but these are considerably
more costly strategies than the paper transactions required to change domicile or stock exchange
listing.
220. E.g., ROMANO, supra note 18, at 49. It should be noted, in this regard, that states can act
more quickly than Congress. For instance, the Delaware legislature responded to Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), considered an undesirable corporate law decision on director
liability, 1.5 years after the holding, whereas Congress has averaged 2.4 years when reversing
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important regulatory characteristic in the corporate context, because firms
operate in a changing business environment, and their regulatory needs
concomitantly change over time.
There are incentives for states to seek to retain more locally
incorporated corporations rather than fewer and therefore to respond to a
net outflow of firms: States receive annual franchise fee payments, and an
important political constituency, the local corporate bar, profits from local
incorporations.22 1 Exchanges, similarly, prefer more listings to less, because
listing fees are a major source of revenue.222 While even a monopoly
regulator is interested in increasing the number of firms subject to its
regulatory authority,223 the SEC has principally done so not by trying to
induce a voluntary increase in registrants by improving its regulatory
product but by either aggressively interpreting the scope of its authority to
include previously unregulated entities or lobbying Congress for a statutory
expansion ofjurisdiction. 24 Competing regulators, by contrast, can increase
the number of firms under their jurisdiction solely by providing a product of
higher value to firms. Thus, states can be expected to be more effective in
setting the appropriate corporate governance default rules than Congress or
the SEC. They have a greater incentive to get things right.
C. Providing Safeguards in Emergency Legislation
While this Article is focused on recommendations for rectifying the
specific policy blunders wrought by SOX, there is a more general policy
judicial opinions invalidating federal statutes. ROMANO, supra note 218, at 239 n.140. Although
the wisdom of the overruling is questionable, the Supreme Court's decision on the statute of
limitations overturned by SOX was decided in 1991, more than a decade before its statutory
reversal. That time frame for a reversal is consistent with the data in William Eskridge's
comprehensive study of congressional reversals of Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal
statutes: The average (mean) reversal occurred twelve years after the decision, with sixty-eight
percent occurring more than two years after the decision. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 338 tbl.1, 424 app. I, 450
app. III (1991).
221. ROMANO, supra note 218, at 28.
222. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 218, at 308 (noting that forty percent of NYSE
revenues in 1998 were from listing fees).
223. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 38-41 (1971) (describing bureaucrats' tendency to maximize budgets).
224. For example, the SEC recently proposed to regulate hedge funds, although they are not a
public investment vehicle. See Judith Bums, SEC May Widen Hedge-Fund Rules, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 29, 2004, at D9. It lobbied Congress successfully in the 1960s to expand its regulation of
firms trading in over-the-counter markets and unsuccessfully from the 1970s through the 1990s to
include stock-based financial derivatives in its jurisdiction. See SELIGMAN, supra note 203, at
293-323 (describing SEC activities leading up to the 1964 amendments expanding registration
requirements to firms traded over the counter); Romano, supra note 200, at 354-67 (describing the
SEC's failed efforts to shift regulatory jurisdiction over financial derivatives to itself from the
CFTC).
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concern: how to improve emergency financial market legislation.
Recommending restraint, such as resisting an immediate legislative
response in favor of more deliberate proceedings, while perhaps more
satisfactory from a policymaking standpoint, is simply not in the realm of
the feasible. Members of Congress cannot be expected to take no action in
times of financial exigency given the election cycle. Retaining one's public
office is an understandably powerful motivating force, and financial crises
are often accompanied by a media frenzy searching for scapegoats that
plays into public discontent and generates expectations of government
solutions (as occurred with SOX).225 A more plausible recommendation is
for lawmakers crafting emergency legislation to include, as a matter of
legislative convention, procedural safeguards to ensure that expanded
regulation will be revisited when more sober assessment is possible-after
markets have settled, the individuals who engaged in actual misconduct
have been punished, and scandals have receded a bit.
There are a number of strategies for implementing a regime of
safeguards, and the most appropriate mechanism may well vary with
statutory specifics. But one time-tested procedural mechanism that would
routinize the review of emergency legislation is for such legislation to
include sunset provisions. Sunset refers to periodic review of regulatory
programs, with termination possible if not renewed by Congress. It came to
the fore in the 1970s as a means of increasing congressional oversight of
the executive branch and has often been applied in nonemergency
legislative contexts. 6 It has specifically been used in financial market
regulation: The federal regulator of commodities futures was created as a
sunset agency, subjecting it to a periodic reauthorization process. 227 Sunset
is not without its own implementation difficulties (such as inflexibility in
the scheduling of reviews and the creation of workload problems for
Congress), which could impede effective review.228 In addition, review of
provisions like the SOX governance mandates might not be as
straightforward as review of federal spending programs for which the
sunset concept was devised. But such a review would nonetheless mitigate
225. There is considerable empirical evidence that the congressional agenda corresponds
closely to what can be called the "'public agenda,"' the issues considered most pressing in the
public's mind (as measured by opinion polls). Bryan D. Jones & Frank R. Baumgartner,
Representation and Agenda Setting, 32 POL'Y STUD. J. 1, 3 (2004).
226. See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 27-28 (1990) (describing how strife between the legislative and
executive branches during the Nixon Administration generated a number of legislative reform
proposals directed at improving oversight, one of which was sunset legislation).
227. See Romano, supra note 200, at 353.
228. For a discussion of the competing concerns about institutional and individual power by
members of Congress regarding oversight that caused the sunset concept to "fade[] away"
politically, see ABERBACH, supra note 226, at 207.
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the problem of quasi-permanent regulatory blunders produced by
emergency legislation that burdens financial markets, thereby impeding
capital development and growth, without any discernible compensating
benefit.
An alternative approach that would avoid some of the implementation
difficulties that congressional review would entail would be to impose the
sunset renewal inquiry on the agency designated to implement emergency
legislation instead. Under such an approach, the SOX governance
mandates, for example, would have to be reviewed by the SEC according to
a timetable fixed by the statute creating those requirements, such as at an
interval of three or four years thereafter. After its review, the SEC would
have to recommend to Congress the statute's renewal (which could include
suggestions for amendment). Without such renewal, the statute would be
automatically repealed. To exercise greater control over the administrative
review, Congress could require the agency to provide it with a written
report documenting the review process and justifying the decision. More
important, to ensure compliance in spirit as well as form with the sunset
provision, Congress could specify that the agency must collect and consider
the relevant academic research bearing on the regulation undergoing
review, with that analysis included in the required report to Congress. Such
a process would not only force the agency to confront a literature that might
be at odds with preconceived regulatory notions but would also improve
legislators' ability to evaluate effectively whether the agency's decision on
renewal was cost justified.
The probability is no doubt low that an agency administering
emergency legislation that expands its jurisdictional authority will
recommend that the legislation be permitted to lapse. An intermediate path
between sunset review conducted by Congress and review by the SEC
would be for emergency legislation, as a matter of course, to establish a
blue-ribbon outside advisory committee, consisting of academic experts and
representatives from industry and the investor community, to be appointed
by the President and the ranking party leaders in Congress within the
statute's sunset time frame. The statute would designate the committee to
undertake the entire sunset inquiry and report directly to Congress, or to
evaluate the relevant academic literature and the efficacy of the agency's
implementation and administration of the emergency statute in a written
document that the agency would use as a basis for making a
recommendation to Congress. Because an agency can be expected to be
predisposed to renew legislation for which it has expended effort on
developing an administrative apparatus, an independent expert advisory
committee should be a more objective assessor of the relevant literature.
Such a committee would therefore be more likely than agency review, even
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with detailed instructions from Congress on its conduct, to improve on the
quality of decisionmaking in the ex post review process compared to that
undertaken when legislating in crisis mode.
CONCLUSION
This Article has examined the substantive corporate governance
mandates adopted by Congress in the wake of the Enron scandals. An
extensive empirical literature suggests that those mandates were seriously
misconceived, because they are not likely to improve audit quality or
otherwise enhance firm performance and thereby benefit investors as
Congress intended. In the frantic political environment in which SOX was
enacted, legislators adopted proposals of policy entrepreneurs with neither
careful consideration nor assimilation of the literature at odds with the
policy prescriptions. The specific policy implication drawn from this
Article's analysis of the scholarly literature and political dynamics is that
the mandates should be rescinded, either by transforming them into
statutory defaults that apply to firms at their option or by removing them
completely and redirecting jurisdictional authority to the states. The more
general implication is the cautionary note that legislating in the immediate
aftermath of a public scandal or crisis is a formula for poor public
policymaking (at least in the context of financial market regulation). The
high salience of events forestalls a careful and balanced consideration of the
issues, providing a window for action by the better-positioned, not the
better-informed, policy entrepreneurs. This is a particular concern because
legislation drafted in a perceived state of emergency can be difficult to
undo. It took more than sixty years to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act, the
New Deal financial market regulation that is now widely recognized as
having greatly contributed to the banking debacle of the 1980s. The
problem would be mitigated by routinizing the inclusion in emergency
legislation of a provision for revisiting the legislation to determine whether
continuation is warranted at a later date when more deliberative reflection is
possible.
Congressional repeal of SOX's corporate governance mandates is not
on the near-term political horizon. Officeholders would not want to be
perceived as revising rules that are supposed to diminish the likelihood of
corporate accounting scandals. The alternative of treating SOX as a set of
default rules could be implemented by the SEC under its general exemptive
authority, but it is improbable that the agency will do so in a comprehensive
way, in part because it is still stinging from being perceived as lagging
behind state regulators in finding and prosecuting entire financial industry
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sectors for alleged misconduct.229 It is therefore important to work to
educate the media, the public, political leaders, and agency personnel
regarding the reality that Congress committed a public policy blunder in
enacting SOX's corporate governance mandates and that there is a need to
rectify the error.
229. E.g., Steve Bailey, Op-Ed, Asleep at the Switch, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2003, at D1
("As the scandals roll out across Wall Street and beyond ... the question 'Where was the
Securities and Exchange Commission?' is becoming part of the lexicon... . It has been left to
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer to uncover one problem after another in the securities
business and to show the SEC and its boss, William Donaldson, what regulation is all about.");
Editorial, Feds Flubbed Mutual Fund Oversight, NEWS TRIB. (Taconia, Wash.), Nov. 5, 2003,
South Sound, at B6 ("Asleep-at-the-wheel federal regulators have helped give 95 million
American investors something they don't need-yet another major stock market scandal to worry
about.. .. Congress should find out how the SEC allowed a scandal of this magnitude to slip
under its radar screen for so long-and require the agency to shape up."). As mentioned supra
note 214, pressure from legislators and the administration, responding to constituents dissatisfied
with the SEC, has led the SEC to create a committee that will report in a year on whether SOX's
applicability to small firms should be modified, but more broad-based exemptions are not on the
agency's agenda.
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Negative relation with variable
combining 100% independent
and two meetings a year
129 pairs of Financial reporting Negative relation with 100%
independent or absence of
firms, 1991-1999 misstatements or fraud financial expert on committee
No association with percent
independent or 100%
159 pairs of Earnings restatements independent; negative relation
firms, 2000-200 1 with financial expert on
committee
Earnings response significantly
Stock market response related to board independence
1241 firms, 2001 to unexpected earnings with no incremental
(earnings significance of audit
informativeness) committee independence
230. The studies in this table are cited supra notes 23-24. Jensen productivity is the change in
market value and equity minus a benchmark return on investment, defined as the change in net
property, plant, and equipment multiplied by the firm's cost of capital (assumed to be 8%).
Tobin's Q is the ratio of a firm's market value to the replacement cost of its assets (proxied for by
total assets). The results reported for Bdard et al., supra note 24, differ from those reported in
ROMANO, supra note 19, at 22, because the results in the published article, cited herein, are the
opposite of those in the working paper, Sonda Marrakchi Chtourou et al., Corporate Governance
and Earnings Management (Apr. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-275053, cited in ROMANO, supra note 19, at 22. The model estimated in
the article differs from that of the working paper in the following ways: elimination of all
governance variables except for those related to the audit committee; inclusion of a dummy
variable for an audit committee with 50%-99% independence; elimination of an interaction
variable for audit committee independence and level of activity; a different definition of audit
committee activity; inclusion of economic variables correlated with earnings management, such as
negative cash flows; and the use of a multinomial regression model using low earnings
management firms as the base comparison, rather than a logistic model.
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TABLE 4. STUDIES ON AUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE
23
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75 firms, 1980-
1991; 26 pairs Financial statement No association with percent
with audit fraud independent
committees
66 firms in high
technology, Univariate test: negative
health care, and Financial statement relation for 1000 independent
financial fraud in two of three industries
services, 1987-
1997 __________
Negative relation with 100%
300 firms, 1996 Aggressive abnormal independent and presence of
accruals financial expert; no association
with majority independent
109 large
Australian firms, Market value No association
1997
No association with percent
independent; positive relation
with proportion of financial
experts on committee in 1995-
119 firms, 1992- Financial analysts' 1996; no association with
1993; 130 in expert with accounting
1995-1996 (77 in score for quaity of background; change in score
both periods) financial reporting from 1992-1993 to 1995-1996
positively related to percentage
experts in 1992-1993 and to
change in number of experts
over the period
Return on assets; No association with percent
485 S&P 500 Jensen onuassety. independent and any measure;
firms, 1992; 486 oneneproductivit no stock market effect for
in 1993 one-year raw market change in composition ofreturn
committee
No association with 100%
692 S&P 500 Abnormal accruals independent; negative relation
firms, 1992-1993 with majority independent or
percent independent
51 firms withfinancial SEC enforcement Univariate test: negative
relation for 100% independent
problems pre- action or quarterly and for presence of accounting
1989; 77 control earnings restatement
firms expert on committee
133 firms Allegations of third-
accused of fraud party and government No association for percent
from 1978-2001 contract fraud; independent; positive
firm 1978- financial statement association for percent of
paired with no- fraud; regulatory "gray" (affiliated) directors
fraud firmsviolations
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250 U.K. firms, Market-to-book ratio;
25dorou 1994 stock return; No association
S1994 accounting measures
retal, 311 Times1000
(U.K.) firms, Tobin's Q No association
1996
No association; negative
282 S&P 500 association with proportion of
et al, (2003) firms, 1992, Abnormal accruals investment bankers or other
1994, 1996 corporate officers on
committee















2443 U.K. Discretionary fees and accruals;
2443 U.. faccruals accruals do not explain
firm-years, Audit fees; (simultaneous fees; positive relation
1994-2000; nonaudit fees; estimation of between fees; no






231. The studies in this table are cited supra note 39. 2000 data unless otherwise indicated.
Earnings surprises are defined as earnings meeting or just beating the consensus analysts' forecast
(that is, an indicator variable for a zero- or one-cent difference between reported earnings and
forecast). Small increases are earnings greater than surprises. Fee ratio is the ratio of nonaudit fees
to total fees (in Antle et al., Pringle and Buchman, and Li et al. the denominator is audit fees;
Bajaj et al. use both denominators). Jenkins uses the ratio of audit fees to total fees, but for
consistency in comparison of the results across studies, the table reports the results as if she had
used the same fee ratio as the others (it reverses the sign of the results in the paper). Total fees are
the total of nonaudit and audit fees. Client importance computes the fee measures (fee ratio,
nonaudit fees, or total fees) in relation to the auditor's total U.S. revenue. The Craswell et al. fee
ratio is the ratio of client audit or client nonaudit fees to total fees.
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Association between
Discretionary ratio and accruals is only
3170 firms Fee ratio; total accruals for income-decreasing(166 firms fee; ai tl (controlled for accruals; negative
in earnings fees; nonaudit performance); relation between audit
earnings fees and total fees and
tests) fees surprises or small increases; no other
small increases systematic significant
associations
No association; higher
100 pairs of Fee ratio; total Securities class fee ratio and nonaudit
firms, 2001- fees; nonaudit actions alleging fees for sued firms for
2002 fees; audit fees accounting subset of 33 firms with
improprieties the largest stock price
drop over class period
Client
importance
(ratio of No association; if use
1871 clients nonaudit and Frankel et al.'s model,
of total fees to Discretionary positive association
fig total accruals between ratio and
revenues); also accruals only for smallest










Australian measured at Qualified No association
firms, 1994; both national opinion
1045 in 1996 firm and local
office level
203 S&P 500 Level of
Fee ratio discretionary Positive associationaccruals
Fee ratio;
1158 firms nonaudit Going concern
(96 received audit fees; audit reportsfirst-time totalt fees-, (simultaneous
firt client (sim te No association
going importance fee model estimated
concern as robustness
reports) ratio and fees; check)
unexpected
ratio and fees
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Discretionary
accruals; news
Fee ratio; report of analyst
610 UK nonaudit fees; criticism or
decile ranking regulatory Positive association for
firms, of client's investigation all measure pairs except
averaged nonaudit fees into accounting; for decile ranking and






firms on Nonaudit fees Negative association
International standardized Qualified (higher ratio reduces
Stock by total assets opinion probability of qualified





1588 firms for ratio Earnings Association between
(5208 greater than .5; surprises ratio and surprises only
quarterly percentile (controlling for for firms with large
earnings ranking of large negative negative earnings; no





Fee ratio; between ratio and
3074 firms percentile Discretionary nonaudit fees rank and
(2012 firms client's earnings accruals and surprises;
innonaudit fees; surprises or negative association
tests) otal fees; surases between audit fees ranktotal fees; small increases adacul;ttlfe
audit fees and accruals; total fees
rank insignificant
4779 U.K. No association for Big
firm-years, Fee ratio Discretionary Five firms; positive
1992-1998 accruals association for non-BigFive firms

















and its interaction with
audit fees are included in
model, but when audit
committees are effective,








432 restating prohibited nonaudit
and 512 service fees; negative
nonrestating relation with tax services
firm fee- Nonaudit fees (permitted) fees; positive
years, 1995- by type of Earnings relation with audit fees
2000; 289 service; audit restatements and miscellaneous
pairs (76 fees nonaudit services fees
pairs for first (permissibility
restatement ambiguous); no
year) association in paired
sample tests
Total fees; fee Greater conservatism for
ratio; audit high-fee clients than for
5430 firm- fees; nonaudit low-fee clients (total
fees; client Earnings fees, audit fees, andyears, 2000 importance; conservatism nonaudit fees); no
unexpected association for fee-ratio
ratio and fee or client importance
measures measures
No association; positive
association for 8.5% of
sample using fee ratio
Fee ratio; and nondirectional or
client negative constrained
3424 firms, importance; Discretionary accruals, which group2000-2001 abnormal accruals has poor corporate
client governance features;






837 U.K. association in one
firms, 1988- Fenaio Quaified specification (nonaudit
1994 nonaudit fees opinion services increase audit
quality)





The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 114:1521
Nonaudit fees; No association; positive
177 large fee ratio; client Qualified or association in one year in
New Zealand importance modified one specification (higher
fin 2000, (total client opinion nonaudit fees increase
224 in 2001 fees to total probability of qualified
243 in 2001 revenues) opinion)
47 bankrupt Qualified No association




110 issued fee ratio;
restated unexpected Financial No association
financials); audit fees; restatements
some tests on unexpected
84 pairs of nonaudit fees
fims
6747 client Client dependence
firms at 499 Client Discretionary associated with decreased
offices of Big fluente ndctionary client discretion (loweroffiv fis in luenc  a  otal accruals) and in s m
Five firms, (ratio of client accruals; acrlsaninom
1996 (4952 log sales to volatility of specifications higher ratefor ccruls; log ale to olailit of of going concern
for accruals; total client accruals; going opinions; no association
going- sales of local concern if national rather than
concern- local office used for
opinion tests) influence calculation
4708
Australian Fee ratio; ratio Earnings No association




firms, Fee ratio Negative association
delisted
1989-1996
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TABLE 6. STUDY OF EXECUTIVE LOAN PROGRAMS
(SHASTRI & KAHLE, 2004)232
Type of loan Mean loan amount Mean Findings on incentive
(number in sample) (% secured) Interest rate alignment hypothesis
Ownership increases; much
Stock purchase (334) $2,500,000 (63.6%) 6.057% higher increases for managers
with low stock ownership
Stock option2 $1,700,000 (78.4%) 6.187% Ownership increases
purchase (246)
Relocation (91) $770,000 (75.3%) 3.910% No effect on ownership
TABLE 7. EVENT STUDIES ON
EXECUTIVE CERTIFICATION OF FINANCIALS
2 3 3
Study Sample Findings
No significant abnormal returns to any
portfolio; noncertifiers did not
Bhattacharya et al. 902 firms required to certify experience abnormal trading volume or
(2002) (of these, 22 noncertifiers) volatility; firm characteristics not
significantly related to magnitude of
abnormal return
Positive abnormal returns on
certification date; portfolio result driven
by early certifiers (when subdivided by
42 bank holding companies certification date, only early certifiers'
Hirtle (2003) (all certified by deadline) returns are significant); firm
characteristics of opacity related to size
of abnormal return but not to timing of
certification
232. The study in this table is cited supra note 48. It used a sample of 70 firms issuing loans
to executives from 1996 to 2000, for a total of 2018 person-year observations, of which 700 are
observations of executives with outstanding loans and 1469 are person-year observations for
ownership calculations. Percent secured for stock and option purchase loans is fraction secured by
stock; for relocation loans, percent secured is fraction secured by assets (purchased house).
233. The studies in this table are cited supra note 57.
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